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I. INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, countries have sought to improve their economies and
trade balances through a variety of methods. In recent decades, many
countries, especially the developing countries, have moved away from
protection of domestic markets toward diversification and promotion of
exports.I "Open" economies are believed to make economic sense.2 One
method countries have chosen to promote exports is the establishment of
customs privileged areas, more commonly referred to as free trade zones
or export processing zones.
These zones are primarily designed to attract foreign investors who
produce or assemble goods for export. The attractions may include the
following: tax breaks or tax holidays, relaxation of tariff barriers and
currency exchange controls, availability of abundant natural resources,
improvements in infrastructure or facilities designed specifically for the
* The author would like to acknowledge the receipt of financial assistance from the
following organizations or funds which, in part, made this work possible: The Schweppe
Foundation, Chicago, Illinois; the Research and Education Fund, Northwestern University;
and, the MacChesney Fund, The Northwestern University School of Law. The author also
would like to thank Professor Kenneth Abbott, Professor Steven Lubet, and Professor Victor
Rosenblum of the Northwestern University Law School for their helpful suggestions and com-
ments while this paper was in preparation. The author would like to express gratitude to the
following for their editorial suggestions and aid in the preparation of this manuscript: Dr.
Linda Kawano and Ms. Diane Curylo. This manuscript represents a reduced and edited ver-
sion of a thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the L.L.M. degree at the
Northwestern University School of Law, Chicago.
1. For a discussion of the new emphasis, see Wall, Export Processing Zones, 10 J.
WORLD TRADE L. 478 (1976).
2. Id. at 479-82.
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investor's operations, cheap labor, and promises that other laws will be
adopted or applied to benefit the investor.
Advocates of the zones consider these deregulated areas both a cure
for host countries' economic malaise and a means of spurring rapid eco-
nomic expansion. The phenomenal success of many free trade zones in
recent years has shown these advocates to be correct. Furthermore, the
success of the zones has led to greater acceptance of the zone concept.
As of 1982, 394 trade zones, including seventy-five United States foreign
trade zones and fourteen special purpose subzones, existed throughout
the world.3 Estimates show that during 1982, these zones accounted for
eight percent of world trade.4 Some estimate that as much as twenty
percent of world trade may be conducted with the help of the free trade
zones by the turn of the century.' In light of the fact that by 1982 ap-
proximately one million people were employed in trade zone operations,
the future impact of the zones will be tremendous.
Developing countries have been particularly attracted to the zone
concept and especially to one type of zone, the export processing zone.
By 1982, developing countries, seeking to ameliorate domestic unemploy-
ment problems or exploit abundant natural resources, had set up over
fifty export processing zones.7 For example, the labor-intensive electron-
ics and textile operations in the export processing zones of Southeast
Asia employ approximately three quarters of a million people.'
Despite their popularity and success, countries that have established
zones have encountered a variety of problems and much criticism. To
provide the proper climate for foreign investment, some countries have
had to make economic and legal concessions that have had a profound
impact on domestic society. Countries that are said to have made too
many concessions are viewed as being overly dependent on foreign trade
and thereby vulnerable to trade declines. Critics point out that trade
zones tend to attract only irresponsible multinationals which seek to ex-
ploit the host country's resource base and exact more concessions. Crit-
ics also argue that the most popular zones are in countries where the
protection of workers, protection of the environment, and other social
3. 1 W. DIAMOND & D. DIAMOND, TAX-FREE TRADE ZONES OF THE WORLD, at xv
(1980) [hereinafter DIAMOND & DIAMOND].
4. Special Trade Zones Increase Despite Critics, Chicago Tribune, Nov. 17, 1983, § 2. at
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interests are weak.9
This study will focus on the zones established in one developing
country, the People's Republic of China (PRO). The Chinese zones, the
Special Economic Zones (SEZs), were first authorized in 1979. China
now has four zones: Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shantou in Guangdong
Province, and Xiamen in Fukien Province.10 Although these zones are
relatively new, they are very significant. A little more than a decade
before the zones were established, China was enveloped in a social
revolution, one tenet of which was the elimination of capitalist influences.
Since then, China's anticapitalist position has softened and China is striv-
ing to attain the goals of its "Four Modernizations" program. The use of
the zones to achieve some of its modernization goals is a bold step for
China,1" not only because the zones encourage investors to utilize, and
arguably exploit, human and natural resources for capitalist purposes,
but also because the zones are complex, multi-purpose areas designed to
put China in the vanguard of the world's economies by the twenty-first
century.
To place China's trade zones in the proper perspective, this study
will review China's history of foreign trade, with an emphasis on the
Chinese treaty port system of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
This study then will examine the economic and political factors which
led the PRC government to decide that the economy would benefit from
establishment of trade zones in the southern and eastern coastal areas.
This study also will discuss the laws which provide the legal and regula-
tory foundation for the zones. Finally, an assessment will be made of the
Chinese zones, with particular emphasis on the Shekou Industrial Zone.
This study is not an investment manual; it does aim, in a limited way,
however, to provide the reader with a historical and contextual perspec-
tive on the new zones. 12
9. Id.
10. EcONOMIC ZONES IN GUANGDONG PROMOTE FOUR MODERNIZATIONS, 100 CHINA
REPORT, ECONOMIC AFFAIRS at 8, 10 Dec. 2, 1980.
11. Note that China is not the first socialist country to adopt a free trade zone. Romania
established a free port in Sulina in 1978. The Free Port ofSulina-Romania, J. COM., Oct. 22,
1979, at 7. Yugoslavia and Italy established a zone, the free trade and industrial zone of
Trieste, on the border between them. Dreyer, Europe's Manifold Free Zones Strive for Similar
Objectives, J. CoM., Nov. 13, 1978, at 2.
12. Many of the laws that the Chinese government have chosen to implement the zone
concept are vague and ambiguous. When this article refers to those laws, certain words and
phrases, whose meanings remain unclear, appear in quotation marks. When, however, the
language is clear and unambiguous, it has been paraphrased.
1986]
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II. FOREIGN TRADE AND THE ANTECEDENTS OF
THE SEZs: THE CHINESE TREATY PORTS
Western countries have had some form of commercial contact with
China for nearly two thousand years.13 Throughout this time, certain
factors have characterized the Sino-Western trade relationship. Western
countries generally took the initiative to make commercial contacts with
China. For the most part, China was the passive agent from which
others sought concessions. In accordance with its tradition, the West
claimed that peaceful intercourse and trade between nations were rights
which all countries were obligated to respect. In contrast, the Chinese
Imperial Court regarded such "rights" as favors which the Court could
withhold or grant. If a western country was granted the right to trade
with China, it generally sought extraterritorial status for its nationals
who would work in China. Western countries saw extraterritorial status
as desirable because they believed Chinese laws were applied in a dis-
criminatory, anti-western fashion and produced harsh results. The Chi-
nese government often granted extraterritorial status, not because it
considered foreigners as equals but because this status made regulation of
foreigners easier.
Another concession, persistently sought by western countries, was
permanent presence in the important Chinese ports. The Imperial Court
granted this concession, albeit in a limited form, again not because it
wanted to encourage foreign incursion, but because it sought to confine
foreign activities to a few areas and ultimately to improve the govern-
ment's control of the foreigners.14
The trade regulation system which China used into the twentieth
century was formulated at an early date. Some of the earliest traders to
visit China were from the Arabic empire and were subject to Chinese
government regulation. Their ships were required to put in at Canton
(Guangzhou) so that vessels and captains could be registered, manifests
inspected, duties collected, and smuggling activities curtailed. By the
thirteenth century, the main features of the Sino-Western port trade sys-
tem were in place. Trade was confined to certain ports (Canton and
Chuan-chou in Fukien Province). Traders were required to remain in
their quarters while in port and troublesome foreigners were disciplined
13. The Romans had the first trade contact with China via the silk route. Chinese ships
reached India and possibly Arabia by the fifteenth century. J. FAIRBANK, TRADE AND DIPLO-
MACY ON THE CHINA COAST 32-36 (1953).
14. For a comparative discussion of the Sino-Western trade relationship, see G. ALLEN &
A. DONNITHORNE, WESTERN ENTERPRISE IN FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 13-
15 (1954) [hereinafter ALLEN & DONNITHORNE].
[Vol. 9
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by other foreigners.15
Europeans first began trading by sea with China in the sixteenth
century. The early European traders sought to establish trading posts in
China similar to those which they were establishing in coastal areas
throughout South and Southeast Asia. The Portuguese are credited with
establishing the first trading settlements in China and the first permanent
settlement at Macao. 6 Other European countries followed in the wake
of the Portuguese success and, with varying success in the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries, tried to establish profitable trading ventures in
several Chinese ports. 7 By the late eighteenth century, China had solved
the administrative problems associated with multiport trade by confining
trade to Canton and strengthening the trade regulation system. 8
The late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries were marked by
15. J. FAIRBANK, supra note 13, at 46.
16. The Portuguese first encountered Chinese traders at Malacca in 1516. In 1517 the
Portuguese trader, Fernando Perez de Andrade, entered the waters surrounding Canton with
eight ships. The Portuguese were well received and the Chinese encouraged the initiation of
trade relations. More ships arrived and trade was begun at Foochow, Ningpo (where a "fac-
tory" or trading post was established), and Amoy. Three other ports were built near Canton,
one of which was Macao. Soon afterwards, the Chinese sought to improve regulation of the
ambitious Portuguese. The Court allowed the Portuguese to concentrate at Macao for which
the Portuguese paid an annual ground rent to the local officials. In 1573 the Chinese built a
wall around Portuguese Macao. In 1587 the Chinese set up a civil magistracy to maintain
fiscal and criminal control over Macao. H. MORSE, THE TRADE AND ADMINISTRATION OF
CHINA 297-98 (3d ed. 1967). For the extraterritorial aspects of Macao, see G. KEETON, THE
DEVELOPMENT OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN CHINA 3-4 (1928).
17. The Spanish established trade contact with China at Canton in 1575. In time, the
Chinese traded between the Spanish base at Manila and ports in Fukien province such as
Amoy and Chinchew. The Dutch arrived in China in 1604 and traded for some time at For-
mosa and Canton. The English came to China in 1637 and initially traded at Amoy and
Formosa, but later moved on to Canton. The French began to trade with China in 1688.
Americans began trading in China after 1784. H. MORSE, supra note 16, at 10-11, 298-302.
18. Initially, the trade regulation system in the seventeenth century was supervised by
local officials and an agent of the court. The governors of Kiangsu, Chekiang, and Fukien
provinces were delegated responsibility for regulating maritime trade in their respective areas.
In Canton, where most of the trade was concentrated, the Imperial Court appointed the first
"Hoppo" or Superintendent of Maritime Customs. Later, the Court appointed certain local
traders, the Hongs, to aid the Hoppo in discharging his responsibilities at Canton. Foreign
trade was restricted to only one port, Canton. The Cohong (Kung-hang, hang or hong means
business) was an association of Cantonese merchants who, as agents of the imperial bureau-
cracy, were required to oversee all foreign trade in the area, personally guarantee the traders'
conduct, sell goods, guarantee collection of duties, negotiate with foreign traders, control
smuggling, and lease spaces to foreign traders.
Foreign traders each were confined under the Canton regulation system to their own fac-
tories (used in the older sense to mean the residence or station of the "factor" or agent of the
home trading company). Under this system, the foreign trader lived at Macao or a nearby
location, traveled to Canton (usually in a group) for business, lived at the "factory" for the
trading season and returned to his permanent residence upon completion of the season. A
19861
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
an increase in Sino-Western trade, tensions due to the Cohong trade reg-
ulation system, and resistance to Chinese claims of jurisdiction over for-
eign traders in Canton. 9 Partially in response to these problems (and
famous set of restrictions on the freedom of Europeans in the thirteen factories was promul-
gated in 1760:
I. All vessels of war are prohibited from entering the Bogue [a river]. Vessels of
war acting as convoy to merchantmen must anchor outside at sea until their
merchant ships are ready to depart, and must then sail away with them.
II. Neither women, guns, spears, nor arms of any kind can be brought to the
factories.
III. All river pilots and ship's compradors [ship chandlers] must be registered at
the office of the Chinese magistrate at Macao, who will furnish each with a license or
badge which must be worn at the waist. No boatmen or other people must hold
communication with foreign ships unless under the immediate control of the ship's
comprador, and the latter will be punished if any smuggling occurs on the ship to
which he is attached.
IV. Each factory is restricted to employ eight Chinese [with certain tasks delegated
to each].
V. Foreigners are prohibited from going on the river at their own will .... They
must always be accompanied by a "linguist," [who] is punished for any breach of
rule.
VI. Foreigners are not allowed to address the officials directly; if they have any
representations to make, it must be done through the Hong merchants.
VII. Hong merchants are not to owe money to foreigners. Smuggling goods to and
from the city is prohibited.
VIII. Foreign ships arriving with merchandise must not loiter about outside the
river; they must come direct to Whampoa and must not engage in clandestine trade
elsewhere.
H. MORSE, supra note 16, at 303-04.
For a discussion of the trade regulation system which grew up in China in the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries, J. FAIRBANK, supra note 13, at 48-52. See also G. KEETON, supra
note 16, at 5-11; H. MORSE, supra note 16, at 302-07.
19. Foreign trading countries constantly confronted China with claims for extraterritorial
status. To further trade objectives and avoid having to police the foreigners, China conceded
to many of these demands. For example, some of the earliest treaties that China signed with
Russia, the Treaty of Nipchu of 1689, art. VI, the Treaty of the Frontier or the Treaty of
Kiakhta of 1727, art. X, and the Supplementary Treaty of Kiakhta of 1768, contained provi-
sions extending extraterritorial status to the Russian traders. For provisions and discussion,
see H. MORSE, supra note 16, at 195-224. Even without these provisions, the Chinese tended
to accommodate the interests of foreign countries by permitting them to apply their own laws
to their nationals. China made an exception only for homicide cases involving a Chinese na-
tional. In these cases, the Chinese based jurisdiction on the doctrine of responsibility (citizens
of the culprit's country were held as hostages until the matter was resolved) and threats of
boycotts of trade. European employers were allowed to punish offending employees aboard
the trading vessels. In non-homicide cases, trading companies were allowed to compensate the
sufferers without official intervention.
It is significant to note that both extraterritoriality and trade regulation became a problem
only when the monopolistic positions of foreign trading companies in China were compro-
mised by an influx of free merchants in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.
Without the large trading companies to exert control over their nationals, the Chinese were
forced to apply their own laws. See G. KEETON, supra note 16, at 27-47.
[Vol. 9
China Special Economic Zones
partially in response to the prohibited importation of opium by foreign
traders), the first Anglo-Chinese war (the "Opium Wars") was fought
from 1840 to 1842.20 The British victory in this war was significant for
several reasons. First, the treaties which ended the conflicts forced
China to make a series of important concessions to the British.21 Second,
the treaties between China and Britain were only the first of a number of
treaties. Due to its poor domestic situation and declining bargaining
power, China was required to enter into similar treaties with many other
countries.22 Third, Britain's victory signaled to the world that China
could be threatened and defeated with military power. As a result, the
first Anglo-Chinese war was one of a number of wars which China
fought and lost between 1840 and 1860. These losses forced the Chinese
government to make even more concessions.23
20. See L. CHIEN-NUNG, THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF CHINA 12-46 (1956).
21. The Treaty of Nanking ended the first Anglo-Chinese war in 1843. The "General
Regulations under which the British Trade is to be conducted at the Five Ports," the so-called
"Supplementary General Regulations," were published at Hong Kong on July 22, 1843. These
fifteen regulations outlined the procedure which a foreign merchant was to follow from the
time the merchant's ship reached the coast of China until its cargo was purchased and taken
away. On October 8, 1843, a supplementary treaty, the Treaty of the Bogue or Hoomunchai
(named for the river at Canton where the Treaty was signed), was entered into by the Chinese
and British. The supplementary treaty was considered to be the "keystone of the legal arch"
supporting the then-new British presence in China. The document clarified many of the most
difficult elements of the general treaty: the restriction of foreign trade to certain limits (art.
IV); residence and travel at the ports (arts. VI, VII); a most-favored-nation clause (art. VIII);
extraterritoriality and the extradition of criminals (art. IX); the stationing of gunboats at the
ports (art. X); the release of the Chinese islands of Chusan and Kulangsu after payment of the
indemnity (art. XI); prevention of smuggling (art. XII); the status of Hong Kong (arts. XIII-
XVI); and the local Hong Kong trade in small vessels (art. XVIII). It is interesting to note
that despite the attempt to clarify certain points represented by the supplementary treaty, two
versions of the supplementary treaty were produced due to the difficulties in obtaining a trans-
lator skilled in both languages. J. FAIRBANK, supra note 13, at 119-26.
22. After the Treaty of Nanking and the supplementary treaty were signed, the United
States and European powers sent envoys to China to request treaties (for trade relations) pat-
terned after the British-Chinese treaties. In July 1844 the United States signed the Treaty of
Wanghia with China. The United States at the time was second only to the British in trade at
Canton mainly because of the United States merchant's free trade status. The French entered
into the Treaty of Whampao with China in September 1844. The other countries which en-
tered into similar treaties with China through the nineteenth and into the twentieth century
were: Russia (1860), Germany (1861), Denmark (1863), the Netherlands (1863), Spain (1864),
Belgium (1866), Italy (1866), Austria-Hungary (1869), Japan (1871), Peru (1874), Brazil
(1881), Portugal (1887), Congo Free State (1898), Korea (1899), Mexico (1899), and Switzer-
land (1918). See G. KEETON, supra note 16, at 286-303; L. CHIEN-NUNG, supra note 20, at
84.
23. The second Anglo-Chinese war was fought mainly by Britain (France, the United
States and Russia also engaged in several actions) and China from 1856 to 1857. The growing
anti-foreign sentiment in the Chinese population and the foreign traders' securing of large
portions of the shipping trade business (especially in the coastal areas) without government
19861
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One of the major concessions which the Chinese government
granted was the cession of Hong Kong to the British. The British gov-
ernment sought the formal cession of Hong Kong in response to its per-
ception that British traders must have a nearby island base to which they
could retire in difficult times. Traders particularly welcomed the idea of
establishing Hong Kong as a British colony for several reasons. First,
Hong Kong had a deepwater harbor which was protected from typhoons
and accessible from both sides. Second, the island could be converted
easily to a safe and inexpensive location for the storage of goods. In time,
Hong Kong became one of the largest foreign enclaves in China and cer-
tainly the most influential in terms of China's economic development.
Another major concession which China was forced to make after the
Anglo-Chinese Wars was the abolition of the Cohong trade regulation
system, the government's traditional trade regulation system in the ports.
After abolition of the Cohong system, five so-called "treaty ports" (Can-
approval were significant reasons to restart the hostilities. The hostilities were ended with the
signing of treaties at Tientsin in 1858, initially by victorious Britain and France, and later by
Russia and the United States. Within two years, another series of engagements took place
between the joint British and French forces and the Chinese forces, leading to the eventual
capture of Peking and the routing of the Emperor. Separate treaties again were entered into by
Britain and France and China. In the treaties of Tientsin and Peking, China made a number of
concessions: eleven additional ports were opened for foreign trade (Newchwang in Manchu-
ria, Tientsin, Hankow, Nanking, Chinkiang, Swatow, Tengchow, Taiwan, Kiungchow, Kiuki-
ang); three square miles of the Kowloon Peninsula (on the mainland opposite Hong Kong)
were ceded to Britain; foreigners were given permission to travel and trade in the interior; and
warships were allowed to be at anchor and to patrol at all ports where foreigners were given
permission to trade. Overall the treaties of Tientsin and Peking formed the main substance of
the "unequal treaties" which dominated China until well into the twentieth century. China
not only lost territory and was required to pay an indemnity to the victors because of the wars,
but it also lost much of its sovereignty. L. CHIEN-NUNG, supra note 20, at 82-87; ALLEN &
DONNITHORNE, supra note 14, at 20-21.
The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 produced another significant defeat to China and
required China to make more economic and political concessions in the treaty of Shimonoseki.
China was required to recognize the independence and autonomy of Korea; cede Liaotung
Peninsula, Formosa, and the Pescadores Islands to Japan; replace all treaties Japan had signed
with China with a new one based on the treaties signed with the European countries; and open
four new ports for trade (Shasi, Chunking, Soochow, and Hangchow). In a subsidiary treaty
of commerce entered into by Japan and China, Japan was given the privilege to engage in
trade, manufacturing operations and industry in all the trade ports of China. Additionally,
after a customs duty was paid, Japan was allowed freely to ship any kind of machine to other
ports. Commodities manufactured by the Japanese in the interior of China were exempt from
all taxes. This treaty possibly had the greatest effect on the Chinese economy of all of the
treaties signed up to that point. Western countries had sought such treaty concessions since
they first began to trade with China. Because of the most-favored-nation clause contained in
all of the other treaties which China had signed with European powers, the privilege granted to
Japan was automatically extended to all treaty nations. L. CHIEN-NUNG, supra note 20, at
137-39; ALLEN & DONNITHORNE, supra note 14, at 24-25.
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ton, Amoy, Foochow, Ningpo, and Shangai) were opened to British trad-
ers.24 Access to these ports was actively sought by the British during
treaty negotiations because they were the main centers of trade on the
Chinese coast.25 Traders believed the treaty ports would facilitate the
export of goods from China and give them an opportunity to tap what
was perceived as the huge Chinese market for their imports. One aspect
of the treaty port concession, which often is overlooked, is that foreigners
were allowed to live in certain areas of the treaty ports. Because traders
not only worked but also lived in the treaty ports, they became wary of
their hosts. As a result, the trade and residence settlements26 became
segregated and well-protected. 27 The emphasis on security gave confi-
dence to even the most xenophobic traders.28
The treaty port system and the associated system of rights granted
to foreign nationals evolved during the volatile period of war, treaties,
civil unrest, and political change in China during the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries.29 The number of treaty ports grew from the initial
five to eighty,"0 with additional ports voluntarily opened by the Chinese
government. 3' The number of foreign concessions and settlements in-
24. Canton was opened for trade on July 27, 1843. Amoy opened on November 2, 1843.
Shanghai opened on November 17, 1843. Ningpo opened on January 1, 1844. Foochow
opened in June 1844. J. FAIRBANK, supra note 13, at 155.
25. For example, Amoy traditionally competed with Canton for the junk trade. Shanghai
was a well established port at the mouth of the Yangtse. Id.
26. The difference between settlement and concession areas turned on the differences in
the registration of land ownership. In settlement areas, such as the International Settlement of
Shanghai, the land remained on the registers of the Chinese land office. In concession areas,
the Chinese government leased the area set aside for foreign residence to the foreign power,
and the consular offices of that power subleased the land to his own or other nationals. ALLEN
& DONNITHORNE, supra note 14, at 267-68.
27. At Amoy the foreign settlement was on the island of Kulangsu which was separated
from the walled city by a harbor. At Foochow the foreign community was on the island of
Nantai which was outside the walled city and separated from it by a river. The settlement at
Ningpo again was outside the walled city and on the banks of the Yung. At Shanghai the
settlement was outside the walled city and on the banks of the Whangpu. At Canton the same
pattern was followed with the construction of an artificial island, Shameen, which facilitated
the defense of the area, access by water, and expansion. The merchants, and not necessarily
the consuls, sought the protection which such segregated settlements provided. J. FAIRBANK,
supra note 13, at 156-57.
28. Id. at 123-24; ALLEN & DONNITHORNE, supra note 14, at 14.
29. See supra note 23; see generally L. CHIEN-NUNG, supra note 20.
30. For a complete list of treaty ports in China, see ALLEN & DONNITHORNE, supra note
14, at 265.
31. In those ports opened voluntarily for foreign residence, foreigners only were allowed
to lease land for a maximum of thirty years. In such ports foreigners were allowed to reside in
any section. For a discussion and complete list of ports opened voluntarily by China, see id. at
265-68.
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creased to more than twenty by 1913.32
The treaty port system represents a watershed in Sino-Western trade
relations. From the foreign traders' perspective, the treaty ports were
vantage points from which to exploit markets free of duties, trade re-
quirements, and the application of Chinese civil and criminal law. China
also realized some advantages from the treaty port system.33 Foreign
trade increased and the treaty port system facilitated regulation of for-
eign trade and traders. For example, by restricting foreign traders to
certain areas, the Chinese government minimized contact between Chi-
nese citizens and foreigners. This was important to the Chinese govern-
ment which believed that contact with the West might lead to
confrontations, something that the weakened government wanted to
avoid.34 Furthermore, the Chinese found the extraterritorial status of
foreign treaty port settlements a convenient means of managing foreign-
ers. Because of their extraterritorial status, foreigners regulated them-
selves, and the Chinese government avoided not only embarassing
criticism of its laws by foreigners but also the need to make concessions
to foreigners.35
The treaty ports also served as a model for modernization and a
source of new ideas and technology. During the treaty-port era China
was in economic decline. The industrial revolution had given the West a
commanding lead, which China is still trying to reduce. The treaty ports
helped to close the gap by serving as gateways for the introduction of
western-style technology and institutions.3 6 The treaty ports also pro-
vided China with goods that allowed it to compete in foreign markets. In
fact, foreign investment in China was responsible for most of China's pre-
World War II economic moderization.37
32. Id.
33. See H. MORSE, supra note 16, at 198-99; ALLEN & DONNITHORNE, supra note 14, at
18.
34. T. TONG, UNITED STATES DIPLOMACY IN CHINA 53 (1964).
35. Regarding the foreigners' attitudes towards Chinese law, see H. MORSE, supra note
16, at 198-99.
36. For example, the first Chinese efforts at industrialization were initiated in treaty port
urban areas because of the Western activities and influence there. MURPHEY, THE TREATY
PORTS AND CHINA'S MODERNIZATION: WHAT WENT WRONG? 1-6 (Michigan Papers in Chi-
nese Studies No. 7, 1970).
37. A large share of the more modern sector of China's economy was made possible by
foreign investment. Most of China's railroads were built with foreign capital. Water transpor-
tation modes, iron mines, coal mines, and manufacturing industries such as saw mills;
shipbuilders; water; gas and electric works; tanners; and cigarette, soda water, and egg produ-
cers were all largely made possible with foreign investment. C. Hou, FOREIGN INVESTMENT
AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA 216 (1965).
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The treaty ports were a source of revenue for China, which collected
duties on products introduced into the domestic area from the treaty
ports. Furthermore, although foreigners removed profits from China,
some of these profits were reinvested in China. The presence of foreign
traders meant more potential customers for China's domestic products.38
Treaty ports increased employment opportunities for the growing Chi-
nese labor force and provided training in new production methods and
technologies.39
Despite the economic benefits of the treaty port system, it also had
some negative aspects. The treaty ports led to a feeling of national hu-
miliation. The ports, dominated by align western systems, demonstrated
China's ineffectiveness in controlling its own destiny. Furthermore, be-
cause much of the new technology would not have reached China if not
for the treaty ports, many realized that the Chinese economy was non-
progressive. Ideologically, the treaty ports became synonymous with
negative foreign attributes such as arrogance, gunboat diplomacy, and
religious prosyletizing.
In response to foreign dominance, a new nationalistic pride swept
the country which helped China become more economically competi-
tive.' Another arguably beneficial effect of the ports was their influence
on Chinese politics. The ports served as a focal point for political and
ideological dissidents, who viewed the ports and those sympathizing with
the port system as an evil that had to be eliminated.41
38. MURPHEY, supra note 36, at 30-31; ALLEN & DONNITHORNE, supra note 14, at 23.
39. C. Hou, supra note 37, at 217; MURPHEY, supra note 36, at 30-31.
40. The Chinese viewed the penetration of Western investment into the country as a chal-
lenge. The government, in response to the Western investor, established its own enterprises
and encouraged private Chinese businessmen to do likewise. To promote domestic competitive
development the government set up language and technical schools, sent students abroad,
granted monopoly rights to certain types of manufacturers, awarded official ranks to certain
entrepreneurs, and guaranteed dividends to stockholders of certain industrial corporations. C.
Hou, supra note 37, at 217.
It should be noted that the treaty ports did not create the type of nationalism and national
consciousness as similar foreign economic intrusion did in other countries of South and South-
east Asia. Instead they refocused the Chineses' insistence on their own self-sufficiency. MUR-
PHEY, supra note 36, at 22.
41. A number of China's political leaders over the years focused on the negative aspects of
the treaty ports. For example, Dr. Sun Yat-sen attributed the decline of the rural sector of the
Chinese economy to the economic penetration by foreigners. He blamed the huge drain of
money out of China on the "invasion of foreign goods," "invasion of foreign paper money,"
and profits or income taken by foreigners. Dr. Sun also attributed the poor life style of the
Chinese, the great number of unemployed, and the weakened state of the country to foreign
imperialism. Y. SUN, SAN MIN CHU I, 37-54 (F. Price trans. 1927).
Chiang Kaishek also criticized foreign trade and foreign investment in China claiming it
had a deleterious effect on Chinese society and the Chinese economy. Chiang argued that the
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Recent commentaries on the treaty port system, however, suggest
that the ports had a relatively insignificant effect on the country.42 Ac-
cording to these commentaries, the ports did not affect the majority of
the Chinese population and, from an economic standpoint, the ports did
not eliminate the Chinese merchant, alter traditional Chinese trading
patterns, or change production methods in the interior.43 Perhaps what
these commentaries have failed to consider is that, while the treaty ports
primarily affected China's coastal areas, the coastal areas were and still
are some of the most economically important regions in the country.'
Although the treaty port system lasted until World War II, its de-
cline began much earlier. After World War I, the defeated countries lost
their extraterritorial rights, concessions, and leases in China and eventu-
ally, as the defeated countries withdrew their extraterritorial rights,
China regained its autonomy regarding tariffs. Popular sentiment in the
West increasingly favored Chinese resistance to foreign dominance and
opposed Chiang Kaishek's pro-Western government. Several western
powers, sympathetic to China's efforts to control its own destiny, relin-
quished their rights. For example, the United States and the United
Kingdom gave up their concessions, settlements, and extraterritorial
rights during the Sino-Japanese War of the 1930's and 1940's. Between
1943 and 1947, other countries followed the lead of the United States and
United Kingdom. With the fall of the Kuomindang and the birth of the
People's Republic of China in 1949, the treaty ports and the traditional
style of foreign investment in China came to an end.
foreign intrusion crippled the national economy and made the economic lives of China's citi-
zens abnormal. The treaty port industrial and commercial system was said to have corrupted
the interior of the country because that system's effects were transported to the inner portions
of the country by the foreign railroad and steamship concessions. This brought ruin to the
existing handicraft, industrial, and agricultural systems. It was claimed that the foreign con-
cessions also corrupted Chinese traditional social and moral values. The opium-smoking,
gambling, prostitution, and robbery said to be prevalent in the concession areas was claimed to
have spread outside the treaty ports. From this influence, insincerity, procrastination, frivol-
ity, deceit, irresponsibility, and indolence were said to have arisen in Chinese society. K. CHI-
ANG, CHINA'S DESTINY 83-95 (1947).
Mao Zedong, while recognizing that foreign capitalism helped China's economy to a cer-
tain degree, claimed that it also destroyed the basis for China's "self-sufficing natural econ-
omy" and its handicraft industries. Imperialistic powers were said to have hindered the
development of China's own industries. Z. Mao, The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese
Communist Party, in SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG 80 (1954). MURPHEY, supra note
36, at 68-70; C. Hou, supra note 37, at 2-3.
42. MURPHEY, supra note 36, at 67-69; ALLEN & DONNITHORNE, supra note 14, at 18-
19; C. Hou, supra note 37, at 211-22.
43. MURPHEY, supra note 36, at 47-49.
44. C. Hou, supra note 37, at 215.
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III. CHINA'S SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES (SEZs)
A. The PRC Before the SEZs
The introduction of a "Four Modernizations" program by Premier
Zhou Enlai at the Fourth National People's Congress in 1975 was signifi-
cant because it signaled the beginning of a more open approach to foreign
trade. Until 1975, China had been relatively closed to foreign trade for
reasons related to its early economic development." To place China's
current modernization program (and thereby the SEZs) in the proper
framework, the PRC's early development must be understood.46
1. Pre-1975 History
The People's Republic of China was born on October 1, 1949, with
the ouster of Chiang Kaishek's Nationalist Party, the Kuomindang. One
of the main tasks of the new government was reformation of China's
economy. To rid itself of foreign control, China expropriated large capi-
tal, industrial, and trade holdings, and transferred assets to the govern-
ment or cooperative organizations.47 China sought foreign aid from the
United States to finance its economic development, however, when nego-
tiations foundered, China turned to the Soviet Union.48 China received
45. For a discussion of the effect these factors had on China's economy and foreign trade,
see A. Ho, DEVELOPING THE ECONOMY OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 9-39 (1982)
and W. KRAUS, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUB-
LIC OF CHINA (E. Holz trans. 1982).
46. Because the economic, political and ideological aspects of the new policies in China
are inseparable, this discussion of the domestic economic policies and foreign trade policies
which led to the establishment of the Chinese SEZs will deal with a variety of factors. A
review of the political developments that, in part, led to recent economic and trade develop-
ments in China appears in Baron, Uneasy Truce: Political Trends in Post-Mao China and Their
Implications for Foreign Trade, in CHINA TRADE: PROSPECTS AND PERSPECTIVES 22-47
(1982).
47. The expropriation program is discussed in W. KRAUS, supra note 45, at 14-15, 40-41.
Foreign entrepreneurs officially were tolerated and protected by the government but gradually
departed because of high taxes imposed on their enterprises, stiff competition from state-run
firms, and bureaucratic pressure placed on the firms' personnel. Compensation paid by the
Chinese government for some of the expropriated firms was minimal because of the large tax
debts these firms had accumulated. Id. at 40-41.
48. Both Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai sought aid from the United States during World
War II. The transfer of aid from the Nationalist government to the Communist faction was
proposed by United States embassy officials in China. In return for United States technical
assistance and capital investment Mao guaranteed that no confiscation or expropriation would
take place. The proposal failed, however, and China began to form closer economic ties with
the Soviet Union. W. KRAUS, supra note 45, at 12-14. At the initiation of the Korean War
and China's siding with North Korea in that conflict, the United States Department of the
Treasury froze all Chinese assets in the United States. One year later, the United Nations
imposed an embargo on China. The United States denied foreign aid to countries that did not
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capital and technical aid from the Soviet Union and Soviet bloc countries
and, despite contrary intentions, China's development plans were pat-
terned after the Soviet model.
During the 1950's foreign trade largely consisted of the importation
of machinery and equipment and the exportation of consumer goods.49
Through the 1950's China accomplished many of its objectives, including
eliminating its semi-colonial status,50 increasing production levels and
improving the quality of life. The Soviet-style emphasis on heavy indus-
trial development and cooperative agriculture, however, proved to be un-
suitable for a developing country such as China. Food and clothing
shortages occurred, causing general unrest and internal confrontations.
By mid-1960, Sino-Soviet relations had become strained and the Soviet
Union partially withdrew trade and technical aid. 1
To correct the imbalances created by the Soviet-style economics,
China pursued more appropriate policies. Without the foreign aid 2 for-
merly available to it, China followed the principle of self-reliance, made
famous by Mao Zedong. According to the self-reliance principle, devel-
opment could be achieved with existing resources and the labor of an
honor the embargo. A list of some 200 items was drawn up, and the coordinating committee
of the embargo, COCOM, prohibited the export of listed items to China. See A. Ho, supra
note 45, at 31-32.
49. A series of treaties and agreements relating to the purchase of Soviet industrial equip-
ment and goods and the construction of large-scale industrial plants by the Soviet Union was
entered into in 1954. In 1956 another treaty was signed which provided that the Soviet Union
would aid in constructing 55 additional industrial projects, and that the cost of this aid ($625
million) would be paid by the transfer of Chinese production. China and the Soviet Union
entered into a treaty on trade and shipping in 1958. The treaty extended most-favored-nation
status to each signatory for purposes of trade, shipping and other economic matters. A subse-
quent Sino-Soviet treaty of 1959 provided that the Soviet Union would construct 78 large
industrial projects and supply the necessary machinery and technical aid to make the plants
operational, for which China would exchange $1.5 billion in goods. See W. KRAUS, supra note
45, at 68-71, 114-15, 125.
50. The government, under its initial program, undertook the review of all treaties entered
into by the Nationalist government and foreign governments in order to recognize, revise or
renegotiate them. As a result of the review, the "unequal" treaties giving foreign governments
the right of settlement or special customs privileges in China were no longer recognized. Id. at
45.
51. With their withdrawal, the Soviets took the plans and documents for projects that
were currently being built, thereby stopping these major projects and causing great damage to
the economic development program. Id. at 125-28.
52. The aid given to China during the 1950's included the help of some 10,800 Soviet and
1500 East European experts. Ten thousand Chinese engineers, technicians and skilled work-
ers, 1000 scientists, and about 11,000 students were trained by the Soviet Union. The Soviet
Union delivered approximately $3 billion worth of industrial equipment and machinery, of
which sixty percent constituted turn-key installations. It was estimated that 130 to 200 instal-
lations were begun or completed before Sino-Soviet economic cooperation ended. Id. at 127-
28.
[Vol. 9
China Special Economic Zones
enthusiastic population. With the withdrawal of Soviet aid, China no
longer could remain isolated from the western industrial nations and im-
ports from the West increased. 3 Gradually, China's economy improved.
Failure of radical Soviet-style policies and the success of more mod-
erate policies led to the political polarization of Chairman Mao's radical
faction and President Liu Shao-chi's moderate faction. To regain polit-
ical supremacy, the radical faction initiated the Great Proletarian Cul-
tural Revolution in mid-1966. The aim of the Cultural Revolution was
to create a new society by transforming the existing superstructure.
Maoist and Marxist ideology, which preached rejection of tradition, ma-
terial incentives, and capitalism, was influential. While one of the early
goals of the Cultural Revolution was the expansion of production
through the Maoist concepts of self-reliance, that objective was never re-
alized. 4 Instead, the revolution grew violent, anti-foreign sentiment was
encouraged, and foreign trade slowed."
As the Cultural Revolution subsided in 1969 and 1970,56 China's
trade with foreign countries, particularly western countries, increased.
Western industrialized nations supplied China with equipment, grains,
and fertilizer. China's primary trading partner was Japan, followed by
Hong Kong and the Federal Republic of Germany.57 In 1971, the
United States lifted its trade embargo against China and attempts to nor-
malize relations began after the visit of President Nixon in 1972.
2. "Four Modernizations Program"
An important change in China's economic policy occurred in 1975
when newly-elected Premier Zhou Enlai introduced a two stage "Four
Modernizations" program at the Fourth National People's Congress.
53. The import of Soviet machines and equipment dropped severely, while China contin-
ued to export to the Soviet Union. The resultant trade balance allowed China to pay off all the
debts it had accumulated with the Soviet Union. Trade from Western countries initially con-
sisted of agricultural products from Canada, Australia, Argentina and France. By 1965, how-
ever, machines, equipment, and complete plants were being imported from Japan, Great
Britain, France, Sweden, and West Germany. Id. at 155.
54. It appears that those backing the revolutionary movement only used the production
goals to quiet the moderate critics of their revolutionary program, since no effort was made to
implement these goals. Id. at 180.
55. During this period, China was a net exporter of foodstuffs while importing iron, steel,
non-ferrous metals, and chemical fertilizers for domestic production purposes. See id. at 202,
tables 4.3 and 4.4.
56. The violent aspects of the Cultural Revolution ended with the victory of Mao's polit-
ical faction at the election of the new Central Committee at the Ninth Party Congress in April
1969. Id. at 205-06.
57. Id. at 203.
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The objective of the first stage of the program was "to build an independ-
ent and relatively comprehensive industrial and economic system" by
1980.58 The object of the second stage was "to accomplish the compre-
hensive modernization of agriculture, industry, national defense, and sci-
ence and technology before the end of the century, so that [China's]
national economy will be advancing in the front ranks of the world."5 9
To achieve these ambitious goals60 an "open economic policy" was
adopted. This policy required expansion of China's foreign trade and
importation of a large quantity of advanced technology and equipment.61
Despite the fanfare with which the Four Modernizations program
was introduced, the program was vulnerable to the political struggles be-
tween the moderate and radical factions, 62 and it foundered in 1976 when
moderate Zhou Enlai died. 63 Mao filled Zhou Enlai's post with a com-
58. Zhou, Report on the Work of the Government, in CHINA RECONSTRUCTS 21 (Mar.
1975) (speech delivered on January 13, 1975 at the First Session of the Fourth National Peo-
ple's Congress of the People's Republic of China).
59. Id.
60. The initial goals of the program were listed as: 4-5 percent average annual growth of
total agricultural output, 4.3 percent average annual growth in grain output after 1978, 400
million tons of grain output, 350 kilograms of grain output per capita, I mou (1/6 acre) of
stable high-yield farmland per rural resident, 32 million acres of newly reclaimed farmland (12
percent expansion), 10 percent (pws) average annual growth of total industrial output, 120
large-scale projects, 10 iron and steel complexes (3 entirely new), 9 nonferrous metal com-
plexes, 8 coal mines, with one billion tons/year by 1987 (average annual growth = 7.2 per-
cent), 10 oil and gas fields, 30 power stations (increase of 6-8 million kilowatts/year), 6 new
trunk railways, widespread use of diesel and electric locomotives, lightweight passenger cars,
greater capacity freight cars, modern high-speed passenger trains, extensive adoption of heavy-
duty rails, automatically controlled crossings, increased capacity bridges, introduction of com-
puter services throughout the system, mechanization of cargo handling, track maintenance and
construction, locomotive repair, improved management, higher labor productivity, improved
educational system, improved scientific research capacity and military modernization. NA-
TIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER, CHINA: IN PURSUIT OF ECONOMIC MODERNIZA-
TION 2-11 (Dec. 1978), quoted in Bennett, China's Economy: Where It Is Coming From and
Where It Is Going, in CHINA TRADE: PROSPECTS AND PERSPECTIVES 17 (1982).
61. The stated purpose of China's open economic policy was to "enlarge foreign trade,
actively utilize foreign funds, import advanced technology, and strengthen economic coopera-
tion and technical exchange with other countries." See UNITED STATES DEP'T OF COM-
MERCE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, CHINA'S ECONOMY AND FOREIGN TRADE,
1979-81, at 1 (1982) [hereinafter CHINA'S ECONOMY AND FOREIGN TRADE].
62. The moderate and flexible political faction headed by Zhou Enlai and Vice Premier
Deng Xiaoping supported the modernization program and advocated rapid economic growth
and the implementation of the faction's industrialization and modernization policies. The rad-
ical faction, that counted among its followers Mao Zedong and his ultra-leftist wife Jiang Qing
and her three associates (collectively forming the "Gang of Four"), maintained that ideology
was preeminent over practice and that revolutionary methods that further the social transfor-
mation of the Chinese population must be followed. See Baron, supra note 46, at 23.
63. The death of Zhou brought the ouster and criticism of fellow moderate Vice Premier
Deng Xiaoping in 1976. This was not surprising, considering the fact that Deng openly criti-
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promise candidate, Hua Guofeng; however, after the death of Mao in
September 1976 and the subsequent arrest of the Gang of Four,' the
modernization program again gained official support, and its implemen-
tation began.65
The Four Modernizations program was institutionalized in a ten-
year economic plan (1976-1985) announced by Hua Guofeng at the First
Session of the Fifth National People's Congress in 1978.66 The ten-year
cized the left wing faction and its emphasis on ideology. Deng sought realistic solutions to
problems. He was quoted as saying that it was unimportant whether a cat was black or white,
as long as it could catch mice. The criticism program against Deng was said to have been
engineered by Mao himself. Of Deng, Mao stated: "this man has no understanding of class
struggle. He has never considered it a main link. His theory of the black and white cat makes
no distinction between Marxism and Imperialism." See W. KRAUS, supra note 45, at 282-83.
64. Hua arrested the Gang of Four at the urgings of the moderate faction, a month after
Mao's death. With the leadership of the radical faction in jail, Hua assumed the chairman
position vacated at the death of Mao and announced his support of the Four Modernizations
program.
65. In August 1977, official recognition that pragmatism and modernization were replac-
ing the revolutionary programs came at the Eleventh Party Congress. See Hua, Political Re-
port to the 11th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (delivered on August 12
and adopted on August 18, 1977), PEKING REV., Aug. 26, 1977, at 23-57. Editorials appeared
which gave the modernizations program the requisite ideological-political-economic basis:
Building China into a powerful modern socialist country before the end of the
century is an ideal long cherished by the Chinese people, a behest of Chairman Mao,
Premier Chou and many revolutionary martyrs and a glorious mission history has
entrusted to the Communists and other revolutionary people of China. Only by
achieving the "four modernizations" can we put our socialist system on a solid mate-
rial basis, further improve the livelihood of the masses of the people, strengthen our
country's defence against possible wars of aggression unleashed by social-imperialism
and imperialism, and make more contributions to humanity. The "gang of four"
unscrupulously opposed the "four modernizations," causing very serious losses and
wasting a lot of our precious time. After smashing the "gang of four" and their
factionalist setups and removing their interference, we are able to work with might
and main in an energetic race against time. The Congress will certainly inspire the
whole Party and the people of the whole country to heighten their revolutionary
spirit still further, go all out, aim high and achieve greater, faster, better and more
economical results in building socialism and advance towards the splendid goal of
modernization.
Ribao, Honggi, & Bao, A Great Milestone-Warmly Greeting the Triumphant Close of the 11th
Party Congress, PEKING REV., Aug. 26, 1977, at 59, 62. A new Constitution of the Commu-
nist Party of China, promulgated also at the 11th National Party Congress, officially estab-
lished the preeminence of the modernization goals in China's economic plans. The General
Programme of the Constitution stated: "The Party must lead the people of all nationalities in
making China a powerful socialist country with a modern agriculture, industry, national de-
fence and science and technology by the end of the century." CONSTITUTION OF THE COM-
MUNIST PARTY OF CHINA (adopted by the 11 th National Congress of the Communist Party of
China on August 18, 1977), reprinted in PEKING REV., Sept. 2, 1977, at 16, 17.
66. An editorial published at the beginning of the First Session of the Fifth National
People's Congress stated the general purpose for the new plan as:
To accomplish the comprehensive modernization of agriculture, industry, national
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plan, which was given legal recognition by the newly-adopted Constitu-
tion,67 was as ambitious as the earlier modernization program.68 To
achieve the goals of this new program, the administration again empha-
sized an open approach to foreign concepts and trade,69 and China began
defence and science and technology by the end of this century so as to make China's
national economy advance in the front ranks of the world .... In the present day
world, being backward economically and technologically means being easily kicked
around. For a whole century following the Opium War, China was kicked around
and beaten. Unequal treaties humiliating the nation and forfeiting its sovereignty
shackled our beloved country. Why was our country subjected to such humiliation?
Why was she trampled underfoot? The corrupt social system was one factor and
economic and technological backwardness was another.
Ribao, Honggi & Bao, A Major Move in Continuing the Long March, Warmly Greeting the
Opening of First Sessions of Fifth N.PC. and First National Committee of C.P.P.C.C., PEKING
REV., Mar. 3, 1978, at 59, 62.
67. The Preamble to the new Constitution provided:
The triumphant conclusion of the first Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution has
ushered in a new period of development in China's socialist revolution and socialist
construction. In accordance with the basic line of the Chinese Communist Party for
the entire historical period of socialism, the general task for the people of the whole
country in this new period is: to persevere in continuing the revolution under the
dictatorship of the proletariat, carry forward the three great revolutionary move-
ments of class struggle, the struggle for production and scientific experiment, and
make China a great and powerful socialist country with modem agriculture, indus-
try, national defence and science and technology by the end of the century.
CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (adopted on March 5, 1978 by the
Fifth National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China at its First Session), re-
printed in PEKING REV., Mar. 17, 1978, at 5, 6.
68. The plan called for a new emphasis to be placed on agriculture, with 85 percent of this
sector to be mechanized and each member of the rural population to have one mou (one-sixth
acre) of farmland with yields guaranteed. By 1985 the agricultural sector was to produce 400
billion kilograms of grain and in each of the years of the plan have a four to five percent
increase in the value of the agricultural output. By 1985 China also planned to produce sixty
million tons of steel. Steel-making techniques, like other techniques of the heavy industrial
sector, were to be updated. Overall, the annual increase of industrial output was scheduled to
be over ten percent. During the period, the State planned to build or complete 120 large-scale
projects, including ten iron and steel complexes, nine nonferrous metal complexes, eight coal
mines, ten oil and gas fields, thirty power stations, six new trunk railway lines, and five new
harbors. China envisioned an overall establishment of fourteen industrial bases. Light indus-
try was also expected to grow and be able to turn out "an abundance of first-rate, attractive
and reasonably priced goods with a considerable increase in per capita consumption." Trans-
portation, communication, and postal networks were to be improved to meet the needs of the
growing economy. Hua, Unite and Strive to Build a Modern, Powerful Socialist Country -
Report on the Work of the Government Delivered at the First Session of the Fifth National
People's Congress on February 26, 1978, PEKING REV., Mar. 10, 1978 at 7, 9.
69. Despite official approval of the plan, the plan had enough critics to require ideological
justification. Publications at the time stated that Lenin recognized the need for foreign help to
develop the Soviet economy because, "without equipment, without machinery obtained from
capitalist countries, we cannot do this [to restore the economy and place the Soviet power
firmly on its feet] rapidly. And we should not grudge the capitalist a little extra profit if only
we can effect this restoration.'" To pay for this help, Lenin was quoted as saying:
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a massive purchasing program abroad.
In 1978 and 1979, China entered into trade agreements with its ma-
jor trading partners, hoping that these agreements would help China to
achieve its economic objectives. By the close of 1978, however, the Chi-
nese leadership realized that the modernization program was overly am-
bitious in an economy primarily based on an outmoded Soviet model.
The ambitious nature of the program is illustrated by the fact that China
would have needed fifty to sixty billion dollars to complete its purchasing
and construction plans.70 Expenditures of this size would have meant
that China would have to sacrifice badly-needed domestic programs,
such as infrastructure improvement and consumer-oriented production
programs.71
Theoretically I say, it is absolutely clear that it would be to our advantage to pay off
European capital with a few score or hundreds of millions, which we could give it in
order to augment, in the shortest possible time, our stocks of equipment, materials,
raw materials and machinery for the purpose of restoring our large-scale industry.
Why China Imports Technology and Equipment, PEKING REv., Oct. 13, 1978, at 11, 12.
Chairman Mao was quoted as having stood for "making foreign things serve China." Id.
Despite the fact that increased foreign help, on its face, seemed to compromise Mao's well
known self reliance principle (see Sarker, Mao Tse-Tung: Apostle of National Self-Reliance,
133 COMMERCE (BOMBAY) 509-11 (1976)), the administration said that Mao recognized the
need for learning from foreign countries. For example, Mao, on the eve of the founding of the
People's Republic of China, was quoted as saying:
The serious task of economic construction lies before us. We shall soon put aside
some of the things we know well and be compelled to do things we don't know well
.... [W]e must learn what we do not know. We must learn to do economic work
from all who know how, no matter who they are. We must esteem them as teachers,
learning from them respectfully and conscientiously. We must not pretend to know
when we do not know. We must not put on bureaucratic airs. If we dig into a
subject for several months, for a year or two, for three or five years, we shall eventu-
ally master it.
See Chairman Hua Kuo-feng's Speech At the National Finance and Trade Conference on
Learning From Taching and Tachai, (July 7, 1978), PEKING REv., July 28, 1978, at 6, 14. As
to increased foreign trade, Vice-Chairman Li Hsien-hien stated that it was China's objective to
"assimilate as far as possible everything good from other countries in the world," and "enable
our people to adopt as quickly as possible the most advanced techniques and methods to de-
velop production and strengthen our hand in self-reliance." Vice-Chairman Li Hsien-hien on
Finance and Trade, PEKING REV., July 28, 1978, at 15. Premier Zhou was said to have real-
ized that by importing advanced technology and equipment China would not have to depend
entirely on foreigners. In regard to foreign-made equipment, Zhou stated that China must
"learn to use it and then critically analyse its strong points and weak points and improve upon
it." Why China Imports Technology and Equipment, supra, at 12.
70. See W. KRAus, supra note 45, at 289; CHINA's ECONOMY AND FOREIGN TRADE,
supra note 61, at 2. This much was needed because tens of thousands of construction projects,
including 1500 medium and large-sized projects, were undertaken simultaneously. Id.
71. To support the massive industrial complexes planned under the modernization pro-
gram, China would have had to make equally massive improvements in the supporting trans-
portation networks, energy production facilities, housing units for workers, and educational
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As a result, at the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central
Committee of the Communist Party of China, the leadership decided to
replace the original modernization plan with a readjustment program. In
April 1979 guidelines were published for the readjustment, consolidation,
reform, and improvement of the national economy. A "Three-Year Pro-
gram of Economic Readjustment (1979-81)," which aimed to improve
the efficiency of existing economic units and planning and management
systems, and to reexamine priorities, was adopted. The program also
evaluated plans for capital construction to determine whether the
planned projects were feasible. As a result, approximately 600 medium
and large scale capital construction projects were cancelled or suspended
in 1979 and 1980, and the budget for future projects was sharply
decreased.72
For China to realize its new goal of "Chinese-style economic mod-
ernization," the administration implemented an innovative open-eco-
nomic policy and a new foreign trade policy.7 3 Foreign trade no longer
would consist solely of large scale importation by China. Instead, China
sought to implement policies of "exporting first, integrating imports with
facilities to train workers and managers. Baron, supra note 46, at 32. The administration also
could no longer ignore the growing domestic demand and need for consumer goods. As the
Chinese economy improved, so did the average worker's ability to purchase what were consid-
ered luxury consumer items. Consumer goods also became the government's lure to encourage
workers to increase their productivity. The government touted new principles such as: "from
each according to his ability;" "[hie who does not work, neither shall he eat;" "an equal
amount of products for an equal amount of labour;" and, "to each according to his work."
Because necessities (e.g., food, medical care, etc.) were virtually guaranteed, the government
had only consumer goods to spur on workers to greater production levels. Integrating Moral
Encouragement with Material Rewards, PEKING REV., April 21, 1978, at 6. While the incen-
tive structure seemed capitalistic, China presented it as an aid in the elimination of capitalism
(see Implementing the Socialist Principle "To Each According to His Work," PEKING REV.,
August 4, 1978, at 6-15. To institute the program, China was forced to awaken a light indus-
trial sector, then dormant, that produced consumer-oriented goods and thereby divert eco-
nomic resources from its modernization program. Baron, supra note 46, at 33.
72. CHINA'S ECONOMY AND FOREIGN TRADE, supra note 61, at 2.
73. Premier Hua Guofeng indicated the need for and scope of such policies:
Economic exchanges between countries and the import of technology are indispensa-
ble, major means by which countries develop their economy and technology. It is all
the more necessary for developing countries to import advanced technology in a
planned way in order to catch up with those economically developed. In order to
accelerate the four modernizations, while resolutely maintaining independence and
self-reliance as our main premise, we must work hard to learn all that is worthwhile
from foreign countries, selectively import advanced technology of which we are ur-
gently in need, and not wall our country off from international exchanges. Both in
the three-year period of economic readjustment and in subsequent years, we shall be
taking energetic steps to develop foreign trade, expand economic co-operation and
technical exchange with foreign countries and employ various appropriate means,
current in international practice, to absorb funds from abroad.
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exports, and striving to achieve a balance between imports and ex-
ports,"'74 and of relying mainly on its own efforts while seeking external
assistance when necessary." As for imported technology, China adopted
a principle of "first use them; second, study them; third, transform them;
and fourth, create new things."76 Imports that permitted China to in-
crease its exports and earn foreign exchange reserves were given a high
priority.
77
Hua, Report on the Work of the Government (delivered at the Second Session of the Fifth Na-
tional People's Congress on June 18, 1979), BEIING REV., July 6, 1979, at 5.
In the cited report, Hua defined the terms of the new economic program. Readjustment
was defined by Hua to mean:
making conscientious efforts to rectify the serious disproportions in our economy
caused by long years of interference and sabotage by Lin Biao and the gang of four,
to bring about relatively good co-ordination in the growth of agriculture and light
and heavy industries and of the various industrial branches, and to maintain a proper
ratio between accumulation and consumption.
Id. Restructuring was defined as "an overall reform of the structure of economic management,
carried out firmly and step by step." Id. at 12. Consolidation consisted of "a resolute and
effective shake-up in the existing enterprises, and especially those in which management is in
confusion." Improvement meant "raising as much as possible the levels of production, tech-
nology and management." Id. at 13.
74. Minister Li Qiang on Expanding China's Foreign Trade to Speed Up the Four Modern-
izations, BEIING REv., April 27, 1979, at 15.
75. Id. at 16.
76. Some Questions on Developing Economic and Technological Exchanges with Foreign
Countries, BEIJING REV., April 27, 1979, at 17.
77. Yu, Arrangements for the 1979 National Economic Plan, BEIJING REV., July 20, 1979,
at 7. To support the change in policy, favorable actions and remarks of Xiao, Zhou, and Lenin
were published. Vice-Minister in charge of the State Planning Commission, Guo Ming, stated
that Mao had spoken many times, before and after the PRC was founded in 1949, about the
question of getting external assistance, establishing trade, and learning from other countries.
Guo Ming pointed out that under Mao and Zhou technology was imported on a large scale
three times in the history of the country: in the early 1950s with the importation of equipment
from the Soviet Union and East European countries; in 1962-1965 with the importation of
technology and equipment from Japan and Western Europe; and, in 1973-1977, with the im-
portation of complete sets of equipment from Japan and Western Europe. Id. at 13. Leninist
ideology was said to be in agreement with the use by the proletariat of the technology and
capital of the capitalist countries to develop its own economy and to speed up socialist con-
struction. Lenin stated that the proletariat "could not retain power by dictatorship, by force,
by coercion alone; power can be maintained only by adopting the whole experience of cultured,
technically-equipped, progressive capitalism and by enlisting the services of all these people."
Lenin was said to have recognized a need for the importation and use of the advanced science,
technology, experience in production and management and cultural achievements of the devel-
oped capitalist countries in order to turn around a backward national economy. Following
Lenin's proposals, the Soviet Union was said to have imported large quantities of machinery
and equipment, especially from capitalist countries; signed contracts with capitalist countries
for technical assistance in designing, equipping, and building certain engineering projects;
made use of foreign loans; and set up joint-stock companies with foreign capital. Though
seeking outside help, Lenin was said to have adhered to the principles of independence, keep-
ing the initiative in one's own hands politically and making economic concessions, provided
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To implement the new policies, a variety of innovative steps were
taken. The bureaucracy was streamlined to make domestic foreign trade
agencies more efficient. Decision-making was delegated to local foreign
trade and export companies, so that these companies better could take
advantage of changing trade conditions. A special export firm and sev-
eral new companies were organized so that foreign traders and domestic
producers could, for the first time, have direct contact with each other.
The China International Trust and Investment Corporation (CITIC) was
established under the State Council to attract foreign capital and import
advanced technology and equipment.7 8 CITIC was given authority to
negotiate and enter into short or long-term joint venture agreements and
other contracts. CITIC was also authorized to act as an intermediary
between Chinese and foreign economic units and individuals.7 9 As an
incentive to domestic exporters, the share of profits that export firms
could return from their operations was increased from five percent to
fifteen percent and, finally, to twenty percent. It was hoped that the in-
creased percentage would, encourage exporters to increase production
and, in the long run, enable them to import new equipment to replace
their own outdated machinery.80
To increase foreign trade, China also entered into trade agreements
with its major trading partners. These agreements were important be-
cause they allowed China to obtain both government and private credits
(which former Chinese administrations had not considered advisable).
For example, one of China's major trading partners, the United States,
entered into a commercial treaty with China in 19798" and gave China
the fundamental interests of the proletariat were not infringed upon. To critics who claimed
Lenin's attitude to the capitalists indicated he was "going capitalist," Lenin was said to have
remarked: "Every class-conscious worker should expose and send packing those who shout
about our having 'lost faith in the forces of the working class' because these tub-thumpers are
actually the accomplices of the bourgeoisie and the landowners." See Lenin on Assimilating
Good Foreign Things, BEIJING REV., July 27, 1979, at 12-13. For additional ideological refer-
ences, see Xu, Only Socialism Can Save China, BEIJING REV., Sept. 28, 1979, at 20-23.
78. China International Trust and Investment Corporation, BEIJING REV., Oct. 19, 1979,
at 4.
79. As an intermediary, CITIC was allowed to accept or raise funds from abroad for
investment purposes in China (by issuing debentures of the corporation or by serving as agents
in the issue of the shares in the investment) and to handle trustee business of short-term or
long-term duration in China. It was also empowered to act as an agent under contract with
foreign manufacturers and merchants who sought to import advanced technology and equip-
ment into China. Additionally, CITIC was delegated the authority to engage in joint ventures
inside and outside China or even make investments itself. Id. at 5.
80. A discussion of the bureaucratic reforms initiated by the government in order to facili-
tate foreign trade appears in W. KRAUS, supra note 45, at 287-89.
81. Initially, the United States and China announced their intentions to normalize rela-
tions on December 15, 1978. The establishment of diplomatic relations began on January 1,
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most-favored-nation (MFN) status in early 1980, lowering tariffs on
nearly 5000 types of Chinese export items.82 Subsequently, the United
States granted China a two billion dollar credit from the Export-Import
Bank so that China could purchase capital equipment from the United
States. 83 Bilateral trade between the two countries increased dramati-
cally,84 and the United States ranked second only to Hong Kong in terms
of total trade with China.
China had rejected foreign participation in its production enter-
prises since the treaty port days when cooperative efforts had led to con-
flicts. In the late 1970's, however, foreign participation to further
countertrade objectives was not only permitted by China but required.
Because China anticipated countertrade would play an important role in
its export-oriented economy, the concept must be briefly explained.
Countertrade (CT) is a trade agreement in which a foreign trader
"sells" a country the equipment, technology, or expertise needed to man-
ufacture a product. The country "compensates" the foreign trader with
goods manufactured with the imported equipment. Generally, the trans-
action does not involve money. China has attempted to base its foreign
1979, with the exchange of ambassadors on March 1, 1979. On July 7, 1979, an agreement on
trade relations between the United States and the PRC was signed by representatives of both
countries. The text of the relevant documents is reprinted in CHINA UNITED STATES POLICY
SINCE 1945, 341-43, 352-54 (1980).
82. Congressional approval of the U.S.-China Trade Agreement, along with the necessary
extension of most-favored-nation status, came on January 24, 1980. Id. at 72.
83. A. Ho, supra note 45, at 35.
84. U.S.-CHINA TRADE, 1972-80 (millions U.S. dollars)










Adapted from Table 7 in Ho, supra note 45, at 37 and Table 5.5 in Kraus, supra note 45, at
251.
This dramatic increase and the overall increase in United States-Sino trade, which has taken
place since normalization of relations began in 1971, has been followed by other countries.
The European Community granted most-favored-nation status to China in 1978, and duties
were reduced in 1980. Japan entered into a trade agreement with China in 1978 for the pur-
pose of oil exploration and production. A loan was made available to support the project by
the Japanese Export-Import Bank. In 1979 Great Britain, France, West Germany, Italy, Swe-
den, Canada and Japan all had signed credit agreements with the Bank of China to finance
China's imports. See W. KRAUS, supra note 45, at 288-89.
1986]
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
trade on CT, as have other developing countries, Eastern European
countries, and the Soviet Union, because CT offers several advantages.8 5
For example, China needed modern equipment and technology to im-
prove its economy, yet had only limited foreign exchange reserves with
which to purchase the desired imports. Through CT, China could obtain
the technology it sought using balanced nonmonetary transactions.8 6 In-
dicating a willingness to enter into alternative trade arrangements, China
pursued four types of CT transactions: compensation trade, export
processing, cooperative ventures, and counterpurchase.87
Another novel step which China took at this time was to change its
85. In general, one advantage of CT is that, because it requires no money, and the amount
of imports are ultimately balanced by the amount of exports, a country involved in CT does
not have to worry about balance of payment or currency problems. Second, because CT re-
sults in goods being produced by the host country which are taken by the foreign trader and
eventually sold by it in foreign markets, the host country gets market penetration in countries
it may never have entered before. Third, in order for the foreign trader to sell the goods made
by the host country, it often must market and advertise them, processes of which the major
countertrade countries generally have only a rudimentary understanding. Finally, after the
CT deal is finished (i.e., the host country has given the agreed quantity of goods to the foreign
trader), the host country obtains a fully operational and generally modem production plant.
For a discussion of these and other reasons that account for the popularity of CT, see
Weigand, Apricots for Ammonia: Barter, Clearing, Switching, and Compensation in Interna-
tional Business, 22 CAL. MGMT. REV. 33 (1979).
86. Dennis, The Countertrade Factor in China's Modernization Plan, 17 COLUM. J.
WORLD Bus. 67, 69 (1982).
87. Compensation trade is the simplest type of CT and is defined as a deal "in which one
partner agrees to help a second partner enter a particular type of business and is paid in the
fruits of that business." Weigand, supra note 85, at 37. To illustrate this form of CT, a British
toy manufacturer furnished the PRC with $50 million worth of machinery and molds to make
toys. The Chinese paid for the imports half in resultant toys and half in cash. The British also
obtained the sole right to sell the toys in Britain for ten years and in the United States for three
years. Id. In such a deal, the foreign trader gives the host country technical help for a number
of years until production is problem-free. See also Dennis, supra note 86, at 70; Importing
Technology: Plans Readjusted, Policy Unchanged, BEIJING REV., July 27, 1979, at 10-11 [here-
inafter Importing Technology].
Export processing can be one of two types of licensing arrangements. In one type
(lailiaojiaqong), the foreign party supplies all the raw materials and packaging required by the
production or supplies a smaller amount and pays for all of that supplied by the Chinese
manufacturer. This type of export processing is used in Hong Kong to make electronic goods
or garments. In the other type of export processing (laiyangjiagong), the foreign party only
supplies samples or specifications from which the Chinese manufacturer produces the goods.
The trader in this case pays a charge for the processing and costs of raw materials. Textiles are
currently made in China for foreign parties according to their specifications and with their
labels attached. With such processing, China hoped to improve the quality of its exports,
improve designs of existing products and learn about foreign market requirements. Dennis,
supra, at 70; Importing Technology, supra, at 11.
In cooperative ventures, the foreign party still supplies the necessary equipment and tech-
nology, but both parties enter into a contractual arrangement detailing which party supplies
the labor, raw materials or components needed to make the product and explaining the man-
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legal system from an informal, regulatory system to a formal, western-
like structure. The change sought basically to provide a more favorable
investment climate for the legally-minded foreign trader.
Traditionally, written law played a limited role in Chinese society.
Conflicts were resolved through means such as intervention of the family,
village elders, or local associations. The teachings of Confucius provided
the standards by which individual conduct was judged.81 In pre-Repub-
lican China (before 1911), written law was used only when other means
of social control failed.89 The dynastic codes, sets of laws or decrees
adopted by various Chinese dynasties since the third century B.C., did
not govern private relations, but only relations between the individual
and the state.90
At the beginning of the twentieth century, China recognized that an
industrialized, commercial society required an intricate legal system and
undertook legal reform.9" To impose the system on foreigners (and
ner in which the resultant product is divided. Joint ventures in China are typically cooperative
ventures. Dennis, supra, at 71; Importing Technology, supra, at 11.
Counterpurchase, the most common form of CT in China today, involves two separate
contracts negotiated between two or more parties which link the sale of goods produced under
one contract with the purchase of goods imported under the other contract. Dennis, supra, at
70.
China has indicated its willingness to enter into other cooperative arrangements. For
example, China has indicated it will allow individual specialists from abroad or entire foreign
countries to help modernize existing and outdated factories in China or to engage in joint
design projects with China. China indicated that it would also cooperate with foreign compa-
nies and scientific research institutes to develop new techniques and produce new products.
Importing Technology, supra, at 11. An example of a novel type of countertrade arrangement
involving a woolen yarn manufacturing operation in China appears in Novel.Approach to China
Offers Useful Hints for Sales and Investments, Bus. ASIA, Nov. 30, 1979, at 381-82.
88. See H. KIM, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTS OF CHINA AND THE WEST 2-7
(1981). Note that the Legalist School in contrast to Confucianism advocated the adoption of
written codes and harsh sanctions to regulate society. The Legalist School was in the ascen-
dancy for only a brief period of time due to the harsh results it produced. D. BODDE & C.
MORRIS, LAW IN IMPERIAL CHINA 23-27 (1967).
89. Michael, The Role of Law in Traditional, Nationalist and Communist China, 9 CHINA
Q. 124 (1962).
90. Id.
91. The reform of the Chinese legal system was initiated when the government empow-
ered the Law Codification Commission in 1904 to review existing Chinese law and make it
more western-like. The Commission first eliminated all excessive punishments, including the
use of physical torture to obtain confessions, under traditional law. A modern court system
was created in 1907 which began to produce a body of Western-style "judge-made law" to
interpret existing law in a uniform and modern fashion. In 1910, 2000 provisions of the Old
Code were eliminated. A criminal code was promulgated in 1912, followed by a Civil code,
Banking Law, Commercial Company Law, Admiralty Law, Insurance Law, Patent Law and
Stock Exchange Law. Overall the Chinese government chose not to implement a common law
system but rather a civil law system based on the Code Napoleon, the German Civil Code and
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thereby eliminate the extraterritoriality system), China recognized that it
would need a legal system that was clear, rational, and adequate accord-
ing to western standards. Only by adopting such a system could the Chi-
nese avoid the criticism that their laws produced harsh and inequitable
results. China believed the establishment of a legal system which was
acceptable to the West would indicate that China was ready to govern
itself and assume a role as a responsible member of the world's economic
community. 92
Although legal reform was implemented, it had limited effect for
political and cultural reasons. Because the Nationalist government was
unable to establish its authority over all of China, the reforms took hold
only in the Nationalist strongholds, urban areas and coastal provinces.
Furthermore, the foreign laws which the government sought to impose
on the legal system lacked any foundation in domestic institutions, cus-
toms, and ideals. Without such a foundation, the government found it
even more difficult to obtain public acceptance of the new legal system.
93
Because the new legal system operated in restricted areas where foreign-
ers resided, the legal system in most parts of China continued
unchanged. 94
When the PRC was founded in 1949, all existing laws were abro-
gated. The new government established a new legal system which, de-
spite the opportunity for unique changes, was influenced by western and
Soviet concepts.95 The new legal system supported the government's
claims of legitimacy and helped it gain recognition worldwide.
By the late 1950's, however, the formal legal system had been gradu-
ally replaced by a less formal and more traditional legal system. Under
the new system, most laws were not written. Instead, citizens received
notice of acceptable behavior through study groups and mass meetings.
The moral rules, (li), which formed the basis of the Confucian legal sys-
the Swiss Civil Code. See Lee, Chinese Communist Law: Its Background and Development, 60
MICH. L. REV. 439, 442-44 (1962).
92. See Li, The Role of Law in Communist China, 44 CHINA Q. 66, 73 (1970).
93. As Roscoe Pound recognized, China needed Chinese law, not American, British or
French law. Pound, The Chinese Constitution, 22 N.Y.U. L. REV. 194, 196 (1947).
94. At that time, Wigmore recognized the unchanged nature of Chinese law when he
stated that the Chinese legal system is "the only old one that has survived continuously to date
- a period of more than 4000 years; in comparison, the other living systems of today are but
children." 1 J. WIGMORE, PANORAMA OF THE WORLD'S LEGAL SYSTEM 141 (1936).
95. The initial effect of the abrogation of the laws was not as widespread as one may
believe. Only those laws with some obvious political or class character were eliminated. The
old court system was allowed to continue to function. Police organizations changed their
names to public security organizations. Only with time did a formal legal system based on a
Soviet model become established. Li, supra note 92, at 76-80.
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tem, were now supplied by Mao's concept of the new democracy. En-
forcement was handled at the local level, rather than by the courts. The
state became involved only when the crime was serious and the criminal
was depraved.96 Because the informal system depended on Maoist
thought, those in power could manipulate the system to their benefit.
Confusion and disorder resulted. During the Cultural Revolution,
Maoist followers, especially the Red Guard, attacked the political and
legal systems. As a result, Mao was able to consolidate his power.97
Mao's continued distrust of the legal system and "legal specialists" pre-
vented a rehabilitation of the legal system until his death in 1976.98
In the late 1970's, establishment of a formal legal system99 was con-
sidered necessary to maintain order and build a strong socialist state."°
The administration also recognized that to attract foreign business it had
to provide a legal framework within which business could be transacted.
On July 1, 1979, seven national laws were adopted by the National Peo-
ple's Congress, including a commercial law, The Law of the People's Re-
public of China on Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign
Investment. 101 The joint venture law took effect immediately, indicating
96. Id. Lee, supra note 91, at 448-50.
97. The effect of the Cultural Revolution on the Chinese legal system is discussed in Li,
supra note 92, at 104-09.
98. Mao's influence on the Chinese legal system is discussed in Leng, The Role of Law in
the People's Republic of China as Reflecting Mao Tse-Tung's Influence, 68 J. CRIM. L. & CRIM-
INOLOGY 356 (1977).
99. In China, law was viewed as a scientific discipline. A Symposium on the Objects of
Legal Study, CHINESE L. Gov'T, Summer 1968, at 27-33. As such, the development of law
had to be pursued because law as a "science" was one of the areas targeted by the four modern-
izations program (agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology) for im-
provement. It is interesting to note that this emphasis on the reform of the legal system during
a modernization period parallels the same emphasis during the modernization drive under-
taken by the Nationalist government during the early part of the century.
100. Of the need for a strong legal system to meet the goals of modernization, it was stated:
Development of the productive forces in China will necessitate major changes in the
relations of production as well as in the superstructure, of which laws, decrees and
rules and regulations form an important component. To this end, various laws and
regulations on economic work, including those for the people's communes and facto-
ries, fulfillment of contracts, protection of forests, grasslands and the environment,
will be drafted and gradually perfected .... Socialist democracy and the socialist
legal system have had a rough time in the past but the outlook today is bright. There
is every hope to expect by the end of the century a powerful, socialist China, highly
democratic politically and highly modernized economically.
China's Socialist Legal System, BEIJING REv., Jan. 12, 1979, at 15. An overall review of the
legal reforms undertaken since the death of Mao appears in Hsia, Legal Developments in the
PRC Since the Purge of the Gang of Four, 5 REv. SOCIALIST L. 109 (1979).
101. The other six were: Organic Law of the People's Court, Organic Law of the People's
Procuratorates, Criminal Law, Law of Criminal Procedure, Organic Law of the Local People's
Congresses and the Local People's Governments, and Electoral Law for the National People's
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the importance the government attached to it.10 2
The joint venture law, like other laws which China has adopted, is
not a regulatory document but a brief declaration of principles. 0 3 The
joint venture law simply encourages' °4 capitalist investors to associate
with Chinese economic units for the purpose of making profits. 0 5 The
Congress and the Local People's Congresses. See Explanation on Seven Laws, BEIJING REV.,
July 13, 1979, at 8-16. An English translation of the joint venture law appears in Rowley,
Cracking the Cryptic Code, FAR E. ECON. REV., July 20, 1979, at 50-51 [specific provisions of
the joint venture law hereinafter cited as JV, followed by the article number].
102. The joint venture law was approved at the second session of the Fifth National Peo-
ple's Congress on July 1, 1979, just as the other six laws were. It was promulgated for execu-
tion on July 8, 1979, by NPC decree. Law Governing Joint Ventures, Foreign Broadcast
Information Service, Daily Report PRC [hereinafter FBIS Daily Rep.], July 9, 1979, at LI.
The other six new laws went into effect on January 1, 1980. New Laws In Effect, BEIJING
REV., Jan. 28, 1980, at 3.
103. The joint venture law contains only fifteen articles and some 2000 words. Unlike the
other laws adopted, it had no precedent in China. Foreign and Chinese participants, in order
to implement this policy document, are required to negotiate all of the details. It was realized
at the time that China had many reasons for not providing a more specific law. China had
little experience up to that point in negotiating and operating a joint venture and omitted the
detail in order to remain flexible. China, by not providing detail, also could build up a body of
experiential information from which it could eventually produce noncontradictory specific leg-
islation and codes of practice. The lack of detail also furthered military objectives because, by
failing to give details, no "strategic information" indicating industrial priorities or locations of
certain economic sectors would be divulged. The lack of detail, while pragmatic in one sense
from the Chinese perspective, also worked to the detriment of China, because the foreign in-
vestor was reticent to become involved in a type of business venture in which the Chinese
themselves seemed to avoid becoming too involved (involvement in this case equals detail). On
the point of the lack of detail in the joint venture law, see Rowley, supra note 101, at 49-52;
Silkenat, China's New Joint Venture Law, Bus. WEEK, Feb. 25, 1980, at 14-15. On the lack of
joint venture experience in China and the need to look to the other socialist countries, such as
Romania, Hungary and Yugoslavia, which have adopted joint venture laws, see Rich, Joint
Ventures in China: The Legal Challenge, 15 INT'L L. 183, 189-90 (1981). On the policy-like
nature of other Chinese laws adopted at the time, see Valauskas & Ottley, Recent Develop-
ments in Environmental Protection and Law in the People's Republic of China, 7 REV. SOCIAL-
IST L. 41-42 (1981).
104. The law merely states that the PRC "permits" foreign investors to participate in joint
ventures in China. JV, art. 1. However, the law provides incentives to encourage the investor
to enter into such operations. For example, those foreign investors who enter into a joint
venture with "up-to-date technology by world standards" may apply for a reduction or exemp-
tion from income tax for the first two to three profit-making years. JV, art. 7.
105. Article 2 states that the "Chinese government protects.., the resources invested by a
foreign participant in a joint venture and the profits due him pursuant to the agreements,
contracts and articles of association authorized by the Chinese Government as well as his other
lawful rights and interests." JV, art. 2. This characteristically nonspecific provision (and
others in the law that mention profit) gives no indication as to how the Chinese define profit,
requiring the foreign participant to negotiate this term and memorialize the definition in con-
tract-like form. As to the ambiguity in the joint venture law, see generally, Rich, supra note
103, at 191-211.
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foreign participants 10 6 are allowed to form "limited liability compa-
nies"1°7 with Chinese participants, 10 8 produce goods for the domestic
and foreign markets, 109 remove profits from the country after paying
stated taxes and fees," 0 and make contributions of cash, capital goods,
industrial property, or advanced technology, the last of which the Chi-
nese prefer.' In exchange for these concessions," 2 China expected to
106. Foreign participants are defined in the law as "foreign companies, enterprises, other
economic entities or individuals .... " JV, art. 1.
107. Article 4 requires that "[a] joint venture shall take the form of a limited liability com-
pany." This type of company, while not defined, takes on the character of a corporation under
the law. JV, art. 4. For example, Article 1 authorizes foreign companies "to incorporate
themselves.., into joint ventures with Chinese companies .. Y.." N, art. 1. In addition, a
joint venture is to have a Board of Directbrs, with Chairman chosen by the Chinese partici-
pant, one or two "Vice-Chairmen" chosen by the foreign participant and a President and Vice-
President(s) collectively chosen by the joint venture parties. JV, art. 6. China does not have a
corporation law, however, so a foreign company technically could not incorporate itself (unless
China allowed it on an ad hoc basis). Accordingly, in light of China's desire to remain flexible,
a joint venture would be structured as a partnership, association, or trust. On the ambiguity of
the relevant sections, see Rich, supra note 103 at 194-95.
108. Chinese participants are defined in the law as "Chinese companies, enterprises or
other economic entities...." JN, art. 1.
109. In order to make such goods, the law requires that the joint venture give first priority
to Chinese sources of "raw and semi-processed materials, fuels, auxiliary equipment, etc.," but
"[it] may also acquire them directly from the world market with its own foreign exchange
funds." Rich, supra note 103, at 194-95.
110. As to profits, fees, and taxes, Article 7 provides that:
The net profit of a joint venture shall be distributed between the parties to the ven-
ture in proportion to their respective shares in the registered capital after the pay-
ment of a joint venture income tax on its gross profit pursuant to the tax laws of the
People's Republic of China and after the deductions therefrom as stipulated in the
articles of association of the venture for the reserve funds, the bonus and welfare
funds for the workers and staff members and the expansion funds of the venture.
A joint venture may apply for a reduction or exemption from income tax for the first two or
three profit making years, if the venture is "equipped with up-to-date technology by world
standards ...... JV, art. 7. The wages, salaries or "other legitimate income" earned by a
foreign worker or staff member of a joint venture is subject to a personal income tax. Joint
venture or personal income may be remitted abroad through the Bank of China in accordance
with the Foreign Exchange regulations. At the time the law became effective, none of the
mentioned tax laws or exchange regulations had appeared. The Joint Venture Tax Law and
Individual Income Tax Law were published a year later. For a text of the laws, see NPC
Standing Committee Issues New Laws, FBIS Daily Rep., Sept. 16, 1980, at L16-22. For a
discussion of laws in reference to the joint venture law, see Shea, China's Joint Venture Law:
First of the Economic Laws, 4 A.S.I.L.S. INT'L L.J. 45, 48-50 (1980).
11I. The types of contributions allowable under the law are not specified. Under Article 5,
"[e]ach party to a joint venture may contribute cash, capital goods, industrial property rights,
etc. as its investment in the venture." JV, art. 5. As far as the foreign participant is concerned,
it must contribute a minimum of 25 percent of the registered capital of the venture (no maxi-
mum stated). V, art. 4. However, if the foreign participant contributes technology or equip-
ment, the law requires it to be "truly advanced and appropriate to China's needs." JV, art. 5.
If outdated equipment or technology is provided which causes deception and losses, "compen-
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facilitate the importation of advanced technology, gain experience with
new production techniques, provide jobs and training, satisfy the domes-
tic demand for consumer goods, save marketing expenses by having the
foreign participant market the goods abroad, and make profits. 1 3 By far
sation shall be paid for the losses." Id. In the case of the contribution of the Chinese partici-
pant, it may include "the right to the use of a site provided for the joint venture .. " Id. The
amount of contribution determines the share of profits, risks and losses to be shared by the
joint venture participants. JV, arts. 4, 7. As stated above, "the resources invested by a foreign
participant in a joint venture" (presumably the foreign contribution) are protected by the Chi-
nese government under Article 2. JV, art. 2. This suggests that the Chinese government will
recognize privately owned property. It should be noted, however, that this is unconstitutional
under the 1975 Chinese Constitution. Article 5 of that Constitution only specified two forms
of ownership of the means of production: "socialist ownership by the whole people [the gov-
ernment] and socialist collective ownership by working people [individual cooperative]." The
fact that the foreign ownership of property is insulated by being placed in the joint venture
form reduces the constitutional tension created by the law. On the ownership problem, see
Klingenberg & Pattison, Joint Ventures in the People's Republic of China: The New Legal
Environment, 19 VA. J. INT'L L. 807, 808-09 (1979); Rich, supra note 103, at 184-85.
112. For example, many of the novel steps that the pragmatic Chinese administration took
at that time in order to modernize the country did not have the full support of all political
factions. Critics claimed that allowing foreigners in the country to participate in joint ventures
and to make a profit was without ideological support. In answer to the criticism, the adminis-
tration touted their own quotations from Lenin, Mao, or Zhou. To illustrate, on the issue of
joint venture profit making, the administration stated that it must be treated from a "dialetical
viewpoint." This meant determining whether the Article 1 principle of "equality and mutual
benefit" to all joint venture participants was satisfied. The administration stated that it must
first be recognized what a foreign participant seeks in coming to China and operating a joint
venture. The administration indicated that "as Lenin described it" a foreign participant only
enters into a joint venture contract "for the purpose of gaining extra profit higher than ordi-
nary profit, or for the purpose of acquiring raw materials that cannot be obtained or are very
hard to obtain by other means." Jiefangfun Bao Discusses Merits of Law on Joint Ventures,
FBIS Daily Rep., July 23, 1979, at L17 (quoting 4 SELECTED WORKS OF LENIN 520). But the
administration stated that it cannot say that it is "suffering losses," because the foreigner's
profit will enable the country to "enhance its material and technological foundation." Fur-
thermore, the administration stated that in order to build China quickly into a modern and
powerful socialist country "it is necessary for us to pay the 'tuition' and the 'price'." On this
point the administration again quoted from Lenin: "to get advice, we must spare no expense.
It is nothing lamentable to spend more money to learn things as long as we can achieve results
from what we learned." Id. (quoting 4 SELECTED WORKS OF LENIN 540). "[W]ithout the
help of foreign capital and their means of production, it would be impossible for us to realize
this plan quickly." Id. (quoting 31 COMPLETE WORKS OF LENIN 413-14). Allowing foreign
investors to operate joint ventures was also criticized because some felt it compromised China's
sovereignty. On this point, including the support the administration relied on in the writings
and experiences of Lenin and Mao, see Gongren Ribao Looks at Importance of Joint Ventures,
FBIS Daily Rep., Aug. 7, 1979, at L7-8.
113. Cheng Ming Optimistic on Joint Ventures Plan, Foreign Broadcast Information Ser-
vice, Joint Publication Research Service (hereinafter FBIS-JPRS], Aug. 14, 1979, at 41. China
expected to achieve these goals from its observations of joint venture operations in other social-
ist countries and its experience with the joint venture operations that it conducted with the
Soviet Union, Poland, and Tanzania. See PRC to Begin Joint Ventures Using Foreign Capital,
FBIS Daily Rep., July 2, 1979, at L35; Jiefangjun Bao Discusses Merits of Law on Joint Ven-
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the most innovative step China took at this time to accomplish its wide
ranging economic objectives, however, was the establishment of unique
trade zone areas in the coastal and border areas of the country.
B. The Rise of the Free Trade Zone Concept
Free trade zones (FTZs) are:
areas separated from the surrounding host country's territory by fences
or other barriers into which goods from abroad can be brought without
quota restrictions or the payment of tariffs and excise taxes, and with-
out being subjected to exchange controls, and to the majority of statis-
tical reporting requirements and regulations aimed at the protection of
consumers. "14
The FTZ is the most versatile and popular form of customs-privileged
area today. The transit zone,' 15 free port,116 free perimeter, 17 enterprise
zone, I 18 and United States foreign trade zones 119 are examples of other
ture, supra note 112, at L18. In addition to the above stated objectives, China also expected to
expand its own export market through joint ventures, since the foreign participant, by market-
ing the resultant goods, made foreign purchasers more familiar with goods made in China.
China also saved infrastructure expenses, since the foreign participant was required to contrib-
ute toward introduction costs. Renmin Ribao Looks at Positive Rule of Joint Venture Law,
FBIS Daily Rep., Aug. 8, 1979, at L8-10.
114. Grubel, Towards a Theory of Free Economic Zones, 118 WELTWIRTSCHAFTLICHES
ARCHIV. 39, 40 (1982).
115. "Transit zones" or "entrepots" are simply zones used by traders to manipulate goods
that are destined ultimately for third countries which are inaccessible to ocean ports of entry.
J. DA PONTE, FREE TRADE ZONES AROUND THE WORLD AND THEIR USE FOR EXPORT-
ORIENTED INDUSTRIAL OPERATIONS 4, U.N. Doe. W.G. 112/26 (April 13, 1972).
116. The free trade zone is the ancestor of the free port. A free port generally involves an
entire port area in which the most flexible of all customs standards apply. Few are in opera-
tion today, because those geopolitical factors necessary to make a free port a success hardly
exist any longer. Hong Kong, Gibraltar and Singapore are three such free ports. Id. at 4-5.
117. The "free perimeter" is a customs privileged area used by countries that seek to at-
tract foreign investment to highly undeveloped areas. In the early 1970's, many Latin Ameri-
can countries including Argentina, Chile, Columbia, and Mexico operated such zones. Free
perimeters have limited application because, like the free port, such zones are difficult to secure
physically. Id. at 5.
118. Enterprise zones authorized in the United Kingdom and the United States are in-
tended to revitalize economically depressed areas. See DIAMOND & DIAMOND, supra note 3,
at xxxvi; Grubel, supra note 114, at 45-46. Concessions such as reductions in Social Security
payroll taxes on employers and employees, a capital gains tax exemption, and special tax cred-
its are offered as inducements to attract employers to these depressed areas. See DIAMOND &
DIAMOND, supra note 3, at xxxvi. Whether these gains will accomplish their objectives is of
considerable debate. One commentator has pointed out that in Britain, enterprise zones have
created strong discontinuities and have encouraged business to move from areas outside the
zone into it. As a result, a new economically depressed area is formed around the enterprise
zone. Additionally, it was found that enterprise zones attracted only larger firms and not the
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types of customs-privileged areas. The FTZ most closely resembles the
Chinese Special Economic Zones and will be discussed briefly.
The concept of the FTZ is not new to the world's trading commu-
nity. The establishment of the first FTZ-like area is attributed to the
Phoenicians.120 The Greeks, Romans, and early Europeans also made
use of trade zones.'21 Understandably, when westerners were allowed to
establish concession areas in China, they utilized the western concept of
trade areas as a model. While overall it can be said that the FTZs re-
sulted from pressures on world trade from the industrial revolution,' 22
FTZs are established by host countries for a number of reasons.
A host country's primary objective in establishing an FTZ is to at-
tract capital investment. Capital investment, whether in the form of as-
sembly, processing, production, or storage operations, has several
benefits: it creates jobs, increases earnings (local and foreign), provides
training for labor and management, and improves the industrial and
technological base of the area or host country. The FTZ is a useful
means of attracting capital investment because it offers investors a segre-
gated area where trade is deregulated. At the same time, the FTZ gives
the host country freedom to deregulate, because the consequences of de-
regulation are confined to a narrow geographic area.
123
small businesses that originally fled because of the bad conditions. Grubel, supra note 114, at
45-46.
119. The United States foreign trade zones, authorized by the Foreign Trade Zone Act of
1934, 19 U.S.C. §§ 81a-81u (1976) (originally enacted as Act of June 18, 1934 ch. 590,48 Stat.
998), are:
fenced-off, secured areas, operated as public utilities by either private or public cor-
porations. Located at ports of entry within the United States or its territories, but
considered outside the country for customs purposes, FTZs have proclaimed as their
purpose the encouragement of domestic location of firms that would otherwise locate
abroad for customs reasons.
Cummings & Ruhter, Recent Developments in Foreign Trade Zone Activity, 11 BAYLOR Bus.
STUD. 7 (1980). See also Foreign Trade Zones, URB. LAND, Mar. 1978, at 10-13.
120. The Phoenician zone in part guaranteed safe passage to those foreign traders visiting
Tyre and Carthage. DIAMOND & DIAMOND, supra note 3, at xvi.
121. Id. The Hanseatic cities of Northern Europe and the Free Cities of Germany pros-
pered because of their free port status and the resultant unrestrained trade. Specific examples
include a free trade zone which in modified form exists today, but which was established by the
Treaty of St. Julien between Geneva and the Kingdom of Savoy, and the freeport established
more than 300 years ago by Denmark in Altona, which is now a part of Hamburg, West
Germany. See Dreyer, supra note 11, at 2.
122. DIAMOND & DIAMOND, supra note 3, at xvii.
123. Foreign trade regulations are generally insensitive measures which produce benefits
only for limited interests or geographic regions by inhibiting the free flow of goods. Zones
allow the selective application of deregulatory measures and give the government the freedom
to aid with greater sensitivity certain economic sectors, certain geographical regions or certain
types of customers. See Grubel, supra note 114, at 46-47.
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Developing countries favor foreign capital investment, generally in
the form of export processing operations. 124 Investors become familiar
with the country and may invest in domestic industries. Foreign capital
investment also helps develop new markets for the host country's goods
and improves foreign trade earnings. These earnings, in turn, improve
the balance of trade and increase foreign exchange reserves. Addition-
ally, foreign capital investment utilizes both human and natural re-
sources and hastens the transfer of technology to the host country.125
If the host country accomplishes its primary goal of attracting capi-
tal investment, it may also remedy certain economic problems. For ex-
ample, by establishing an FTZ and successfully attracting capital
investment, a country can reduce its international balance of payments
deficit, unemployment, and any technology gap.126
Developed countries also utilize trade zones, not only to attract for-
eign capital investment but also to keep domestic investment in the coun-
try. Domestic manufacturers that rely on imported material for their
production processes often view customs duties and quota restrictions as
a disincentive to the maintenance of domestic operations. 127 FTZs per-
mit the domestic investor to remain in the country and yet gain the cus-
toms and quota advantages of producing outside the country. For this
reason, FTZs in developed countries have ceased to be mere transit
points for the storage, repacking, or light processing of goods intended
for reexportation. Instead, FTZs have evolved into multiple purpose
zones that attract sophisticated domestic and foreign operations. 128
124. Export processing operations are emphasized by developing countries because such
operations produce goods only for foreign markets and allow the host country to protect its
nascent domestic industries. Naturally, foreign investors view developing countries as large
markets for their goods and would like to locate operations in these countries to produce goods
for these markets. Developing countries traditionally have avoided this exploitation, however,
by restricting imports and emphasizing import substitution-based industrialization. Because of
this desire to protect domestic industries, yet still open up their countries, developing countries
have promulgated complex sets of export-oriented policies for their FTZs. See Wall, supra
note 1, at 478-79.
125. Takeo, Free Trade Zones in Southeast Asia, MONTHLY REV., Feb. 1978, at 33.
126. Id. at 33-34.
127. Duties and quotas are established in order to protect domestic industries. When the
domestic manufacturer suffers because of these restrictions, however, the country's initial
objectives are frustrated.
128. To illustrate, the United States FTZs, as originally conceived, were public utilities
designed "to expedite and encourage foreign commerce." Act of June 1934, ch. 590, purpose
clause, 48 Stat. 998. Remanufacture and the exhibition of goods in a FTZ were prohibited.
Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 590, § 3, 48 Stat. 919 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 81c
(1976)). In 1950, amendments to the 1934 Act added manufacturing to the list of authorized
activities, because the FTZs were viewed as providing foreign manufacturers with an unin-
tended advantage over United States manufacturers of the same kind of merchandise. The
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Because countries establish FTZs to achieve a variety of goals, the
form of FTZ may vary from one country to another. All FTZs, however,
have common elements.
1. FTZs
FTZs are restricted areas with extraterritorial status which are seg-
regated from the host country's customs territory.' 29 The FTZ may be
as small as one part of a manufacturing plant 130 or may extend over
many square miles. 131 All FTZs make one major concession to investors
- materials and components may be brought into the zones free of the
usual tariffs and import controls. 132  The FTZ may also allow traders to
store goods for an unlimited period of time, only introducing them into
the host country when it is advantageous to the trader. 3 3 Without quota
U.S. FTZs are now considered to be entrepots for the entire United States market. For a
discussion of this change, see Note, U.S. Foreign-Trade Zone Manufacturing and Assembly:
Overview and Update, 13 L. POL'Y INT'L Bus. 339, 343 (1981) [hereinafter USFTZ Overview].
129. Extraterritorial status generally is limited to only the customs concessions granted to
those using the FTZ. Accordingly, laws governing workers' safety and employment condi-
tions, environmental protection, as well as profits and wage taxes will apply as if the zone
activity occurred within the host country's customs territory. See Grubel, supra note 114, at
40. The true extent of the extraterritorial status granted to an FTZ operation, however, may
vary considerably and depend on the host country's willingness to grant legal concessions to
potential investors in order to attract them.
130. In the United States, such small zones are referred to as "subzones" or "zones for
specialized purposes." They are defined as "a zone, or a subzone in an area separate from an
existing zone, for one or more of the specialized purposes of storing, manipulating, [or] manu-
facturing goods .. " 15 C.F.R. § 400.304. Subzones are useful for firms that meet the neces-
sary requirements, since any portion of the firm's operation may be designated a subzone and
thereby alleviate the firm's need to relocate into an existing FTZ.
131. Consider, for example, the Chinese SEZs. See infra note 132.
132. The trader in certain zones is allowed to decide whether to pay duties and be subject
to quotas imposed on the goods in the condition in which they arrive in the zone or in the
condition they enter the customs territory. The customs privileged status in some zones is
extended to capital equipment and machinery brought into the zone for use therein. See J. DA
PONTE, supra note 115, at 5-6.
In the United States, the Customs Service classifies merchandise or components brought
into the zone as privileged or unprivileged, foreign or domestic. 19 U.S.C. § 81c (1976). A
privileged goods classification is advantageous to a zone manufacturer or assembler, since
taxes and duties are assessed according to the goods' status when they enter the zone. When
the manufactured or transferred goods are formally brought into the United States customs
territory, no tax or duty is paid on its now heightened value. Rather, tax is paid on its former
value. Goods made of unprivileged parts in whole or in part are taxed according to their value
when shipped from the FTZ into the United States, thereby eliminating the major advantage of
the FTZ. This lower duty is referred to as an inverted tariff. For a discussion of the operation
of the United States FTZ duties, see USFTZ Overview, supra note 128, at 355-58.
133. For example, a manufacturer of lighters brings lighter components into the United
States FTZ. No duty is assessed at that point. The goods then are shipped into the United
States customs territory. Funds from the sale of the lighters go to pay the customs charge on
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restrictions, goods of nearly any type134 may be brought into the FTZ
and stored, processed, and exported without difficulty. 135
Another element common to all FTZs is that they offer investors an
advantage beyond duty and quota relief. A wide variety of additional
benefits may be realized. FTZs established in remote countries allow an
investor to consolidate operations and thereby simplify distribution and
transportation networks. 136 Furthermore, manufacturers and assem-
blers, which require high technology processes to produce or test their
goods, may obtain these processes from within the FTZ, generally at a
less expensive rate. Operations that create large amounts of waste may
find it advantageous to operate in the FTZs because duty is paid on the
finished product only, not on waste created in the zone. Goods processed
or manufactured in an FTZ, although made entirely of foreign compo-
nents, may carry a label indicating domestic manufacture (for example,
"Made in U.S.A." if the goods were made in a United States zone).
Goods may also be exhibited in an FTZ without duty problems. Insur-
ance is lower on goods stored in an FTZ, because the value assigned to
the goods does not include duty. Finally, the goods receive some degree
of protection from the local customs service which polices the FTZ.
137
It is difficult to generalize about the advantages which FTZs present
to potential investors because the zones offer different benefits depending
on the host country's objectives. As stated above, developing countries
seek generally to attract foreign capital investment and specifically to at-
tract export processing operations. To accomplish this goal developing
countries establish a particular type of FTZ, an export processing zone
(EpZ).
138
2. Export Processing Zones
As the name implies, an export processing zone is designed to allow
those lighters that are brought into the customs territory. USF=Z Overview, supra note 128, at
355-56.
134. Of course, some restrictions as to the type of goods that may be brought into the zone
do exist. Firearms and explosives are generally prohibited. DIAMOND & DIAMOND, supra
note 3, at xviii.
135. For a general discussion of the duty and quota advantages of FTZs, see id. at xviii-xxi.
136. Barolsky, Trade Zones: Spur to Development, J. CoM. 1, Oct. 20, 1980, at 1, col. 1.
137. USFTZ Overview, supra note 128, at 356-57.
138. EPZs may be "policy enclaves," "product enclaves," or both. An EPZ is a policy
enclave when the government modifies its trade policies in order to allow firms to invest in
certain areas isolated from the domestic economy for export-oriented purposes. An EPZ is a
product enclave when the host country provides incentives to allow firms to produce certain
goods in that area whose sale is forbidden or restricted on the domestic market. Wall, supra
note 1, at 480.
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foreign companies freely to import raw materials or semi-finished goods,
and from these to manufacture, process, or assemble products for export.
As with FTZs, the host country makes duty, quota, and other legal con-
cessions to the investor. If these concessions are insufficient to attract
investors, the host country may build production facilities and worker
housing for sale or lease to investors, improve infrastructure, subsidize
workers, or streamline the trade bureaucracy.
139
Taiwan was the first East Asian country to establish an EPZ. The
Kaohsiung EPZ was established in 1965 and the Taichung and Nantze
EPZs were established in 1970. South Korea also set up an EPZ in 1970
called the Masan Free Export Zone. Both the Phillipines and Malaysia
established EPZs in 1972: the Bataan EPZ and the Bayan Lepas EPZ,
respectively. 140
An investor will select an EPZ if it has a labor-intensive manufac-
turing operation or if it seeks to utilize natural resources available in the
host country. 141 For example, because of their supply of cheap labor,
Southeast Asian EPZs are now dominated by labor-intensive electronic
assembly operations and textile industries.
Regardless of the advantages an EPZ may offer, an investor's deci-
sion to locate in a particular country's zone often depends on the political
and economic conditions in the host country. 142 Before investing sub-
stantial amounts of capital, investors will examine the host country's ex-
change rates, income and property taxes, and the possibility of
nationalization. The investor may also look at the present and historic
attitudes toward foreign businesses.
4 3
139. Duty and quota concessions are generally sufficient if the country already has a com-
parative advantage in the production of goods that are in strong demand on the world market;
that is, the host country must have a good industrial infrastructure base, good housing for EPZ
personnel, or a good supply of skilled workers. If the country does not have this comparative
advantage, it must make up the deficit itself. Wall, supra note 1, at 480; Takeo, supra note 125,
at 31.
140. Takeo, supra note 125, at 31.
141. Barolsky, supra note 136, at 1.
142. Political and economic obstacles to private investment in a developing country are
often a consequence of the country's underdevelopment. Obstacles include a weak political
system, a lack of large markets, or an inadequate economic infrastructure. The investment
climate in a country is made of a variety of political and psychological attitudes and prejudices.
Investment climate is measured by an analysis of general elements such as the credibility or
predictability of government policies. Other important elements include restrictions on capital
import, exchange, repatriation of profits, or employment of aliens. Additionally, regulation in
taxation and in the type of public supervision of the investor's economic activities will be
considered. See J. Kuusi, THE HosT STATE AND THE TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATION 38
(1979).
143. J. DA PONTE, supra note 115, at 1. The investor is aided in making a proper decision
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Having explored different types of zones, their characteristics and
origins, Chinese trade zones, and particularly the Shekou zone, now will
be examined.
C. The Birth and Stabilization of the SEZs
In early 1979, the Chinese State Council took a bold step to speed
up its economic modernization objectives: it established the country's
first trade zone. The manner in which the Chinese government set up the
zones now will be discussed. Special reference will be made to the laws
adopted to stabilize the tenuous position of the zones and clarify the gov-
ernment's attitude toward foreign investment.
1. The SKIZ and the First Investor's Handbook
On January 30, 1979, the Chinese State Council established its first
trade zone, the Shekou district of Shumchun Country in Southern
Guangdong Province." Establishing the zone was a bold move in light
of the harsh lessons that China had learned during the treaty port days.
The new zone, the Shekou Industrial Zone (SKIZ), is near Hong
Kong on the eastern coast of the Pearl River estuary. It is approximately
30 kilometers west of Shenzhen, 150 kilometers from Canton
(Guangzhou), and 30 kilometers southwest of Hong Kong. It is sepa-
rated from the New Territories by the Deep Bay and from Hong Kong
by the Yuanlang and Liufu Mountains.145 The Shekou District is under
the political administration of Shenzhen City in Guangdong Province.
When it established the SKIZ, the State Council gave authority to
develop and manage the zone to the China Merchants Steam Navigation
Company (CMSN).1'46 This delegation of authority was consistent with
the new policy of decentralization of power. The delegation to CMSN
was well considered. CMSN was a government agency established over
100 years ago to attract foreign investment and promote trade. In 1949 it
for his operation by the great number of zones which exist in the world today. As stated in the
text above, in 1982 some 394 FIZs existed worldwide. See supra note 3 and accompanying
text. To illustrate the popularity of EPZs, it has been estimated that 50 countries had EPZs or
were planning to develop an EPZ in 1982. STZ Increase, supra note 4.
144. New Guangdong Industrial Area Established, FBIS-JPRS, March 21, 1980, at 14.
145. Id. It should be noted that while the SKIZ is located on the Deep Bay and at the
mouth of the Pearl River, the area does not offer the best navigation by water; the heavy silt
deposits from the Pearl River require the area to be dredged every two years.
146. Some believe that choice of CMSN was inevitable because CMSN was said to have
purchased an interest in the SKIZ area from China along with the right to run it. Shekou
Industrial Zone Spells Out Investment Incentive, Bus. CHINA, Jan. 23, 1980, at 1 [hereinafter
SKIZ Incentives].
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became part of the Ministry of Communications. Eventually CMSN be-
came China's agent in Hong Kong and engaged in trading, property de-
velopment, and warehousing. By the 1980's it owned or operated about
200 ships and became known for its familiarity with western-style
trade.147 CMSN now manages the SKIZ under a twenty-five year lease
from the Guangdong Provincial Government.' 48
CMSN's plans for the development of the SKIZ call for work to
proceed in stages. The Shekou zone was divided into six areas, five of
which were designated industrial districts: the Shekou Industrial Dis-
trict, Songgang Industrial District, Longgang Industrial District,
Caichong Industrial District, and Nantou Industrial District. 49 Devel-
opment work first began on the Shekou District.
Shekou, a small, nonindustrialized, fishing village, was chosen as the
site for an industrial zone because of its proximity to Hong Kong. China
sought economic and physical ties with Hong Kong. These ties could
not be formed from a great distance, however, because the roads leading
to and from Hong Kong were poor. As a result, China chose the closest
possible site to Hong Kong. The proximity of Shekou to Hong Kong
reduced the costs of road transportation. An additional advantage was
that Shekou bordered on Deep Bay. Therefore, trade could be conducted
by ship. Finally, the zone's location meant that foreign staff could travel
easily to and from Hong Kong, avoiding the hardship which other rural
areas would have presented. 150
By April 1979 CMSN had contacted foreign companies to ask if
they were interested in entering into joint equity ventures in the SKIZ.
CMSN was seeking production, manufacturing, and processing indus-
tries which engaged in foreign sales but which did not have quota limita-
tions or serious pollution problems. 151 To attract investors, a
spokesperson characterized the SKIZ as a special industrial zone but not
a "tax free port" or "free trade zone." '52 This characterization was not
explained, but it may have allowed the government to avoid the obvious
political question: How can a socialistic country make concessions to
147. See discussion of CMSN and the SKIZ in Fung, China Industrial Area Offers Differ-
ences, Asian Wall Street J., Aug. 5, 1981, at 9 [hereinafter cited as SKIZ Differences].
148. Id. at 6.
149. See discussion and map in Japan Trade Center (JETRO), Hong Kong, Shekou Special
Industrial Zone, CHINA NEWSLETrER 24 (Oct. 1979) [hereinafter JETRO].
150. Id.
151. New Guangdong Industrial Area Established, supra note 144, at 14-15. The serious-
ness of China's pollution problems were largely coming to the forefront at this time. On this
point see Valauskas & Ottley, supra note 103, at 41.
152. Government Sets Up Zone for Foreign Industry, FBIS-JPRS, Sept. 19, 1979, at 132.
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foreign capitalists? Like all trade zones, however, the SKIZ was segre-
gated from the surrounding land by a fence, and only authorized people
had access.
153
To make the SKIZ attractive to foreign investors, the CMSN had to
create an infrastructure suitable for industrial operations. CMSN dedi-
cated a large part of its 300 million Hong Kong dollar investment to
infrastructure improvements. CMSN referred to the infrastructure work
as the "five open-ups and one leveling," one part of which was the level-
ing of eleven million square feet of land. 54 By January 1980 CMSN had
entered into negotiations with 500 firms.155 At the same time, it pub-
lished a SKIZ Investor's Handbook in English and Chinese. The 1980
Handbook contained eleven "particulars" which detailed SKIZ policy. 1
56
The introduction to the Handbook provided that CMSN would ne-
gotiate and enter into joint venture contracts with foreign companies
mainly for the production, manufacturing, and processing of export
goods. Contract negotiations would be conducted in Hong Kong, where
the agreement would be signed. 57 The joint venture agreements would
be incorporated and registered at the Administration Bureau of Industry
and Commerce of Shenzhen
1 58
153. Political observers believed the fence was needed to prevent the smuggling of immi-
grants into Hong Kong. Id. Investors simply described the SKIZ as a special area for receiv-
ing business from Hong Kong and elsewhere outside China. JETRO, supra note 149, at 23.
154. New Guangdong Industrial Area Established, supra note 144, at 15-16. The "five
open-ups" consisted of the opening of land and water traffic, and water, electrical, and tele-
phone lines. An eight kilometer asphalt road was to be built from Nantou in Shenzhen Munic-
ipality to the Shekou dock. Another seaside road was to be built from Shekou Township to the
Shekou dock. Water was to come from the Xili reservoir fifteen kilometers away by pipe,
while high voltage lines were to be strung from Shenzhen Municipality to Shekou. Ultimately
China planned the power to come from Hong Kong. Sea lanes are to be opened with dredging
and a new dock. Telephone contact will be made with a microwave link to Hong Kong. Id. at
16.
155. SKIZ Incentives, supra note 146, at 9.
156. One translation of the Handbook and particulars appears at SKIZ Incentives, supra
note 146, at 10-11; another translation appears at Shekou Joint Venture Regulations Outlined,
FBIS-JPRS, Feb. 11, 1980, at 66 [hereinafter SKIZ Regulations; specific references to the par-
ticulars will be made by reference to the particular number]. The Handbook first appeared in
Hong Kong in that district's leftwing newspaper, Ta Kung Pao, discussed in Investment in
Shekou, CHINA TRADE REP., Feb. 1980, at 2-4.
157. SKIZ Regulations, supra note 156, at 66. Allowing the regulation and finalization of
agreements in Hong Kong is significant for choice-of-law questions.
158. China had no corporate law at the time, so that only approval and registration had to
be acquired. CMSN stated it would handle the registration formalities. New Guandong Indus-
trial Area Established, supra note 144, at 14-15. The fact that the approval was obtained
through a local bureau, on its face, indicated that the Beijing bureaucracy did not have to
become involved. The local approval authority, however, did indicate that any joint ventures
whose investment size exceeded 30 million yuan (about $100 million) in foreign capital would
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"Particulars of Joint Ventures in SKIZ" was presented as a law. It
was similar to previously adopted joint ventures law, but differed on spe-
cific points. Partners in a SKIZ venture, like a joint venture, were re-
quired to contribute at least twenty-five percent of the venture's total
investment. 59  While the joint venture law did not restrict the types of
investments, the particulars permitted cash investments only.160 One ex-
ception to the cash investment requirement was that "[t]echnological
patents and equipment may be converted into cash as investment."' 16' As
to organization, a SKIZ venture was required to have a board of direc-
tors, president, vice-president, and department managers. 62 CMSN re-
tained power to appoint the chairman of the board (under the joint
venture law only the chairman had to be Chinese), while other corporate
officials were to be chosen by all participants. 63 Furthermore, the par-
ticulars provided that while the planning period of the SKIZ joint ven-
ture shall be determined by the venture's particular line of business, the
average term was stated to be approximately twenty-five years.'" This
last provision is significant because it was the first time that the contract
period for a Chinese joint venture was stated. The twenty-five year pe-
riod is also significant, because it terminates after the British lease over
the New Territories and Hong Kong expires.
On the issue of the choice of law, the particulars allow the joint
venture's memorandum and articles of association to refer to "Hong
Kong and international conventional practices."1 65 In the event of dis-
putes, the particulars provide that the parties should attempt to settle
through "friendly consultation."'' 66 If, however, resolution is impossible,
the parties may agree to use a conciliation or arbitration tribunal,
whether Chinese or non-Chinese.
67
Land control in the SKIZ is delegated to a subsidiary of the CMSN,
require approval from Beijing. Joint Ventures in Sumchun [sic] Still in Doubt, FBIS-JPRS,
Sept. 19, 1979, at 133 [hereinafter Shumchun Joint Ventures]. Overall, deals of excessive value
or size, or which required the use of natural resources or impinged upon national security were
expected to obtain Beijing approval. SKIZ Incentives, supra note 146, at 9.
159. SKIZ Regulations, supra note 156, particular 5.1, at 68.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. particular 5.2.
163. Id.
164. Id. particular 5.3. Extension of the period may be obtained within six months of the
contract's expiration. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 71.
167. Id.
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the "Real Estate Company of the Shekou Industrial Zone" (REC).
16 8
Joint ventures were obligated to apply to the REC before setting up oper-
ations in the SKIZ. The joint ventures also were required to pay for the
use of the land "in compliance with the rules concerned."' 169 The "land
utility cost" was set between two and four Hong Kong dollars per square
foot per year.
170
Under the particulars, labor for SKIZ operations was to be provided
by a SKIZ labor service company, upon receipt of the joint venture's list
of requirements.1 71 The joint venture could interview the candidates rec-
ommended by the labor service company; however, if the joint venture
accepted a candidate, it could not enter into a contract with that individ-
ual. Instead, it had to contract with the labor service company for the
individual's services, thereby giving the company (and its principal,
CMSN) full contract rights. 172 Yet, allowing the rights and obligations
of employers and employees to be summarized in a contract represented
a major concession by the Chinese because it reduced the government's
flexibility to negotiate given changing conditions. Another revolutionary
provision of the particulars allowed dismissal of workers who violated
the rules and regulations of the venture. 173 Prior to this, dismissal of
unproductive workers was not an option open for the joint venture, a
restriction which discouraged investment in China. 74
The particulars provided that workers in a SKIZ joint venture were
to be paid in Hong Kong dollars, which were in turn to be converted into
PRC currency (the renminbi). 175 A sum equal to ten percent of each
worker's wages was to be set aside for medical benefits and a welfare
fund. 1 76 Workers and staff were to be given bonuses if production quotas
168. Id. particular 5.4, at 69.
169. Id. Land use regulations had not been adopted at the time of the promulgation of the
SKIZ particulars.
170. Id.
171. Id. particular 5.7, at 69-70. The term "manpower" covers "workers, technicians and
administrative personnel." The particulars do not indicate whether a joint venture can supply
its own manpower.
172. Id. at 70.
173. It is not clear to what the stated "rules and regulations of the venture" referred. Be-
cause low productivity of the Chinese worker has been a chronic problem, any such rules and
regulations should indicate the level of productivity required of workers so that a joint venture
has some recourse against unproductive workers.
174. On the unproductive worker, see SKIZ Incentives, supra note 146, at 10.
175. SKIZ Regulations, supra note 156, particular 5.8, at 70. As to the money used in
conducting SKIZ business, foreign currency was required for bookkeeping and accounting
purposes under particular 5.9. Id. at 70-71. Foreign currencies were allowed to be freely
brought into and taken out of the SKIZ, but only through SKIZ banks. Id.
176. Id. particular 5.8.
1986]
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
were met and products were of at least standard quality. 177 The SKIZ
particulars also provided that workers and staff were to be given paid
holidays and sick days. 178 Insurance for the workers and staff was to be
obtained from an insurance company to be established in the SKIZ.
179
SKIZ ventures were allowed to offer different salaries and benefits to Chi-
nese and foreign senior management. 180 The income of foreign staff was
subject to personal income tax."8
Contrary to earlier statements which declared that the SKIZ was
not a "tax free port" or "free trade zone," its similarity to a trade zone
was immediately apparent. For example, the tax incentives offered to
investors and the CMSN's stated objective-that the SKIZ was to be
competitive with Hong Kong, one of the world's great free ports-indi-
cated that the SKIZ was actually a free trade zone.
As a tax incentive, Particular 5.5 allowed the free importation of
"all supplies furnished to SKIZ," such as equipment, construction
materials, raw materials, and daily necessities. 8 2 Like other trade zones,
finished and semi-finished export products were also exempted from an
export tax. 18 3 In contrast, products brought into the domestic market
from the SKIZ were subject to taxes.'
84
The fact that CMSN intended the SKIZ to compete with neighbor-
ing Hong Kong is apparent from several provisions of the particulars.
Particular 5.8 required that, while the wage level for SKIZ workers must
be higher than that paid to domestic workers, it must remain lower than
that paid to Hong Kong workers. 185 Particular 5.5 granted a three to five
year tax holiday to a SKIZ joint venture.1 8 6 At the end of the holiday, a
ten percent corporate tax would be levied.1 7 In contrast, Hong Kong, at
the time, granted no tax holiday and levied a seventeen percent tax on
corporations. Although other countries offered tax holidays of longer






182. Id. particular 5.5, at 69.
183. Id.
184. Id. The tax is "in accordance with customs' regulations of the PRC." At the time the
particulars were published, however, such regulations were not made public.
185. Id. particular 5.8, at 70. Skilled workers in the SKIZ earned as much as 200 yuan
($670) per month, while "ordinary workers" earned approximately 30 yuan ($100) per month.
Shuinchun Joint Ventures, supra note 158, at 133.
186. SKIZ Regulations, supra note 156, particular 5.5, at 69.
187. Id.
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years), and Sri Lanka (10 years), the SKIZ's corporate tax rate was low-
est. 188 The rents for land in the SKIZ ranged from two to four Hong
Kong dollars per square foot per year, much lower than Hong Kong's
fifty-five Hong Kong dollars per square foot.189 Particular 5.10 required
water costs to be twenty percent lower than the Hong Kong rate.1 90 A
comparative analysis of the SKIZ and other industrial zones in Asia
reveals that it was cost-competitive with Hong Kong when it was estab-
lished. The SKIZ, however, did not compare as favorably with other
nearby zones. (See Table 1 on page 192.)
2. The Guangdong Regulations
While CMSN was promoting and developing the SKIZ, China was
planning a more comprehensive set of special economic zones. The inter-
est in more zones was based on CMSN's positive experience with the
SKIZ. Moreover, the SKIZ probably served as a model for the develop-
ment of future zones. The SKIZ, therefore, should be considered as a
transitional or experimental phase in the development of China's special
economic zones.
China's decision to establish special economic zones was announced
by Vice Premier Gu Mu at a press conference in Tokyo in September
1979.91 Gu Mu indicated that China had decided to set up special dis-
tricts in Shenzhen near Hong Kong and in Zhuhai near Macao. 19 2 The
location of the new zones was settled in December 1979 when the Second
Session of the Fifth People's Congress of Guangdong Province adopted a
resolution which declared the zones would be located in Shenzhen,
Zhuhai, and Shantou.1 93
188. This was the first time that the Chinese administration manipulated tax policy to
achieve trade objectives. See JETRO, supra note 149, at 23.
189. See Mixed Feelings in Shekou, CHINA TRADE REP., Mar. 1980 at 353.
190. SKIZ Regulations, supra note 156, particular 5.10, at 71. Even though electric power
was supplied by the Hong Kong-based China Light and Power Company, requiring China to
spend approximately $180 million to construct the necessary transfer system, it was provided
at the same rate obtainable in Hong Kong. Government Sets Up Zone for Foreign Industry,
supra note 152, at 132.
191. FBIS-JPRS, Apr. 2, 1980, at 47; Gu Mu's Press Conference in Tokyo, BEIuING REV.,
Sept. 14, 1979, at 4-5.
192. At the press conference Gu Mu stated:
Compatriots from Hong Kong and Macao as well as friends from foreign countries
are welcome to set up all kinds of enterprises and undertakings in these regions either
in the form of joint ventures or in the form of sole proprietorship. We shall adopt
more open approaches toward the management and administration of these two spe-
cial zones than in other inland areas.
FBIS-JPRS, Apr. 2, 1980, at 47.
193. Id.
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China Special Economic Zones
Despite the interest generated by the announcement, more informa-
tion regarding the SEZs was not released until March 1980.194 At that
time, Sun Ru, an economist and the deputy director of the Guangdong
Provincial Bureau for Trade and Foreign Countries, defined the special
economic zone concept. Sun described a SEZ as:
[a] place with suitable conditions [where] a certain area of land is to be
set aside and a more open approach is to be adopted toward its admin-
istration than in other inland areas and [where] various forms of eco-
nomic cooperation are to be conducted with the industrial and
commercial world including foreign friends, Overseas Chinese and
compatriots in Hong Kong and Macao. 195
Sun Ru also stated that individuals are welcome "to invest or to form
joint ventures with China in various kinds of enterprises and undertak-
ings.., to set up factories ... to operate various kinds of service trades
such as commerce, housing, tourism... [to] invest in public utilities such
as roads, power stations and so on."
19 6
In March 1980 the government released the "Principles on the Ad-
ministration of Special Zones".19 7 The principles indicated that, while
zone activities must abide by Chinese laws, more permissive administra-
tive regulations would be forthcoming.198 The principles set forth several
requirements. Investments in the zones would be protected in "accord-
ance with the law," by use of a "fairly long period" of time during which
the "legitimate interests" and the "due profits" of investors would be
protected. 199 Enterprises in the zones would be required to pay profit
taxes, rent for using the land, property taxes, and management fees.z°
Furthermore, workers in zone operations were to be provided by a cen-
tral labor service company and chosen, based on their merits, through an
examination system.20 1 These workers could be dismissed "according to
legal provisions. ' 20  The principles refer repeatedly to Chinese law,
194. Id. at 48.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 50-52.
198. Id. at 50. The principles indicated that an administrative body responsible for the
administration and management aspects of the SEZs would be formed along with an economic
development company. Id. The company would be responsible for the economic development
of the zone, the provision of conveniences to investors, and the construction of public facilities.
Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 50-51.
201. Id. at 51.
202. Id. The principles indicated that the administrative body of the zone would regulate
the minimum wage paid to those Chinese working in the zone. Id.
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however, no relevant body of law existed at this time. Although the ad-
ministration's objective in publishing the principles was to clarify the sit-
uation, the absence of formal law only led to more speculation and
confusion.
The principles illustrated the similarity of the new zones to free
trade zones. Duty free status was extended to all building materials, ma-
chinery and equipment, raw and semiprocessed materials, fuel, semifin-
ished products, means of transportation, and export products.20 3 All
products made by zone operations had to be exported to foreign mar-
kets.2" If an investor needed to sell its products on the domestic market,
however, it could apply for administrative approval. 20 5 Once an investor
who received approval and paid a customs duty, it could sell goods on
the domestic market as imported goods.20 6
Foreign investors had to wait six months before the first SEZ law
appeared. On August 26, 1980, the Fifteenth Session of the Fifth Na-
tional People's Congress Standing Committee adopted the Regulations
on Special Economic Zones in Guangdong. 2 7 The Regulations consist
of six chapters and twenty-six articles. The law is characteristically gen-
eral in nature, lacks even the specificity of the SKIZ particulars, contains
ambiguities, and provides that supplementary law is necessary to imple-
ment the law.208
The regulations authorize the establishment of special economic
zones in Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and Shantou Municipalities of Guangdong
Province.20 9 The stated aim of the regulations is to "develop economic
cooperation and technical exchange with foreign countries and promote
socialist modernization. ' 210 Under the regulations, companies belonging
to foreigners and overseas Chinese will be "encouraged" to set up in-
dependent enterprises in the zones or run joint ventures with China.21'
203. Id.
204. Id. at 50.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. An English translation of the SEZ regulations appears in NPC Approves Regulations
on Economic Zones in Quangdong, FBIS Daily Report, August 28, 1980, at L9-13, reprinted in
AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL (HONG KONG), BRIEFING IN CHINA: REGULATIONS FOR
GUANGDONG SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES 1-4, (Sept. 5, 1980) [hereinafter SEZ Regs.]. Refer-
ences in the following discussion to special provisions of the law may be found in these
translations.
208. For example, the regulations state that a land use law (Art. 12), labor regulations
(Art. 21), and other laws (Art. 1) are necessary to implement the provisions of this law.
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By making joint ventures merely an option, China is indicating that for
the first time in the history of the PRC foreigners will be allowed to
operate wholly-owned enterprises. The regulations guarantee the zone
trader "favorable conditions" and "stabl[e]" operational sites.212
The unique character of the Chinese zones is revealed in the regula-
tions. Zone traders are allowed to invest or operate joint ventures with
China in those "undertakings which have a positive meaning in interna-
tional economic cooperation and technical exchange." '213 These under-
takings include industry, agriculture, animal husbandry, breeding,
tourism, construction, advanced technological research and manufactur-
ing, and other business of interest to both sides.214
To promote, develop, and regulate activities within the zones, the
law establishes two major administrative bodies in each zone:215 the
Guangdong Provincial Administrative Committee in Charge of the Spe-
cial Economic Zones (GPAC)216 and the Guangdong Provincial Special
Economic Zones Development Company (GpCO).217 GPAC is dele-
gated a variety of responsibilities under the law, including managing the
Guangdong zones,21 8 establishing a suitable infrastructure,219 and per-
forming administrative duties for the Shenzhen SEZ.22" The GPCO is
212. Id. art. 4.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Other regulatory bodies set up to facilitate zone business include labor service compa-
nies and "advisory committees." Id. art. 6. The advisory committees consist of certain invited
"Chinese and foreign experts and people who are enthusiastic in promoting modernization in
China; their purpose is to provide advice to the zones." Id.
216. Id. art. 3.
217. Id. art. 25.
218. GPAC is required "to exercise the power of unified management over all special zones
on behalf of the Guandong Provincial People's Government." Id. art. 3 (emphasis added).
219. GPAC is responsible for the "leveling and other land preparation work and construc-
tion work for water supply, drainage, electric power, roads, docks, communications, ware-
houses and other public facilities." Id. art. 5.
220. Under Art. 23 of the SEZ Law, GPAC must:
draft, organize and implement development projects in the special zones... review
and approve the traders' investment projects in the special zones.., handle indus-
trial and commercial registration work and land allocation in the special zones...
coordinate working relations for banks, insurance companies, tax units, customs,
border inspection units and posts and telecommunications in the special zones ...
find sources of staff members and workers for the enterprises in the special zones and
*. . safeguard the just rights of staff members and workers ... run educational,
cultural, public health and other public welfare work in the special zones ... safe-
guard security in the special zones and protect the inviolability of person and
property.
Organizations similar to GPAC will handle these responsibilities in the Zhuhai and Shantou
Special Economic Zones. Id. art. 24.
19861
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
responsible for accumulating funds, operating enterprises, cooperating
with traders to establish joint ventures, acting as an agent for traders to
help them procure and market goods, and providing consulting
services.22'
To establish an operation in the zone, a trader must submit an appli-
cation to GPAC.222 After review and approval by GPAC, the zone trad-
ers are given registration certificates and land use certificates.223 Traders
may open accounts and handle foreign exchange matters at Bank of
China branches in the zone or at other government-approved zone
banks.224 Traders may also purchase insurance from the Chinese Peo-
ple's Insurance Company or other government-approved insurance com-
panies established in the zones.22 5
While all land remains the property of the government, 226 it is fur-
nished to the trader according to the trader's actual needs. 227 Provisions
of the regulations dealing with management and labor are generally lib-
eral. Traders may operate their own enterprises independently and hire
foreign personnel for technical and management work.2 28 For nontech-
nical and nonmanagement work, however, zone enterprises may hire
only Chinese employees. 229 These employees may be hired through labor
service companies230 or directly, providing permission is obtained from
GPAC.231 The zone enterprise may test or evaluate applicants232 and
must enter into employment contracts with employees.233 Zone enter-
prises are required to manage and protect workers.234 When necessary,
221. Id. art. 25. A literal reading of the SEZ provisions indicates that overlapping author-
ity was delegated to GPCO and GPAC.
222. Id. art. 7.
223. Id.
224. Id. art. 8. Significantly, this provision indicates that foreign banks may be allowed to
operate in the zone.
225. Id. As with the banking reference, this provision indicates that many companies may
be allowed to operate in the zone.
226. Id. art. 12.
227. Id.
228. Id. art. 10.
229. Id. arts. 10, 19.
230. The SEZ regulations indicate that the labor service companies are to be established in
the zones to handle only the hiring of Chinese workers. Id. art. 19.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. The employment contract must contain provisions stating the wage level, wage
structure, incentive system, labor insurance and state subsidies for workers. Id. art. 21. Such
contracts also were required to comply with those regulations prescribed by GPAC. Id. This
indicates that the contracts for zone enterprises lacked finality on any points addressed by
subsequent regulations. See id.
234. Id. Art. 22 provides that: "Enterprises in the Special Zones should adopt necessary
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Chinese workers may be dismissed under the provisions of the employ-
ment contracts.235 Workers may also resign in accordance with their em-
ployment contracts.2 36 Overall, the regulations simplify entry and exit
procedures for investors.z37
The sections of the regulations discussing duties and export restric-
tions illustrate the free trade character of the SEZs. In the earlier princi-
ples, 38 the regulations required that commodities produced by zone
enterprises be sold on the international market.239 Zone enterprises,
however, may sell goods on the domestic market if approval is obtained
from GPAC and a customs duty is paid.2' ° Enterprises may import
goods needed for their operations without paying an import duty.
241
Consumer goods required by zone traders, however, are subject to either
full or reduced import tariffs, depending on the situation.24 The import
of goods into the zone and the export of commodities are subject to cus-
toms declaration procedures.2 43
The rate of income tax on zone enterprises is set at fifteen percent. 2 "
Preferential treatment was extended, however, to enterprises established
within two years of the promulgation of the regulations, enterprises with
an investment of at least five million United States dollars, and enter-
prises that involve "higher technologies" or a "longer cycle of capital
turnover. '2 45 Traders that reinvest their profits in the SEZs for a mini-
mum of five years may request a reduction or elimination of income tax
on the reinvested profits.246
After the tax is paid, traders may send "legitimate profits" out of
labor protection measures to insure that staff members and workers work under safe and sani-
tary conditions."
235. Id. art. 20.
236. Id.
237. Id. art. 18.
238. See supra text accompanying notes 197-206.
239. SEZ Regs. art. 9.
240. Id.
241. Id. art. 13. Examples of such duty-free imports include "[m]achinery equipment,
spare parts, raw materials, and transport vehicles." Id. Note, however, that zone enterprises
will be encouraged to use "machinery, equipment, raw materials and other supplies" produced
in China. Id. art. 17. Encouragement consists of "favorable treatment" such as "paying ex-
port prices for the same kind of commodities at the time of purchase" and paying prices in
foreign exchange. Id.
242. Id. art. 13.
243. Id. The export of goods into China's domestic markets is not subject to the "customs
declarations procedures." Id.
244. Id. art. 14.
245. Id.
246. Id. art. 16.
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China through a zone bank.24 7 Similarly, foreign employees may send
their after-tax wages and other income out of the country.2 4 Before a
trader can close a zone operation, it must give GPAC an explanation.249
Once approval is received and loans and debts are handled, the business
may be closed250 and assets removed from China.25'
3. The Second Investor's Handbook
In September 1981 CMSN published a revised and expanded version
of its Investor's Handbook.252 As in the earlier version, the 1981 Hand-
book indicates that the SKIZ is similar to a free trade zone. It notes that
the "[m]eans of production and consumer goods which are necessary for
SKIZ and have to be imported from foreign countries, Hong Kong or
Macao" are exempted from import duties; "[flinished and semi-finished
products manufactured by the enterprises of SKIZ shall be exempted
from export duties;" and "duties shall be levied on products for the do-
mestic market .... 253 The average contract period for a SKIZ opera-
tion remains at twenty-five years,254 and the intent to compete with Hong
Kong operations is still apparent. 5
The 1981 Handbook differs from the earlier version on several im-
portant points. One difference is the type of operations which are now
permitted in the SKIZ and encouraged by CMSN. The Handbook pro-
247. Id. art. 15. Such remittance will be subject to the provisions of a foreign exchange
control law which, at the time of the SEZ law, had not been drafted. Id.
248. Id. Both sections indicate that even after the appropriate tax is paid China will regu-
late the profit and income that leaves the country.
249. Id. art. 11.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT DIVISION, CHINA MERCHANTS STEAM NAVIGA-
TION Co., LTD., INVESTOR'S HANDBOOK CHINA: MERCHANTS SHEKOU INDUSTRIAL ZONE
IN SHENZHEN SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE OF GUANGDONG PROVINCE (rev. ed. 1981) [herein-
after 1981 HANDBOOK, referred to by section or particular number and page]. An edited
version of the Handbook appears in Guide to Investment in Shekou ... New Rules and Regula-
tions for Shekou, CHINA TRADER, Mar. 1982, at 55-58.
253. 1981 HANDBOOK, supra note 252, particular 5, at 22-23. Note that the "have to be
imported" language of this provision indicates that to some degree import substitution will be
encouraged.
254. Id. particular 3, at 22.
255. For example, wages paid to SKIZ workers must be higher than in domestic portions
of China but lower than in Hong Kong. Id. particular 8, at 23-24. Land use charges remain at
HK $2 to HK $4 per square foot per year. Id. particular 4, at 22. Energy costs are set at the
same rate as applied in Hong Kong, and water costs are set at a rate 20 percent lower than that
in Hong Kong. Id. particular 10, at 24.
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vides that the SKIZ is to be considered a part of the Shenzhen SEZ.25 6
As such, it is no longer for joint venture operations only, and investors
may operate privately-owned enterprises.257 The Handbook limits the
types of operations allowed to those which have a positive effect on inter-
national economic cooperation, technical exchanges, and other trades of
common interest to investors and CMSN.258 Operations involved in rap-
idly-developing trades or high technology are particularly welcome.259
Operations that fall into the following categories, however, are not wel-
come: (1) those that cause severe and irreversible pollution; (2) those
that use outmoded or worn equipment; (3) those whose export products
are covered by China's export quotas; (4) those which are in the nature of
compensation trade;2 0 and (5) those which involve assembling or
261processing.
The Handbook also contains a number of new provisions concerning
duties and taxes. While materials and goods imported to be consumed in
the SKIZ are exempt from duties, cigarettes and liquor are subject to a
fifty percent import duty under the new provisions.262 SKIZ operations
continue to qualify for a three to five year tax holiday but the Corpora-
tion Profit Tax applied at the end of the period is set at fifteen percent.263
The applicable tax was ten percent under the 1980 Handbook.264 Also
new to SKIZ operations is the extension of special preferential treatment
to enterprises with an investment in excess of US $5 million, enterprises
with a longer cycle of "capital turnover," or enterprises that introduce
advanced technology to China.265
The new Handbook also differs in its treatment of wages. Particular
8 indicates that the monthly wage for a SKIZ worker is HK $750, a rate
256. Id. at 19. Accordingly, SKIZ operations may be subject to both the Joint Ventures
Law and the SEZ Regulations.
257. Id. particular 2, at 22. In the case of privately-owned enterprises, the investors are
required to pay an annual management fee consisting of a prenegotiated proportion of the
"total turnover" of the enterprise. The 1981 Handbook provides, as did the 1980 Handbook,
that SKIZ negotiations and the signing of contracts will still take place in Hong Kong, while
the enterprises will continue to be registered and incorporated at the Administration Bureau of
Industry and Commerce of the Shenzhen Municipality. Id. at 19.
258. Id. particular 1, at 21-22.
259. Id.
260. See supra text accompanying notes 85-87.
261. 1981 HANDBOOK, supra note 252, particular 1, at 21-22.
262. Id. particular 5, at 22.
263. Id. at 23. As to those SKIZ operation agreements signed before the SEZ Regulations
had been approved, they are still only taxed at the "rate originally agreed upon," which pre-
sumably is the 10 percent rate.
264. SKIZ Regulations, supra note 156, at 69.
265. 1981 HANDBOOK, supra note 252, particular 5, at 23.
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which remains competitive with Hong Kong.266
The Handbook also provides some information on the progress of
infrastructure improvements in the SKIZ. For example, thirteen million
square feet of land were levelled for factories and housing.267 A 600
meter quay 268 and an eight kilometer road from the quay to Nantou,
which connects to the Guangzhou-Shenzhen highway and ultimately to
Hong Kong, were completed, making SKIZ accessible by water and
land.269 A 13.8 kilometer water main was laid from Xili Reservoir in the
Northeast to the SKIZ,270 and portions of the Hong Kong to SKIZ elec-
trical supply system were completed.27" ' Work on the telecommunica-
tions system continued under the control of Cable and Wireless System
Ltd. of Hong Kong.27 2 Industrial premises, flats, and villas, which were
to be sold or leased to SKIZ operations, were still under construction,
but two four-story buildings were scheduled for completion by the end of
1981.273 Finally, construction of hotels, guest houses, residential
quarters, and a commercial center was in progress.274
After publication of the Handbook, the officials of CMSN and the
SKIZ explained its new provisions. Leung Hung-Kun, manager of the
marketing division of CMSN, said the "not welcome" provisions were
added so that investors would not waste time on unsuitable projects.
275
Leung stated that operations using second-hand equipment were still
welcome but operations using obsolete manufacturing technology or
processes were not.276 He also said compensation trade was no longer
welcome in the SKIZ because it was often subject to market factors be-
266. Id. particular 8, at 23-24.
267. Id. at 20. The earlier Handbook stated approximately 10 million square feet would be
available. SKIZ Regulations, supra note 156, at 66.
268. 1981 HANDBOOK, supra note 252, at 20. The quay was originally scheduled for com-
pletion September 1980. SKIZ Regulations, supra note 156, at 67.
269. 1981 HANDBOOK, supra note 252, at 20. The road was originally scheduled for com-
pletion by March 1980. SKIZ Regulations, supra note 156, at 67.
270. 1981 HANDBOOK, supra note 252, at 20-21. The entire SKIZ water works system had
been scheduled for completion by July 1980. SKIZ Regulations, supra note 156, at 68.
271. 1981 HANDBOOK, supra note 252, at 21. The earlier Handbook stated that the "whole
system will be able to start operating by July 1980." SKIZ Regulations, supra note 156, at 68.
272. 1981 HANDBOOK, supra note 252, at 21.
273. Id. at 21. The earlier Handbook only provided that factory sites would be available
from March 1980. SKIZ Regulations, supra note 156, at 67.
274. 1981 HANDBOOK, supra note 252, at 21. No provision had been made in the earlier
Handbook for living facilities or related amenities.
275. SKIZ Man Explains What the New Edition Is All About, CHINA TRADER, Mar. 1982,
at 58-59 [hereinafter SKIZ Man Explains].
276. Id.
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yond the parties' control.27 7 Leung pointed out that assembly and
processing activities are for areas which have existing production facili-
ties in place that are not being used to their fullest capacity. Such facili-
ties do not exist in the SKIZ, since factories were recently built there to
handle specific. production tasks. 8 Leung suggested some restrictions
on the type of one hundred percent privately owned enterprises that
CMSN will permit in the SKIZ. For example, investors may own one
hundred percent of a SKIZ enterprise "as long as it helps the introduc-
tion of modem technology and management to the zone. '2 79 Qualifying
enterprises are required to pay an annual management fee, which Leung
indicated is approximately ten percent of the FOB value of exports.
280
Xiu Zhi Ming, Vice Director of the SKIZ, took a different approach
to one hundred percent foreign owned businesses when he stated: "We
are looking for joint ventures or projects where the entire innvestment
[sic] is owned by the foreign side."' 281 As to the annual management fee
to be paid to CMSN by investors, Xiu stated the exact amount was
negotiable.282
Leung explained that the special preferential tax treatment in Partic-
ular 5 would consist of a lower management fee, a longer tax holiday,
and other assistance.283
Explaining the wage system for SKIZ workers, Leung stated that
the average wage of HK $750 included welfare funds and medical
benefits. 284 Eighty percent of the wage may be retained by SKIZ em-
ployees and twenty percent must be returned to the state.285 Xiu be-
lieved the retained wage would be attractive to SKIZ workers and
encourage productivity, since workers in the Shenzhen zone are allowed
to keep only seventy-five percent of their wages.286 As an extra incentive,
Xiu said foreign enterprises in the SKIZ will be allowed to implement a
system, frequently used in Hong Kong, of double-month pay at the year's





281. Curry, Organization Prevails in China's Shekou Estate, J. COM., Aug. 27, 1982, at 18.
282. Id.
283. SKIZ Man Explains, supra note 275, at 59.
284. Id. This is as stated in particular 8. 1981 HANDBOOK, supra note 252, at 23-24.
285. Curry, supra note 281, at 18. Of interest to the workers, however, is the percentage
which will in fact be drawn by the SKIZ Labour Services Company for welfare and medical
benefits.
286. Curry, supra note 281, at 18.
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envelopes, symbolic of good fortune.287
4. Ten-Point Policy Outline for SEZ Development
In the summer of 1981 Guangdong officials revealed to People's
Congress' delegates from Hong Kong and Macao a new set of policies for
the SEZ. The policies had been adopted at an earlier provincial meeting
called by the State Council which brought together officials from both
Guangdong and Fujian Provinces.288 The policies, grouped in ten points,
provided a general development outline for the SEZs and sought to de-
centralize management by giving zone officials greater flexibility.
The first point provided that the planning and construction of the
SEZ should be suited to local conditions, with special emphasis on actual
effect.289 Shenzhen and Zhuhai zones were intended to be multipurpose
zones, with economic activity in the areas of industry, animal husbandry,
agriculture, commerce, housing, and tourism.290 Xiamen and Shantou
were to be mainly export processing zones, relying on tourism as an aux-
iliary source of income.291
Under the second point, certain types of imported goods were to be
given preferential tariff treatment.292 After a line demarcating the zones
was established, all materials needed for production or consumption
could be brought duty-free into the zones.29 3 Cigarettes and alcholic
drinks (and other unspecified items), however, would be taxed at half of
the usual tariff rate.2 94 If these goods were then transported outside the
zone area, they would be taxed at the full import rate.29 5
Procedures for control over the Chinese border would be simplified
under the third point.296 For example, SEZ authorities would have the
power to order visa officers to issue entry visas to overseas Chinese and
foreign nationals wishing to enter a particular zone.297 Also, multiple
287. Id.
288. The new policies are discussed in Guangdong Vice Governor Discusses Special Zones,
FBIS Daily Rep., July 28, 1981, at W3 [hereinafter FBIS July 28, 1981] and Ten-Point Special
Policy for Special Economic Zones, Takung Pao (Hong Kong), Aug. 20-26, 1981, at 1, col. 1-4
[hereinafter Ten-Point Policy]. Note that these two accounts and the discussion here repre-
sents an analysis of the non-contradictory sections of these accounts.
289. FBIS July 28, 1981, supra note 288, at W4.
290. Ten-Point Policy, supra note 288, at 1.
291. Id.
292. Ten-Point Policy, supra note 288, at 1, and FBIS July 28, 1981, supra note 288, at W4.
293. Ten-Point Policy, supra note 288, at 1.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id.; FBIS July 28, 1981, supra note 288, at W4.
297. Ten-Point Policy, supra note 288, at 1.
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entry visas good for one year could be issued to those wishing to enter
and leave a zone frequently.298
The fourth point dealt with labor relations and required employees
of zone enterprises to be employed under a contract. 299 The zone enter-
prises, however, would have the right to decide matters of employment
or dismissal.3" Wages were to have two components: "basic" and
"floating."3 ' Pension and social welfare provisions were also to be
introduced.30 2
The fifth point provides that the zones would have independence to
conduct foreign trade and would be required to look at the state's foreign
trade policy for guidance only.30 3 Although state enterprises were per-
mitted to handle commercial matters, zone enterprises also could estab-
lish joint ventures with foreign firms and could import necessary
commodities. 3°
Policies regarding zone currency were set out in the sixth point.30 5
This point established the renminbi as the principle currency in the
zones, although foreign currencies could be used in specified areas.30 6
The point indicated, however, that the People's Bank was considering
whether to use special currency in the Shenzhen zone.30 7 Chinese banks
registered outside China would be permitted to open zone branches, and
select foreign banks would be given permission to establish zone of-
fices.308 The State Foreign Exchange Control Administration would set
up its own zone office.309
Infrastructure development was discussed in the seventh and eighth
points. The seventh point indicated that an effort should be made to
raise development funds domestically; however, capital from overseas





302. Id. See also infra note 319.
303. Ten-Point Policy, supra note 288, at 1; FBIS July 28, 1981, supra note 288, at W4.
304. Ten-Point Policy, supra note 288, at 1.
305. Id.; FBIS July 28, 1981, supra note 288, at W4.
306. Ten-Point Policy, supra note 288, at 1.
307. Id.
308. Id. The Ten-Point Policy account indicated that Chinese banks registered only in
Hong Kong would be allowed to set up a zone branch, while the FBIS account indicated such
banks from both Hong Kong and Macao could set up such a branch. FBIS July 28, 1981,
supra note 288, at W4.
309. Ten-Point Policy, supra note 288, at 1.
310. FBIS July 28, 1981, supra note 288, at W4.
1986]
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
fled that foreign capital could be used to build airports, harbors, rail-
roads, and telecommunication facilities,31 which could be run by the
zones, or jointly by the zones and the foreign investors.312
The ninth point directed the People's Congresses of Guangdong and
Fujian provinces to draft new legal measures to regulate zone activi-
ties.3 13 Regulations, which had been drafted for the Shenzhen special
zone, would be submitted for approval directly to the provincial People's
Congress. Regulations regarding customs and taxation would be drawn
up and submitted for approval by the Central Committee.314
The final point provided that the zone bureaucracy should be
streamlined to provide efficient and simple administration. 3 5 The point
emphasized the autonomous nature of the zones and that security should
be strengthened to ensure law and order.31 6 Frontier guards and police
forces would patrol the demarcated borders.317
In addition to these new zone policies, Guangdong Vice Governor
Zeng Dingshi also revealed at the 1981 meeting that Guangdong and
Fujian zones would be given freedom to develop their own economies,
with certain limitations.318
5. The Provisional Regulations for the Guangdong SEZs
In December 1981 Guangdong provincial officials made public a set
of five regulations designed to attract additional foreign investment into
the zones.3 19 The regulations represented the implementation of the ten-
311. Id.
312. FBIS July 28, 1981, supra note 288, at W4. While this account indicates that such
facilities may be structured as joint ventures, the ten-point policy indicates that facilities can be
run "in cooperation with foreign enterprises." Ten-Point Policy, supra note 288, at 1.
313. Ten-Point Policy, supra note 288, at 1. This account indicated that these measures
would consist of "special by-laws and regulations."
314. FBIS July 28, 1981, supra note 288, at W4.
315. Id.
316. Ten-Point Policy, supra note 288, at 1.
317. Id.
318. The zones were required to follow "five cardinal principles":
1) to uphold the four basic principles;
2) to abide by the unified major principles of the party and the state;
3) to submit to the unified and planned guidance of the state and also the overall
balance;
4) to fulfill the tasks entrusted by the state; and
5) to firmly uphold the principle of unity in external work.
FBIS July 28, 1981, supra note 288, at W5.
319. The new regulations are discussed in the following: Regulations for Guangdong Spe-
cial Zones Discussed, FBIS-JPRS, Jan. 20, 1982, at 109 [hereinafter FBIS-JPRS, Jan. 20,
1982]; Gelatt, Laws for China's Economic Zones Are Unclear, Asian Wall St. J., Feb. 10, 1982,
at 20, col. 1 [hereinafter Asian Wall St. J., Feb. 10, 1982]; Gelatt, Land, Entry Laws in China's
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point policy guidelines publicized five months earlier by Guangdong offi-
cials in Hong Kong. They were authorized by a resolution adopted at a
Standing Committee of the National and People's Congress meeting in
Beijing on November 26.320 The regulations were approved by the thir-
teenth session of the Standing Committee of the Guangdong Provincial
People's Congress on November 17, 1981, and were sent to the Standing
Committee of the National People's Congress for rectification and
promulgation.321
On December 24, 1981, the Standing Committee of the Guangdong
Provincial People's Congress promulgated four new regulations which
came into effect on January 1, 1982. 2  Three of the four regulations
were of general application to all SEZs, while the land regulation applied
only to the Shenzhen SEZ.
a. The Guangdong Provisional Entry/Exit Regulations in Special
Economic Zones
Article 18 of the 1980 SEZ regulations, also formulated as the third
Economic Zones, Asian Wall St. J., Feb. 11, 1982, at 18, col. I [hereinafter Asian Wall St. J.,
Feb. 11, 1982]; Moser, Guangdong's SEZs: Four New Regulations Fill Important Gaps, CHINA
Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1982, at 40; Fung, Laws Are Unveiled on Foreign Investment in the
Guangdong Special Economic Zones, Asian Wall St. J., Dec. 24, 1981, at 4, col. 1 (daily)
[hereinafter Asian Wall St. J. Daily, Dec. 24, 1981]; Fung, Guangdong Unveils Several Laws to
Attract Investment to Zones, Asian Wall St. J. Weekly, Dec. 28, 1981, at 5, col.l [hereinafter
Asian Wall St. J. Weekly, Dec. 28, 1981].
320. FBIS-JPRS, Jan. 20, 1982, supra note 319, at 109.
321. Regulations for Special Economic Zones Approved, FBIS Daily Rep., Dec. 14, 1981, at
49. The five regulations approved at the session were identified as: 1) "temporary provisions
on management of enterprises, labor and wages in the special economic zones of Guangdong
Province"; 2) "temporary provisions on management of personnel entering and leaving the
special economic zones of Guangdong Province"; 3) "temporary provisions on management of
enterprise registration in the special economic zones of Guangdong Province"; 4) "temporary
provisions on management of land in Shenzhen special economic zone"; and 5) "temporary
provisions on administrative management in Shenzhen special economic zone." The regula-
tions were drawn up by the provincial "special zones management committee" after the pro-
mulgation of the Guangdong SEZ Regulations. The drafts of the five regulations were
examined and revised at a joint Guangdong and Fujian provinces meeting on the SEZs after a
study team conducted an on-site inspection of the Shenzhen SEZ and after the legal commis-
sion of the Standing Committee of the Provincial People's Congress was allowed to submit its
own comments. The first three regulations listed here were to be applicable in all of the SEZs
of Guangdong Province. The last two were only applicable to the Shenzhen SEZ. See id.
322. Guangdong Regulations on Special Economic Zones, FBIS-JPRS, Jan. 6, 1982, at 77.
While five regulations earlier had been approved, four additional regulations were promulgated
by the Standing Committee. The four dealt with "entry and exit visas for the special zones,
registration of enterprises, wages for labor in the enterprises, and land control in the Shenzhen
special economic zone." The regulations were said to "grant preferential treatment and cer-
tain conveniences to overseas investors so that a new system conducive to absorbing foreign
capital and importing technology can be established." Id.
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point of the Ten-Point Policy Outline for SEZ Development, indicated
that customs rules soon would appear. Also, it provided that entry and
exit procedures would be simplified and that import duties on certain
items would be reduced or eliminated. In late 1981 Provisional Entry/
Exit Regulations (EERs), effective as of January 1, 1982, appeared.323
The EERs deal primarily with travel to and from the SEZs of certain
undefined classes of people.
The scope of the regulations is set out in article 2. This article pro-
vides that the EERs "apply to all foreigners, Overseas Chinese, Hong
Kong, Macao, and Taiwan compatriots who enter the special economic
zones (SEZs) via the country's open ports within the SEZ or via ports
designated for the SEZ." Those who seek to enter China via open ports
or leave China via the SEZs, however, are required to do so in accord-
ance with existing regulations.324
The EERs deal at length with travelers entering from Hong Kong or
Macao. Under Article 3, different entry and exit procedures are set out
for Foreign Nationals and Overseas Chinese (FNOC), as well as "compa-
triots" from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan. To obtain a visa, FNOC
must hold a passport and apply through "authorized travel organs or
other representative organs in Hong Kong or Macao. ' '325 Those FNOC
who work or own factories or homes in the SEZ may obtain multiple
entry visas, provided they have a letter of proof from the SEZ develop-
ment company.326
"Compatriots" of Hong Kong and Macao who seek to enter the
SEZs must present a "Home Visit Certificate" and an application which
must be approved. 327  Residents of Hong Kong and Macao who "have
set up factories, have other work and have bought homes or live in the
SEZ" may be excused from filing an application. 328 To be excused from
filing, a Hong Kong or Macao resident must present to the SEZ Munici-
pal Public Security Bureau a "Hong Kong Macao Compatriot Resident
323. A translation of the EERs taken from the Ta Kung Pao (Hong Kong ed., weekly
supplement in English) appears in Moser, supra note 319, at 41 [hereinafter reference will only
be made to specific articles of the entry/exit regulations].
324. Id. art. 2. It is not clear which regulations are meant.
325. Id. art. 3.1. The third point of the Ten-Point Policy Outline indicated that SEZ au-
thorities would have the power to order visa offices to issue entry visas for FNOC who wish to
enter a zone. See supra text accompanying note 297.
326. EERs, supra note 323, art. 3.1. Such multiple entry/exit visas are more limited in
scope than those which the third point of the Ten-Point Policy Outline indicated would be
adopted. Those visas were said to be issued to those who wish to enter and leave a zone
frequently. See supra text accompanying note 298.
327. EERs, supra note 323, art. 3.2.
328. Id.
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Permit" or a letter of proof from the SEZ development company. 329
Those exempted will be issued a "permanent registration booklet for per-
sonal effects.",
330
Residents of Taiwan may apply for visas to the SEZs through au-
thorized travel organs in Hong Kong and Macao if they have identifica-
tion.33' Entry and exit documents will then be issued by China's visa
office.332
"Foreigners" applying to enter a SEZ directly from a country or
territory other than Hong Kong or Macao must present entry visas is-
sued by China's visa office. 333 Foreign nationals, however, who seek to
enter the SEZ from China or enter other parts of China from a SEZ,
must do so in accordance with existing regulations.334
Only certain types of tourists may obtain group visas.335 Under Ar-
ticle 5, only tour groups of FNOC seeking to enter the SEZs from Hong
Kong or Macao for tourist purposes may be issued group visas.
A "resident permit" may be issued by the SEZ to certain classes of
people traveling to and remaining in the SEZs for over one year.3 36
FNOC and residents of Hong Kong and Macao may qualify for a "tem-
porary resident permit" from the municipal Public Security Bureau if
they live or own homes in a SEZ and wish to remain between six months
and one year.3 "
The segregated nature of the SEZs is highlighted by the fact that
Chinese citizens who wish to enter or exit a SEZ are subject to certain
regulations. These regulations are not specified, however, and Article 11
provides only that the entry and exit procedure for Chinese cadres and
staff working in a SEZ will be in accordance with existing law.
The EERs also indicate that everyone entering or leaving a SEZ
may be subject to inspection. Under Article 2, those leaving China via a
SEZ or entering another part of China via an open port are subject to
inspection by port authorities. FNOC entering a SEZ from Hong Kong
or Macao will be inspected and cleared at border checkpoints. 338 The
baggage of those entering from Hong Kong, Macao, or overseas is sub-
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Id. art. 3.3.
332. Id.
333. Id. art. 4.
334. Id. art. 9. Again, what such regulations may be is unclear.
335. Id. art. 5.
336. Id. art. 6.
337. Id.
338. Id. art. 3.1.
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ject to inspection by SEZ customs.3 3 9 Persons and goods from "epidemic
areas," 34° however, are subject to inspection at the port of entry by
health and animal and plant quarantine authorities. 34' Additionally, to
travel by road between the SEZ and Hong Kong or Macao, drivers must
first obtain approval from the SEZ (Municipal) People's Government
and an inspection and clearance from the SEZ (Municipal) Public
Security.34 2
Although observers welcomed the new entry and exit regulations,
especially the multiple-entry visas, 343 a close reading of the EERs indi-
cates they are less significant than predicted. For example, the EERs
apply only to a narrow class of travelers and investors, 34  and fail to
simplify important customs procedures. Also, the new regulations are
ambiguous, and therefore leave much discretion with local authorities.3 4 5
While the EERs may not ease the burden of SEZ travelers and in-
vestors, they are significant because they implicitly establish a border
within a border, similar to the treaty port days when certain areas were
set off from the rest of China. As a result, the SEZs will not be just open,
multiple-use neighborhood areas, but will finally take on that segregated
quality which is characteristic of a true FTZ.
b. Guangdong Provisional Labor and Wage Regulations in
Special Economic Zones
Potential SEZ investors eagerly awaited the new labor regnla-
339. Id. art. 7.
340. Id. art. 8. This quarantine provision refers to the "Health and Quarantine Regulation,
People's Republic of China's" [sic] and "Animal and Plant Quarantine Regulations, People's
Republic of China."
341. Id.
342. Id. art. 10.
343. See Asian Wall St. J., Daily, Dec. 24, 1981, supra note 319, at 4, col. 1; Asian Wall St.
J., Weekly, Dec. 28, 1981, supra note 319, at 4, col. 1. Note the more cautious attitude in
Moser, supra note 319, at 40. The Ta Kung Pao (Hong Kong ed., weekly supplement in
English) read the regulations to allow overseas Chinese, foreign investors, and Hong Kong,
Macao, and Taiwan compatriots who go regularly to a SEZ for "business reasons" to obtain a
multiple entry visa. FBIS-JPRS, Jan. 20, 1982, supra note 319, at 109.
344. EERs, supra note 323, art. 3.1. As pointed out in the preceding footnote, the new
regulations do not automatically grant a multiple entry/exit visa (MEV) to any traveler.
Rather, the regulations provide that only a certain class of "Foreign Nationals and Overseas
Chinese" (i.e., those who have set up factories, have other work, or have bought homes or live
in the SEZ and need to travel regularly to and from the SEZ) may, with a letter of proof from
the SEZ development company, apply for a MEV. Foreigners are unable to obtain a MEV.
345. A potential FNOC investor must fit within the unexplained "other work" provision of
Art. 3 in order to be able to apply for a MEV. "Foreigners" must present entry visas for
inspection and clearance.
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tions,34 6 hoping for clarification of employment contracts, salary levels,
and management of new employees. The fourth point of the Ten-Point
Policy Outline had indicated that zone staff and workers would be em-
ployed under a contract, zone enterprises would have some autonomy
regarding termination and other employment matters, and enterprises
would be responsible for employee pension and welfare benefits. The
new "provisional" Labor and Wage regulations (LWRs), which became
effective January 1, 1982, addressed these points. The regulations, how-
ever, were ambiguous and left much for local interpretation.
Labor contracts are addressed in Article 2 of the LWRs. The article
requires foreign and SEZ enterprises to enter into labor contracts with
new employees. A labor contract must include the following points:
"employment, dismissal, and resignation; job specification; service pay-
ment, award, and fines; working hours and holidays; labor insurance and
welfare; labor protection; and labor discipline."347
The LWRs also directed the Shenzhen SEZ and the Zhuhai and
Shantou municipalities, under the guidance of the SEZ (Municipal) La-
bor Bureau, to set up a labor service company.348 This organization was
to assist SEZ enterprises in the employment of labor and provide gui-
dance to workers seeking employment with a zone enterprise.349
The regulations set out, albeit in uncertain language, a variety of
freedoms for SEZ enterprises. The SEZ enterprise may hire staff and
workers through the labor service company, if it obtains the Labor Bu-
reau's approval.350 The SEZ enterprise may advertise for workers on its
346. A translation of the labor regulations taken from the Ta Kung Pao (Hong Kong ed.,
weekly supplement supplement in English) appears in Moser, supra note 319, at 42-43 [herein-
after reference will only be made to specific sections of the Labor Wage Regulations].
347. LWRs, supra note 346, art. 2. Under the SKIZ particulars, the SKIZ joint venture
was not allowed to enter into an employment contract with domestic employees, but only
could contract with the SKIZ labor services company. See supra text accompanying note 172.
348. LWRs, supra note 346, art. 3.
349. Id.
350. Id. art. 4. The true extent of the freedom extended by this provision is uncertain for a
number of reasons. First, since "staff and workers" is not defined under the regulations, it is
unclear whether all "staff and workers," including those from foreign countries, may only be
hired after bureaucratic approval or whether the provision refers only to domestic staff and
workers. Second, it is unclear what this approval obligation actually entails. Third, the provi-
sion does not indicate whether an SEZ enterprise can obtain blanket approval for any and all
hiring done by the enterprise or whether the SEZ enterprise must obtain an approval for each
and every employee it seeks to employ.
Note that the term "staff and workers" likely includes only Chinese citizens, since under
the SEZ regulations zone enterprises were allowed to hire only Chinese employees for nontech-
nical and nonmanagement work. See supra text accompanying note 228.
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own behalf"' and may make a selection based on an examination.3"2
The SEZ enterprise is permitted to run technical schools and classes to
train management and technical workers.3 53 SEZ enterprises are given
the right to make decisions on the enterprise's wages, awards, and
allowances.354
Although the enterprise is also given certain rights to reprimand or
terminate staff and workers,3 55 these rights are restricted by the regula-
tions. Under Article 4, an SEZ enterprise is given the right to employ
workers for a six-month probationary period. To terminate a worker,
however, one of two conditions must exist. Under Article 16, SEZ enter-
prises may dismiss staff and workers whose employment is considered
redundant or unnecessary in view of changes in production or technical
conditions, or who fail to reach requirements after training and could not
be reassigned to more suitable work.356 Under Article 17, a staff member
or worker may be dismissed for violating enterprise regulations and caus-
ing losses.357
The LWRs set limits on enterprise employment practices. For ex-
ample, SEZ enterprises are required to employ only staff workers who
are above the age of sixteen.35 8 There are also a number of provisions
restricting the enterprise's freedom regarding the daily, weekly, and an-
nual work period of SEZ staff and workers. Article 10 provides that the
SEZ enterprise must employ workers for an eight-hour day and a six-day
week, with the exception of special types of workers for whom separate
351. LWRs, supra note 346, art. 4. The provision presumably does not allow those seeking
to establish an enterprise in an SEZ to advertise for workers to determine what the labor
market is like.
352. Id.
353. Id. art. 6. The regulations in a variety of sections (arts. 1, 2, 4, 8, 11, 15, 16, 17, and
18) distinguish between management, staff, and workers. These regulations imply that man-
agement refers to foreign personnel. Therefore, SEZ enterprises are only allowed to train for-
eign management workers at such schools or in such classes.
354. Id. art. 9. Despite the apparent liberality of this provision, other provisions discussed
in the subsequent text limit wages. See infra text accompanying notes 361-366.
Note also that this liberal provision is in conflict with the wage provision of the Second
SKIZ Investor's Handbook which required wages to "HK $750 or so on the average." 1981
HANDBOOK, supra note 252.
355. See supra text accompanying notes 347-348.
356. LWRs, supra note 346, art. 16. The term "requirements" is undefined and it is un-
clear whether this term refers to personnel requirements, productivity requirements, or re-
quirements which the enterprise itself has failed to meet. After dismissal, a staff member or
worker is entitled to one month's wages for every year of service, one month's wage if the staff
member or worker has worked less than one year, or a half of a month's wages if the staff
member or worker is still on probation.
357. Id. art. 17.
358. Id. art. 5.
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rules shall be made.359 Article 11 provides that SEZ enterprise staff and
workers shall "enjoy rest days, public holidays, home leaves, and special
leaves for marriage and other reasons" according to the rights and bene-
fits stipulated in the labor contract and regulations promulgated by the
Chinese government.
3 60
Although the regulations give the SEZ enterprise some freedom to
establish how wages will be earned,361 they also set out several wage stan-
dards. Remuneration for staff and workers must be negotiated and in-
cluded in the labor contract.362 To set wage levels, the enterprise must
consider the type of operation and the nature of the work and should
provide for an annual increase of five to fifteen percent in accordance
with staff and worker proficiency.363 The SEZ enterprise must also pro-
vide overtime pay for work above a certain (presumably negotiable)
level.364 Under Article 8, the SEZ enterprise is allowed to pay the
worker or staff member only seventy percent of his or her wage "includ-
ing basic and floating wages. ' 365 Of the remaining wage, five percent is
deducted for staff and worker benefits and twenty-five percent goes to the
state to pay social labor insurance and other worker subsidies.36 6
Other LWR articles provide that the SEZ enterprise must abide by
the general laws in addition to SEZ regulations. The SEZ enterprise
must give the staff and workers rest days, holidays, home leaves, and
359. Id. art. 10. The eight-hour day, six-day work week is not fixed at its upper limit
because the enterprise must pay "overtime... accordingly."
360. It is unclear what these regulations are.
361. LWRs, supra note 346, art. 9. The Regulations allow an SEZ enterprise to make its
own decisions on the enterprise's "form of wages, awards, and allowances." Additionally,
wages are allowed to take the form of "piecework, or hourly, daily, or monthly work," as the
SEZ enterprise deems fit.
362. The "labor contract" is addressed in Art. 2.
363. LWRs, supra note 346, art. 7.
364. See supra note 359 and accompanying text.
365. LWRs, supra note 346, art. 8. The term "basic and floating wages" is undefined under
the Regulations. Note that the fourth point of the Ten-Point Policy Outline indicated that
wages were to have two component parts: basic and floating. To what these components
actually referred is unclear even under the LWRs. See supra text accompanying note 301.
366. It is unclear whether the SEZ enterprise is allowed to keep the five percent itself as a
subsidy to cover the enterprise's overhead in providing benefits to staff and workers, or
whether it is given to the state and goes to cover the cost of "subsidiaries" which the state may
provide to the SEZ enterpise or the cost of benefits the state provides to staff and workers.
Under the First SKIZ Handbook, ten percent of an employee's total wages was to be set
aside for the worker's welfare fund and to pay for the worker's medical benefits. See supra text
accompanying note 176. It should be recognized that a government official, in explaining the
wage and benefits provisions of the SKIZ Second Handbook, stated that SKIZ employees were
to be allowed to keep eighty percent of earned wages and submit twenty percent to the state.
That proportion would now violate the LWRs. See supra text accompanying note 285.
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special leaves stipulated by Chinese government regulations. 367 The SEZ
enterprise must comply with labor and environmental protection laws,
368
and SEZ authorities have the right to inspect and supervise to ensure
compliance.3 69 The SEZ enterprise must comply with the government's
regulations on female workers and give special consideration to the pro-
tection of their health. 37" Additionally, the SEZ enterprise must insure,
according to the government's Labor Insurance Regulations, against on-
the-job accidents which cause wounds, disability, or death.37 1
While the regulations limit the freedom of SEZ enterprises, they also
restrict the conduct of enterprise staff and workers. Although a SEZ
enterprise must accept workers' or staff members' resignations 372 ten-
dered under special circumstances, workers who have received "special
training" for a period of three months or more are not allowed to resign
until completion of one year's service.373 If a specially trained worker
resigns or leaves without permission before the completion of one year,
that worker must compensate the enterprise for the costs of his or her
training.374 Furthermore, staff members or workers who violate the en-
terprise's regulations and cause losses may be subject to "warnings, de-
merit marks, wage reductions, or dismissal ... according to the nature
and degree of their offense."
375
The regulations make special provision for workers from Hong
Kong, Macao, and Taiwan. Article 19 provides that all conditions affect-
ing the "hiring, dismissal, resignation, awards, fining, welfare, and social
insurance" of compatriots from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan must
be set forth in employment contracts, and decisions in specific cases can
be made only by the the board of directors of the SEZ enterprise.
367. See supra note 360 and accompanying text.
368. LWRs, supra note 346, art. 12.
369. The scope of this inspection and supervision authority is unstated, but it calls into
question the degree of control and privacy which an enterprise actually has when operating in
an SEZ.
370. LWRs, supra note 346, art. 13.
371. Id. art. 14.
372. This reference to "members of the staff and workers" contained in Art. 15 suggests
that "staff and workers" is intended to mean a specially designated class containing
"members."
373. LWRs, supra note 346, Art. 15.
374. Id. Art. 15, however, does not indicate how the enterprise shall be compensated.
375. Id. art. 17. Note that cases of dismissal must be reported to the SEZ (Municipal)
Labor Bureau. Under Art. 18, if a dismissed staff member or worker refuses to accept the
dismissal, that individual may submit his or her case to the enterprise for further consultation.
"If the consultation fails, the case may be referred to the SEZ (Municpal) Labor Bureau for
mediation." An appeal of the Labor Bureau's decision may be taken to the local People's
Court. Id. art. 18.
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The Labor Regulations are deceptively simple. They appear to pro-
vide foreign investors with the flexibility to deal with the unknown quan-
tity of Chinese labor. The value of the regulations, however, is
diminished because of their ambiguous language and the requirement
that the local labor approve all labor contracts.376
c. Guangdong Provisional Land Regulations for Shenzhen Special
Economic Zone
The Land Regulations (LRs), which came into effect on January 1,
1982, apply only to SEZ enterprises in Shenzhen province. Generally,
the regulations codify the socialist principle that land is not to be sold
(since all real property belongs to the people), but only leased. The regu-
lations complement the general land use provisions in the SEZ regula-
tions and set out rates for the lease of property.37 7 In addition, the
regulations provide that SEZ enterprises are responsible for installing all
necessary public utilities.
The regulations recognize that the Municipal People's Government
of Shenzhen has the right to "requisition, appropriate or recognize" land
in the SEZ and administer "developed and underdeveloped mineral re-
sources, streams, cultivated and uncultivated land, wooded areas, and
land and offshore resources. 378
The law requires individuals and enterprises to abide by the SEZ
general development plan, once approved. 379 The regulations prohibit
the unauthorized alteration of the topography and general configuration
of the land, as well as the appropriation of lands and buildings.380
The regulations set out the procedure which an investor must follow
to use land in the Shenzhen SEZ. Units and individuals must apply to
the Shenzhen Municipal People's Government.3 8' An investor seeking to
use SEZ land, however, must apply to the municipal planning depart-
376. Id. arts. 2, 3.
377. A translation of the LRs taken from the Ta Kung Pao (Hong Kong) edition appears
in Moser, supra note 319, at 44 [hereinafter reference only will be made to specific article
numbers of the LRs].
378. Id. art. 2. Under this article, the administration, requisition, appropriation, or nation-
alization is to take place according to the "reconstruction needs of the SEZ and relevant laws
and decrees ...." Id. What these needs, laws, or decrees are is not stated.
379. Id. art. 3.
380. Id.
381. Id. art. 4. Under Art. 7 the "SEZ land development" is under the administration of
the Shenzhen Development Company, which may make arrangements regarding the revenue
from and costs for land development. The contours of the responsibilities of each of the bu-
reaucratic organizations to which reference is made remains unclear under the regulations.
Note also that under the SEZ regulations, GPAC was given the responsibility to review
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ment and provide documents, contracts, agreements, and other relevant
data.3" 2
Once the investor completes payment procedures for the use and
demarcation of the land, the investor will be issued a "Certificate for
Land Use." '383 Within six months the investor must submit a general
blueprint and the construction and production plans.384 Within nine
months of the issuance of the certificate the investor must break
ground.38 5 If the investor fails to comply with this schedule, the certifi-
cate and payments are subject to forfeiture.386
To obtain final approval, the SEZ enterprise must comply with the
requirement for the "ratio of space allotted to buildings and greenery"3 7
and satisfy safety and fire prevention standards set out in the govern-
ment's civil engineering regulations.388 All SEZ enterprises are subject to
final inspection and approval by the proper authorities before going into
and approve applications submitted by investors and to issue registration certificates and land
use certificates.
Note that a conflict arises regarding which bureaucratic organization has control over the
land in the SKIZ. The SKIZ particulars provide that the Real Estate Company of the Shekou
Industrial Zone has land control responsibilities there.
382. LRs, supra note 377, art. 8. It is unclear how an Art. 8 "investor" is different from an
Art. 4 "unit" or "individual." The distinction on the face of the regulations appears to be
important except for the fact investors are allowed to apply apparently only "on the strength of
approved documents, contracts, agreements, and the submission of relevant data .. " Id. art.
8.
383. Id. Once the approved documents, contracts, agreements, and relevant data have
been submitted, the investor will be allowed to apply for SEZ land use. At that point, the only
thing preventing the investor from receiving the "Certificate for Land Use" is the undefined
payment.
384. Id. art. 9. The Land Use Certificate is a preliminary document since it is based merely
on the strength of the documents, contracts, agreements, and relevant data which the investor
has used in order to apply for the certificate. The character of the construction or production
does not come into play in the land use decision at all. The regulations do not make clear to
whom the investor should submit the "general blue print" or the "construction and production
plans."
385. Id.
386. Id. The article provides that any delay must be reported to the department "which
approved the project" (presumably the municipal planning department) for verification, and in
the case of "illegitimate delay" the certificate will be canceled. Id. It is unclear whose sched-
ule is to be used to determine investor compliance, but because of the sanctions the cautious
investor should determine this point before proceeding with any plans.
387. Id. art. 11. The ratio is not specified in the regulations, nor is it clear what "required
by SEZ" actually means. Presumably it refers to the Municipal People's Government of
Shenzhen, which is given the obligation to administer land use in the SEZ.
388. Id. art. 12. Under the regulations, if an enterprise goes into operation without meet-
ing the safety and fire prevention precautions and an accident does occur, the enterprise must
compensate for the resulting losses and will be held "legally responsible" for the accident. The
LRs clarify neither the civil engineering regulations nor what "legal responsibility" actually
entails. Id.
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operation. 389 If the investor is not permitted to begin operations, other
investors cannot tear down, modify, or rebuild the structure.
390
Once final approval is obtained, the SEZ enterprise must use the
land in accordance with the contract and agreement.391 The regulations
prohibit units and individuals from engaging in the unauthorized appro-
priation of land and buildings.392 If an investor uses land without ob-
taining the necessary approval, the investor's contracts are considered
invalid.393 Land sales, all disguised forms of land sales, leasing, unau-
thorized transfers of land, mining, and exploitation of resources are
forbidden.394
The regulations recognize "takings" of civilian dwellings and other
structures. Article 6 states that compensation for structures that must be
moved or torn down because of land appropriation shall be as stipulated
in regulations issued by the People's Republic of China and the
Guangdong Provincial People's Government.395
The actual term during which an enterprise is permitted to use land
varies according to investment size and need, but will not exceed the
term specified in the regulations for any one use.396 The regulations
specify that enterprises financed by outside investors or joint ventures
will be charged for land use and that the charges will vary according to
the location and purposes for which the land is used. 39 7 Educational,
389. Id. art. 10. The term "proper authorities" is undefined, thus opening the question of
to whom the SEZ investor will have to look for approval and whether the SEZ investor will
ever know when it has finally satisfied all those who have approval authority.
390. Id. art. 10. Because of the expansive and ambiguous working of this extreme provi-
sion, it is possible that an investor who builds an entire production unit, but who fails "final
approval," may find that it will not be allowed to modify the unit in order to comply and
obtain final approval.
391. Id. art. 13.
392. Id.
393. Id. art. 14. It is unclear whether only those contracts related to the use of the land are
invalid or rather any and all contracts into which the enterprise may have entered are invalid.
394. Id. art. 5.
395. Art. 6 does not state whether the person or persons who had lived in the civilian
dwelling or had an interest in the structure receive any compensation because it has been
moved away or torn down.
396. LRs, supra note 377, art. 15. The terms and periods set out in the regulations are the
following: industrial use - 30 years; commercial use (including restaurants) - 20 years;
development of marketable housing - 50 years; educational, scientific, and technological and
medical use - 50 years; tourism - 30 years; and, "for crop raising, animal husbandry, and
raising grounds"-- 20 years. Id. "Raising grounds" refers to that land needed for the raising
of poultry or fish, Guide to Some Economic Regions in China of Interest to Foreign Business-
men, SINO-BRITISH TRADE, Mar. 1982, at 8. The land use terms set out in this article vary
with those set out in the regulations as provided in Moser, supra note 319, at 45.
397. LRs, supra note 377, art. 16. Under the 1980 Handbook, the land utility cost was set
at HK $2 to HK $4 per square foot per year. See supra note 170 and accompanying text. At
19861
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
cultural, scientific and technological, medical, and social welfare institu-
tions receive preferential treatment. 39 ' Nonprofit institutions and excep-
tionally advanced technologies are exempt from land charges.399
Probably the most burdensome provisions of the Land Use Regula-
tions relate to the obligation of the SEZ enterprise to install public utility
facilities. Under chapter IV, Article 20, SEZ enterprises must install
public utility facilities as required by municipal plans and "within the
confines of their allotted land .... " (which implies that the facility must
be installed on the land the enterprise leases, thereby increasing the size
of the plot of land needed by the enterprise). These facilities include
power lines, water supply lines, drainage works, sewage systems, gas
lines, and telecommunication facilities.' Additionally, the SEZ enter-
prise is responsible for the cost of connecting its own pipes with external
mains.4°1 Furthermore, the SEZ enterprise must dispose of and treat
residual substances, fumes, and wastewater and is subject to inspection
and fees imposed by the SEZ environmental authorities.4 °2
The Land Regulations are beneficial to the investor because they
provide new information. For example, the regulations include an over-
view of the bureaucracy and procedures established to handle Shenzhen
SEZ land use matters. Like all Chinese SEZ regulations, however, the
Land Regulations are ambiguous. For example, it is unclear whether
these regulations will apply to the SKIZ, which offered more reasonable
the time, land charges in Hong Kong were HK $55 per square foot. See supra note 189 and
accompanying text. The charges per square meter per annum for land used are set out in the
regulations: land for industrial use - 10-30 yuan; land for commercial use - 70-200 yuan;
land for development of marketable housing - 30-60 yuan; land for tourism - 60-100 yuan;
land for crop raising, animal husbandry, and raising grounds - subject to negotiation. LRs,
supra note 377, art. 16. These rates are subject to readjustment once every three years but the
rates will not fluctuate more than 30%. Id. The land charges may be paid "in one lot, or paid
within two years free of interest, or paid annually at an interest rate of 8 percent." Id. art. 18.
Therefore, it appears that the investor who pays its land use charge "in one lot" (presumably
meaning all at one time before the enterprise's production begins) will save money because of
the avoidance of interest charges and the possible rate fluctuation every three years. But again
it is uncertain whether the investor may pay the enterprise's land use charges for the entire
term of the enterprise or just for the first three year period.
398. Id. art. 17. Whether the "preferential treatment" extends only to land use charges is
unstated.
399. Id. art. 17. It is not clear what such exempt enterprises may be or who will decide the
issue.
400. Id. art. 21.
401. Id.
402. Id. art. 22. For China's new Law on Environmental Protection, see Valauskas &
Ottley, supra note 103, at 39.
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land use rates than the Shenzhen. 4'03
d. Guangdong Provisional Regulations for Business Registration
in Special Economic Zones
The Business Registration Regulations (BRRs) 4 set forth proce-
dures which a SEZ enterprise must follow on an annual basis. Under the
BRRs, a SEZ enterprise must comply with registration requirements and
pay taxes and fees. Noncompliance will jeopardize an enterprise's au-
thorization to operate in the zone.
Before an enterprise"4 5 is permitted to operate in a zone, it must
submit an application containing certain information." 6 If the applica-
tion is approved by the local or provincial government 40 7 the enterprise
will receive a "registration certificate" or "business license" from the
SEZ Department of Industry and Commerce 8 and is then legally pro-
tected by the People's Republic of China." 9
After the enterprise is established, the BRRs restrict the enterprise's
freedom in several ways. The SEZ enterprise must open bank accounts
with the Bank of China or another government-approved bank.41 0 It
403. With respect to fees, the SKIZ Guidelines stated that land use fees were HK $2 to HK
$4 per square foot.
404. The BRRs appear in translation in Moser, supra note 319, at 46 [hereinafter reference
only will be made to specific article numbers of the BRRs].
405. Enterprises subject to the BRRs include foreign equity enterprises, equity joint ven-
tures, and non-equity joint ventures. Id. art. 2.
406. The SEZ enterprise registration applications must be filled out in triplicate, in Chinese
and another language, and contain the following "main items": name of business, address,
range of business, operation of business, registered capital, and the sharing of capital held by
each partner in equity or non-equity enterprise, members of the board, general manager, dep-
uty-general manager or factory director, deputy factory director, the organ approving the doc-
ument, document ordinal number and date, total number of employees, and number of foreign
staff and workers. Id. art. 4.
In addition, the application must be accompanied by an approval document from the
local SEZ (Municipal) People's Government or SEZ administrative committee where the en-
terprise is located; copies in Chinese and another language of the enterprise's partnership
agreement; charter, contracts, and a list of the enterprise's board members; and a copy of
registration from that country where the enterprise originated. Id. art. 3.
407. Under the 1980 SEZ Regulations, approval of an SEZ enterprise came only from the
provincial government. See Asian Wall St. J. (Daily), Feb. 10, 1982, supra note 319, at 4.
408. BRRs, supra note 404, art. 2. Businesses termed "special" by the People's Republic of
China will be given "special registration certificates or licenses." Id. It is unclear what "spe-
cial" actually means, whether such a designation is desirable or not, and to whom and how the
designation is given.
409. Id. art. 6. It is not known who decides what is legitimate production.
410. Id. art. 7. In order for foreign banks and other financial institutions to be allowed to
open an office in an SEZ, it must follow "separate regulations." Id. art. 2. Under the SEZ
regulations, however, a zone investor was allowed, but not required, to open an account and
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must also register with the local tax office.4 11 To maintain operations, a
SEZ enterprise must annually renew its registration certificates (for the
enterprise and its branch offices)412 and pay the registration fees set by
the SEZ (Municipal) People's Government or the SEZ administrative
committee.413
Before an enterprise can change its method of operation, it must
obtain approval from the SEZ (Municipal) People's Government or the
SEZ administrative committee and notify the SEZs' Department of In-
dustry, Commerce and Tax office of the changes.414 Additionally, before
a SEZ enterprise can cease its operations it must obtain permits from the
SEZ (Municipal) People's Government, the SEZ administrative commit-
tee, or another authorized government office. These permits, as well as
the enterprise's registration certificate or business license, must be
presented to the SEZs' Department of Industry, Commerce and Tax
office.415
The BRRs authorize the SEZ Department of Industry and Com-
merce to inspect and supervise SEZ enterprises.416 Any enterprise that
violates the regulations may be warned, fined, or ordered to close.4 17
As with other regulations, the BRRs are ambiguous and inconsis-
tent. For example, under Article 3, either the local government or pro-
vincial government may approve a SEZ enterprise. Under the 1980 SEZ
Regulations, however, approval comes only from the provincial govern-
ment.418 Furthermore, it is unclear whether the BRRs replace the bu-
reaucracy established to handle SKIZ enterprises. Additionally, the
BRRs do not discuss the standards and procedures for the inspection of
SEZ enterprises.
handle foreign exchange matters at the Bank of China. See supra note 224 and accompanying
text.
411. BRRs, supra note 404, art. 7.
412. Id. art. 9. The regulations make no mention of whether business licenses must be
renewed each year.
413. Id. art. 10. It is unstated at what level those fees will be set.
414. Id. art. 8. "Changes" include alteration of the SEZs location, line of production, "in-
crease, cut or transfer [of] its registered capital," extension of the enterprise's "expiry date,"
and those "items" listed in the enterprise's registration application. For example, before an
enterprise can change its "total number of employees" (one of the "items" on the application)
the SEZ must obtain the necessary approvals.
415. Id. art. 11. The BRRs are not clear on what this entire procedure actually entails.
Under the SEZ Regulations, a trader must provide reasons to GPAC, obtain approval, and
handle all debts and loans before it is allowed to close a SEZ business and transfer assets out of
the country. See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
416. BRRs, supra note 404, art. 12. The extent of supervision is unclear.
417. Id.
418. See Gelatt, supra note 319, at 4.
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IV. THE SEZs: AN ASSESSMENT
A. Initial Confusion
China's efforts to attract foreign investors to its trade zones have
faltered at the implementation stage. Possibly due to the leadership's un-
familiarity with the zone concept or its concern about the popular reac-
tion to an invasion of foreign investors, the zones were established
through vague and ambiguous policy statements. Foreign investors felt
uncomfortable with the ill-defined nature of the zones, especially consid-
ering that the Cultural Revolution had occurred only ten years earlier,
and adopted a conservative approach to zone investments. The concerns
of foreign investors can be explained by the confusion in several impor-
tant investment areas such as taxation, applicable law, and profits.
In the area of taxation, the zone provisions did not explain whether
enterprises would have to pay China's consolidated tax in addition to
zone taxes. The consolidated tax was a turnover tax, similar to an excise
duty, with rates from 1.5 percent to 6.9 percent, which supposedly ap-
plied to every stage of domestic processing and delivery, regardless of
previously paid taxes.419 Moreover, the personal income taxes imposed
on zone investors and the preferential treatment extended to zone enter-
prises were not described in detail. Remittance taxes were not mentioned
at all.
On the issue of law, the Guangdong Regulations referred to foreign
exchange law, corporate law, banking law, and land use law, none of
which existed when the regulations were adopted. Corporate, banking,
and land use laws, however, did appear in the Guangdong Provisional
Regulations of 1981, which became effective January 1, 1982. In addi-
tion, the joint venture law, which on its face applied to the SKIZ and the
SEZ, was not integrated into the zone provisions. The tax exemption it
contained for enterprises with advanced technology was, therefore, of
questionable application to joint ventures in the zones.
The regulations concerning permissible profits were also unclear.
According to the regulations, "legitimate" after-tax profits and other
''proper" earnings could be removed from China in compliance with the
foreign exchange rules. Despite the importance of this information to
foreign investors, the words legitimate and proper went undefined and
"foreign exchange rules" did not exist.
The four Guangdong Provisional Regulations promulgated in late
1981 provided additional information with respect to (1) customs proce-
419. Id.
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dures, (2) domestic labor, (3) land use, and (4) the establishment and
operation of an SEZ enterprise. Like the previous SEZ provisions, how-
ever, the Provisional Regulations were ambiguous, and even conflicted
with the SEZ provisions, therefore creating more questions than they
answered.
The SKIZ Handbook is far more detailed than the SEZ regulations.
Greater specificity in the SKIZ language may be due to the fact that the
SKIZ is a smaller area, requiring consideration of fewer factors and in-
terests. Furthermore, the ambiguous language and lack of specificity in
the zone provisions may provide more latitude for negotiations.
The investor's search for the character of the zones, however, was
complicated by the unclear relationship between the SKIZ and the SEZ,
and the Handbook and the SEZ Regulations. For example, the SKIZ tax
rate was set at ten percent while the SEZ tax rate was fifteen percent.
Additionally, while the SKIZ was managed by CMSN, the SEZs were
managed by GPAC and others.
To clarify the status of the SKIZ in the SEZ system, China had two
alternatives. It could have placed the SKIZ within the SEZ bureaucracy,
decided inconsistencies in favor of the SEZ provisions and practices, and
elevated Guangdong SEZ officials to positions superior to those of
CMSN's officials. This solution would have avoided the economic and
political problems that would have resulted if the CMSN developed a
superior special economic zone in the same province as the other SEZs.
The integration of the SKIZ into the SEZ, however, could leave foreign
investors with the impression that China was reluctant to accept western-
style business practices. China's second option was to allow CMSN to
retain some or all of its authority and permit the SKIZ to develop
independently.
The second SKIZ Handbook clarified the status of the SKIZ in the
SEZ by stating that the SKIZ was part of the Shenzhen SEZ of
Guangdong Province. In subsequent discussions, however, SKIZ offi-
cials stated that, while the SEZ rules were applicable to investment in the
SKIZ, the rules would be applied flexibly.42 Therefore, while the SKIZ
was part of the Shenzhen SEZ, CMSN would permit negotiations even in
areas where the rules were fixed.421
420. See Mixed Feelings on Shekou, supra note 189, at 353.
421. SKIZ Differences, supra note 147, at 6; Fung, Relaxing Red Tape: Chinese Hope Capi-
talist Features Will Attract Investment to Industrial Area, Asian Wall St. J. Weekly, Aug. 10,
1981, at 12, col. 1 [hereinafter Relaxing Red Tape].
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B. Preference for the SKIZ
Despite initial investor confusion, the SKIZ developed in the 1980's
as one of the best sites in China for foreign investment. CMSN actively
promoted the SKIZ and promised quick decisions, simplified procedures,
and flexibility.422 CMSN promised to run Shekou "like a big private en-
terprise," and pledged to make decisions based on economic, not political
principles.42 3 The objective of both CMSN and the Chinese government
was to establish the SKIZ as a major manufacturing center, attracting
high technology and selected industrial operations, so that the SKIZ
would become an important foreign exchange earning area for China.424
Initial reports indicate that the SKIZ has been successful in at-
tracting investment. By 1981 SKIZ officials reported twenty-one projects
in the SKIZ, with a total value of HK $500 million.425 CMSN had in-
vested fifteen to sixty percent in thirteen of seventeen projects.426 Fur-
thermore, negotiations for 200 or more projects were reportedly
underway.4 27  Overall in 1981, zone operations reportedly earned HK
twenty million dollars.4 28 The majority of enterprises earned a profit in
the first year of operation.429
By 1982 estimates of the investment in the SKIZ ranged from HK
$700 million430 to more than HK $1 billion.431 Most of the investment
422. Fung, China Prepares to Lure Foreign Investors to Build Plants at Shekou Industrial
Site, Wall St. J., June 5, 1981, at 31, col. 1 [hereinafter Lure of SKIZ].
423. Relaxing Red Tape, supra note 421, at 12, col. 1.
424. Lure of SKIZ, supra note 422, at 31, col. 1.
425. Progress Noted on Shenzhen Economic Zone, FBIS Daily Rep., Nov. 9, 1981, at 1.
Unofficial sources estimated that in 1981 seventeen projects with a total value of HK $550
million (US $95.2 million) were under development in the SKIZ. SKIZDifferences, supra note
147, at 1, col. 3. To illustrate the type of investment in the SKIZ, the Far East Consortium
Ltd. of Hong Kong, along with two Singapore Companies, invested HK $200 million in three
SKIZ projects designed to produce flour, biscuits, and animal feed by 1982. SKIZDifferences,
supra note 147, at 6, col. 3. A tourist hotel and machinery repair shop also became operational
in 1981. Seaside villas were also under construction. The villas were for sale to investors or
could be rented by tourists. Apartment buildings in a housing estate were also for sale. Addi-
tionally, factories producing aluminum goods, oxygen, yachts, flour, and containers were
under construction. Progress Noted on Shenzhen Economic Zone, supra, at 1.
426. SKIZ Differences, supra note 147, at 6, col. 3; Relaxing Red Tape, supra note 421, at
12, col. 2.
427. SKIZ Differences, supra note 147, at 1, col. 3.
428. Initial Success of Shekou Industrial Area Reported, FBIS-JPRS, Oct. 5, 1982, at 54
[hereinafter SKIZ Success].
429. Id.
430. Curry, supra note 281, at 18.
431. Fung, Efficient Management Cited at China Industrial Estate, Asian Wall St. J., Feb.
8, 1982, at 14, col. 1 [hereinafter SKIZ Efficient Management].
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money came from Hong Kong4 32 and was concentrated in technology
and light industrial operations.433 In that same year, CMSN reported
that contracts for thirty-six additional projects had been signed.434
Sixteen of these projects were in regular operation and nineteen used or
planned to use advanced technical equipment.435 The single largest in-
vestment project in the SKIZ was a HK $100 million operation estab-
lished by a Hong Kong based company, Sino Master Steel Limited, to
produce steel from scrap.436
Investors remained interested in the SKIZ for many reasons. One of
the zone's main attractions was its autonomy. Another attraction was
that the SKIZ was well-organized and efficient. Several factors contrib-
uted to the organization and efficiency. CMSN was familiar with west-
ern business practices. Investors seeking to locate there, rather than in
other zones, therefore, did not have to educate zone officials about their
methods of operation. Also, SKIZ officials, due to the CMSN influence
and CMSN's experience with foreigners, were not anxious about the
political consequences of locating businesses in the zone. Furthermore,
only one organization, CMSN, managed the zone, thus eliminating the
plethora of bureaucratic agencies found in the other Chinese zones.437
Several other factors drew investors to the SKIZ. First, disputes
between SKIZ parties could be arbitrated in third countries, whereas
parties in other SEZs were required to negotiate disputes themselves.438
Second, technicians and managers for SKIZ operations could be drawn
432. Curry, supra note 281, at 18.
433. SKIZ Efficient Management, supra note 431, at 14, col. 1.
434. Among the 16 in operation are the following: 1) the Zhonghong Oxygen Plant, which
utilized United States equipment; 2) the Haihong Lacquer Plant, which used a Danish paint
manufacturing technique and Chinese raw materials to produce 3000 tons of paint for export
and for sale to China's transport and communications departments; 3) the Haiyun Container
Plant, which was jointly operated by East Asiatic of Denmark and Sea Containers Inc. of the
United States to make sea containers; and 4) the Sino-Swiss Machinery Plant, which was a
joint venture between the Hong Kong office of Edward Keller of Switzerland and CMSN and
reconditioned machinery for the Hong Kong Market. SKIZ Success, supra note 428, at 53-54.
The advanced technical equipment was said to consist of a "microwave relay program con-
trolled digitalizer communications system," patent rights from a Danish company for making
"Old Man" brand lacquer, continuous casting equipment from Italy, an acetylene generator, a
cold roller and cutter for aluminum, and an automatic boiler. Id.
435. Id. at 54.
436. SKIZ Efficient Management, supra note 431, at 14, col. 3. Twenty percent of the
plant's output was to be sold in China. Id.
437. Reportedly, one steel company signed a contract with CMSN after only a week's
worth of negotiations. In some cases it was the foreign corporation and its shareholders that
produced delays in time. Id. at 14, col. 2.
438. Lure of SKIZ, supra note 422, at 31, col. 2.
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from Hong Kong, rather than the domestic economy, 439 and unlike other
zones, SKIZ operators could dismiss workers."' Third, factory space
could be purchased cheaply in the SKIZ4 1 and the SKIZ was accessible
by a daily hovercraft from Hong Kong.' 2 Fourth, customs and immi-
gration formalities were simplified for those involved in SKIZ operations,
making departures and arrivals easier and less time consuming." 3
Finally, the infrastructure in the SKIZ was an investment incentive.
The first SKIZ Investors Handbook promised that the infrastructure
work (the "opening and leveling") would be completed by mid-1980.4
That schedule was not kept," 5 possibly because the work was taking
place in a deserted area." 6 Although the delays were initially viewed as
a drawback, 447 the fact that the infrastructure was completed specifically
for the efficient operation of the SKIZ and the fact that the costs of im-
provements were absorbed by CMSN were seen as advantages." 8
C. The Success of the SKIZ
When it chose to establish the trade zones, the PRC had a simple
but major objective: to attract large-scale foreign investment, thereby
hastening economic development, alleviating unemployment, and im-
proving the balance of trade and payments. The SKIZ has been the most
439. Id.
440. Id.
441. The Hua Jay Joint Venture Company, partly owned by CMSN and by Jay Ease Con-
struction Company of the United States, built 8 blocks of four-story buildings in the SKIZ.
The floors were sold at the cost of HK $1000 and HK $1200 per square meter, which is one
third the cost of similar space in Hong Kong. SKIZ Differences, supra note 147, at 6, col. 5.
442. Id.
443. Curry, supra note 281, at 18.
444. SKIZ Regulations, supra note 156, at 67.
445. Schedule appears in introductory section 4 in the First Investors Handbook. SKIZ
Regulations, supra note 156, at 67-68.
446. SKIZ Success, supra note 428, at 53. CMSN reported that it had some success in the
infrastructure work. The construction of a 150-meter berth, a 100,000 square meter work site,
a 200 square meter dock with embankment, a harbor pond, and an approach passage was
reportedly completed by March 1981. The success was said to be due to reward and penalty
provisions included in the department contracts, the "application of economic laws," the appli-
cation of the "principle of distribution according to work," and the fact that the workers raised
the slogan "win Glory for the Motherland by striving for the Four Modernizations." First
Stage of Shekou Industrial Area Construction Completed, FBIS-JPRS, July 22, 1980, at 77.
447. Lure of SKIZ, supra note 422, at 31, col. 2.
448. CMSN reported that "100 tall buildings" had been built in the SKIZ by mid-1982,
and that in the SKIZ, CMSN accomplished the "accessibility by vehicles, accessibility to water
supply, accessibility to electric power supply, accessibility by boats, accessibility by telecom-
munications and leveling the ground." SKIZ Success, supra note 428, at 53, col. 3.
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successful of all of the SEZs in achieving these objectives." 9 Foreign
firms from 1983 reportedly invested over HK $1 billion in the SKIZ.4 5 °
Countertrade has played an important role in the economic activities of
the SKIZ and by late 1983 SKIZ authorities had entered into sixty-five
cooperation agreements with companies from the United States, Den-
mark, Norway, Japan, Switzerland, Singapore, and Hong Kong. 51 Dur-
ing the first half of 1984 the SKIZ administration signed HK $800
million in contracts with twenty foreign investors,452 four times the value
of 1983 contracts.453 Additionally, in mid-1984, twenty-five of the fifty-
one joint ventures and one hundred percent privately-owned enterprises
reported profits.454
Several administrative agencies with expansive powers recently were
established in the SKIZ.455 A separate district party committee and an
administrative body were established in Shekou, operating under the
Shenzhen City Party Committee and Government. The new Shekou ad-
ministrator has authority to approve agreements and contracts signed in
Shekou and to issue entry and exit certificates to foreign investors perma-
nently residing in the zone. The administrator may also approve the im-
portation of equipment and materials for use in the zones. 456 In addition,
a taxation bureau was set up in the SKIZ with responsibiltity for collect-
ing taxes. Taxes collected during 1984, other than customs duties, will
be used to construct public utilities in Shekou.4 57
In 1984 the Chinese government placed an additional 10.7 square
kilometers under Shekou district administration,458 increasing the area of
the SKIZ five times over. The SKIZ has also changed because of the
449. The success of the SKIZ must be interpreted cautiously, however, because, due to its
efficiency and organization, it is not necessarily representative.
450. Curry, supra note 281, at 18.
45 1. Sanyo Electric Co. of Japan Starts Operations in Shenzhen, Xinhua General Overseas
News Service [hereinafter XGONS], Oct. 31, 1983, item no. 103142.
452. Shekou Joint Ventures Report Profits, XGONS, June 3, 1984, item no. 060320.
453. Id.
454. Id.
455. The new agencies were established after the Guangdong Provincial Communist Party
Committee and the Provincial People's Government approved a report on the issue of delega-
tion of decision-making authority submitted by the Shenzhen City Party Committee and Gov-
ernment. Along with the establishment of the new organizations, measures dealing with the
following were also adopted: management of public security, the importation of new projects
and materials, employment, use of tax revenue, issuance of passes for travel to Hong Kong and
Macao, management of the post offices and telecommunications, transportation, and tourism.
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introduction of new industries. One new industry is devoted to the ex-
ploitation of offshore oil reserves in the Eastern Pearl River basin area of
the South China Sea.459 Two Chinese oil companies, China National Oil
and Gas Exploration and Development Corporation and the Hanhai
Eastern Petroleum Corporation of the China National Offshore Oil Cor-
poration, entered into a ten-year contract with Core Laboratories Inter-
national, Limited, of the United States. Under the agreement, the
companies, operating as China-Corelab, will provide laboratory, engi-
neering, consulting, and field services for onshore and offshore oil devel-
opment.460 In 1984 the SKIZ's port company established a base in
nearby Wuhan to provide support services for offshore oil development
in the area.46' Also in 1984, a major new petroleum joint venture was
established in Chiwan, a new area of the SKIZ. The venture, Chiwan Oil
Base Company, Limited, is jointly run by the China Nanshan Develop-
ment Company, Limited and the Offshore Joint Services Company of
Singapore P.T.E., Limited.462
The electronics industry now plays a more important role in SKIZ
operations. In late 1983, Sanyo (Shekou) Electric Co., Limited, began
operations in the SKIZ.463 This company is composed of six "work-
shops": three workshops are run with joint Sino-Japanese investments
and three only with Japanese investment.464 The operations produce ra-
dios, tape recorders, electronic watches, luminous electronic diodes, and
other products. Approximately 1000 people from all areas of
Guangdong province are employed in these operations.465 Sanyo has
also entered into an agreement with the Light Industrial Department of
Guangdong province to open an air conditioner production unit in the
SKIZ.466
D. The Zones: A Costly Experiment
The PRC has found that any success which the zones have attained
459. The area has long been frequented by ships engaged in the geophysical exploration
activities. See BP Prospecting Ship to Start Operations in South China Sea, XGONS, Aug. 31,
1983, item no. 083151.
460. New Joint Venture Signed, XGONS, Feb. 28, 1984, item no. 022854.
461. The base was designed to provide labor, warehouses, cargo yards, and spaces for boats
and helicopters. Supply Bases Set Up in South China for Offshore Oil Operations, XGONS,
Feb. 19, 1984, item no. 021952.
462. Id.
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has come only at a price. The administration found that it constantly has
had to defend the SEZ program and the open door policy against wide-
spread domestic criticism. Furthermore, the administration has been
forced to expend a great deal of energy combatting corruption and other
societal problems which have been a byproduct of zone activities.
Discussions of the merits of the open door policy and its implemen-
tation through the SEZs began in the late 1970's. Those discussions have
evolved into comparisons between the current situation and the treaty
port period of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.467 Critics charge
that the SEZs are similar to the westernization period of the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries when the Chinese leadership arguably betrayed
the country and permitted foreigners to set up capitalistic enclaves in the
treaty ports. Supporters of the open door policy and the SEZs agree that
the westernization movement compromised China's sovereignty, but ar-
gue that, in the long run, the movement benefitted China economically
and politically. SEZ supporters believe the SEZs will produce similar
benefits. They also believe that the current open door policy differs from
China's nineteenth and twentieth century policies because now China,
rather than the investors, controls the situation.468 Moreover, advocates
of the open policy argue that China can no longer "struggle in isolation"
but must continue the struggle through contact with "international
capitalists."46 9
While officials believe an open door policy has improved China's
economy, they acknowledge that the open door has "also let in flies and
mosquitoes."470 For example, booming economies in the SEZs have cre-
ated problems. Increased investment in the SEZ has created more em-
ployment, a higher standard of living, and a greater demand for
1
467. Guangming Ribao on the Nature of Westernization Movement, FBIS Daily Rep., Oct.
10, 1980, at L8-LI4 [hereinafter Westernization Movement]; Wanbao on Qing Emperor's Re-
strictions on Foreign Contracts, FBIS Daily Rep., Oct. 8, 1980, at L5-L6; Wen HuiBao Reeval-
uates Late Qing Emperor, FBIS Daily Rep., Nov. 19, 1980, at 05-011.
468. Westernization Movement, supra note 467, at L13-15.
469. Advocates of the open door policy and the SEZs state that after the October Revolu-
tion Lenin advocated a system of state capitalism in which foreign capitalists were allowed to
have concessions in the Soviet Union. Lenin attributed certain value to these concessions: "If
we are not good at implementing the policy of concession or absorbing foreign capital with
enterprises run under the concession system, we will not be able to talk about adopting serious
and practical measures to improve our economic situation." But Lenin also stated: "Un-
doubtedly each concession means a new war. However, it is war waged in another field, that is
to say, in the economic field .... Concession does not mean peace but war. But it is a war
which brings about more benefits to us." Commentator Views Trade, Economic Crime, FBIS
Daily Rep., May 13, 1982, at K2.
470. See Fung, Guangdong Opens Its Doors to Capitalism But Finds Unsavory Elements
Come, Too, Wall St. J., June 11, 1982, at 21, col. 1.
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consumer goods. Because consumer goods are in short supply, the unsat-
isfied demand has led to inflation and economic crimes. In Guangdong
Province, inflation has already reached one hundred two percent (in
comparison to four to six percent outside the Province).47' Economic
crimes are a serious problem. For example, televisions, radios, and
watches are in great demand and are smuggled in from nearby Hong
Kong.472 Another economic crime is bribery. Business deals in the SEZs
reportedly go more smoothly if consumer products, such as color televi-
sion sets, change hands.473 Similarly, production in SEZ operations may
be increased if part of the operations' profits are paid over to the Chinese
foremen.47 "Speculation" in personal property is also prevalent and
consumer goods are imported freely and cheaply into a SEZ, then resold
in other areas at inflated prices.475
Officials have undertaken a number of programs to control crime,
including educating the populace to the dangers of the new capitalistic
enclaves.476 People have been counselled that a protracted struggle was
underway between "corruption by capitalist ideology" and "socialist ide-
ological opposition to corruption. '477 The government warned individu-
als to beware of the "capitalist sugar-coated bullets""47 and "spiritual
opium" '479 which might overcome the weak-willed. The government
warned that those engaged in smuggling and other criminal activities
were "parasites" who would be eliminated to "allow the open door policy
to bear rich fruits.
480
In addition to economic crimes, the SEZs have created other
problems. The high standard of living and the availability of consumer
goods and western conveniences have attracted many Chinese to the
471. Id. at 21, col. 1.
472. Id.
473. Weisskopf, Four Little Hong Kongs, Wash. Post, April 19, 1982, at A18, col. 2.
474. Id.
475. Fung, supra note 470, at 21, col. 2.
476. Id. One anti-corruption program initiated in 1982, and supported by Deng Xiaoping
himself, consisted of the highly publicized arrests of prominent officials who condoned corrup-
tion. Another program consisted of the grant of amnesty to all who had committed economic
crimes if they surrended. Two thousand, six hundred government officials subsequently sur-
rendered in Guangdong Provice. Id.
477. Commentator Views Trade, Economic Crime, supra note 469, at K2.
478. Id.
479. An example of such "spiritual opium" was said to be the "large number of porno-
graphic and reactionary audio and video tapes." Article Cites Corruption Imported from the
West, FBIS Daily Rep., April 22, 1982, at K3.
480. Be~ifng Ribao Views Open Door, Decadent Ideology, FBIS Daily Rep., Mar. 15, 1982,
at Rl, 2.
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SEZs.4 s8 To curtail immigration, China isolated the SEZs from the rest
of the country. For example, the Shenzhen SEZ is surrounded by sev-
enty million dollars of barbed-wire fence, the zone perimeter is patrolled
by guards, and customs officers check all goods entering and leaving the
zone.482 The zones also have created unrest among workers who have
found economic incentives more attractive than socialist ones. To com-
bat this, the government established the "Office for the Cultivation of
Spiritual Civilization" for the purpose of inculcating socialist values
through education. The Office recognizes, however, that it may no
longer be possible to control the full effects of "bourgeois influence.
4 83
The government has also increased border patrols to prevent dissatisfied
workers trained in the SEZs from slipping into Hong Kong or Macao.4 8 a
Although China was unprepared for the societal problems created by the
zones, it continues its commitment to the zones, apparently recognizing
that it must pay a price to attain its economic objectives.
While the SKIZ and, to a far lesser degree, the SEZs have been suc-
cessful in opening up China's economy, the success could have been more
marked in attracting foreign investment if the zones had been established
in a different manner. A 1972 United Nations Industrial Development
Organization (UNIDO) workshop on free trade zones outlined a proce-
dure for establishing a free trade zone. 85 First, a country must enact
enabling legislation that clearly states the program objective and estab-
lishes guidelines for the types of operations permitted in the zone.48 6 The
legislation should also enumerate the customs and non-customs benefits
of conducting business in the zones.487 In planning a zone, a country
should consider the physical requirements of zone operations and pro-
vide basic infrastructure.88 Finally, after establishing free trade zones, a
country must ensure that the zones are properly administered and do not
481. To illustrate how dramatic the influx of people into the SEZ has been, the population
of Shenzhen multiplied by five times from 1979-1982. Weiskopf, supra note 473, at A18, col.
1.
482. Ching, China's Shenzhen Gives Capitalism a Shot at Success, Asian Wall St. J., Aug.
13, 1982, at 1, col. 3.
483. It is now said in the province that "once you've tasted caviar, you can't go back to
salted fish and vegetables." Weiskopf, supra note 473, at A19, col. 4.
484. Muir, New Laws, Old Problems, AMCHAM, Feb. 1981, at 21.
485. United Nations Industrial Development Organization, Training Worksh9p in Indus-
trial Free Zones as Incentives to Promote Export-Oriented Industries, Shannon International
Free Airport, Republic of Ireland, March 5-16, 1972. A paper outlining observations from
that workshop appears in J. DA PONTE, supra note 115.
486. A variety of considerations were put forth by this workshop, only a few of which are
discussed here. J. DA PONTE, supra note 115, at 11-12.
487. Id. at 12.
488. Id. at 13.
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become mere loopholes in the country's customs system.48 9
In establishing and administering its zones, China clearly violated
the UNIDO principles. First, enabling legislation for the SEZs was am-
biguous and vague. Although government officials produced more
specific guidelines, these guidelines generally raised more questions than
they answered. As a result, foreign investors avoided major
commitments.
Second, in planning the SEZs, China did not coordinate the zone
programs with the country's other laws and policies. For example, the
zone regulations stated that individuals could own interest in property.
This provision, however, was not reconciled with the constitution, which
prohibits individual ownership of property. Also, after the SKIZ was
officially brought within the SEZ regulations, no effort was made to re-
solve conflicts between the regulations and the SKIZ Handbook.
Third, the Chinese SEZs lacked adequate infrastructure to support
the types of industries Chinese officials sought to attract. Fourth, the
SEZs developed leaks so that foreign goods slipped from the SEZs into
other areas of the country. Although China has erected physical barriers
to prevent the infiltration of foreign goods, this process has been costly
and time-consuming.
E. The Latest Chapter
The first word that the SEZs as a whole may not be achieving their
original objectives came from Deng Xiaoping in mid-1985. Deng told a
group visiting China on June 29, 1985, that he hoped the Shenzhen SEZ
would succeed, "but if it fails, we can draw lessons from it."' 490 Some
days later on July 3, Deng told visiting Turkish Prime Minister Turgut
Ozal that China's economic reform, which included the SEZs, was sim-
ply "a bold experiment," but that he remained convinced that it would
be successful.4 91 While the statements of China's leader created a stir in
Hong Kong, observers believed that Deng made these comments to pre-
empt further domestic criticism that the SEZs and the economic reform
measures as a whole were doomed to failure.
492
At about the same time, it became evident that China had just ex-
perienced a record trade deficit (US $7.83 billion for the period of Sep-
489. Id. at 14.
490. Bonavia, A Failed Semantic Experiment, FAR E. ECON. REV., July 18, 1985, at 95.
The group consisted of an Algerian delegation headed by Mohamed Cheret Messadia. Id.
491. Id. at 95-96.
492. Id. at 96.
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tember 1984 to June 1985), 491 which forced it to draw down its precious
foreign exchange reserves. Responsible for this deficit was an import and
consumer goods mania which had swept the country, of which the spe-
cial economic zones had played a pivotal role.4 94
It was discovered that the Shenzhen zone, China's model zone at
one time, had much to do with the country's economic turmoil. Instead
of attracting foreign capital and producing goods for export (which
would have prevented a trade deficit and would have increased China's
foreign exchange reserves), zone enterprises in Shenzhen had been at-
tracting domestic capital by selling goods, particularly imported goods, to
Chinese purchasers.495 The zone had become the nations' shopping
center. Purchasers, most of whom were well-connected in China's bu-
reaucracy, came from all over the country to exchange their renminbi on
the black market to buy the consumer goods that were in great demand
back home. It was determined that in 1984, seventy percent, and in the
first half of 1985, eighty percent of the zone's output was going to the
domestic market. 496 By allowing this to occur on such a scale, China was
guaranteeing Shenzhen's failure as a trade zone.
Turning Shenzhen's "inward-looking" economy to an "outward-
looking" one, as it should have been all along, required a solution as
complex as the problem. China could not simply impose a blanket ban
on domestic retail sales because such a ban would have been met with
great resistance from well-connected individuals and officials who had an
interest in the zone's burgeoning retail trade. Furthermore, any such ban
may have sent the zone into an economic tailspin and ultimate failure. It
was this last point which China's administration sought desperately to
avoid as the zones, and particularly the Shenzhen zone, were intended to
demonstrate that China was savvy enough to handle limited capitalism
and, in the long run, Hong Kong's wide-open economy.49 7
To demonstrate the concern which the Shenzhen zone's economic
health had generated, Shenzhen's mayor was replaced,498 Deng Xiaoping
took time out from his winter vacation to visit the Shenzhen SEZ,4 99 and
a ten-day conference in Beijing was convened by Gu Mu, China's over-
493. Do Rosario, Time to Pay the Piper, FAR E. ECON. REV., Aug. 22, 1985, at 95.
494. Id.
495. Do Rosario, Into the Red Zone, FAR E. ECON. REV., Sept. 19, 1985 at 61.
496. Id. at 63.
497. Id.
498. The former mayor of Shenzhen, Liang Xiang, was replaced by Li Hao, a one-time
deputy secretary of the State Council who had worked with Gu Mu, the State Councillor who
oversees all of the SEZs. Id. at 61.
499. Bonavia, Reorienting Outwards, FAR E. ECON. REV., Feb. 6, 1986, at 34.
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seer of all of the economic zones, in late December 1985, to study the
zone problem."° While the Shenzhen SEZ was given a reprieve by the
conference, the question of the true value of the zones and, in particular,
the Shenzhen zone, remains a hotly debated topic.01
V. CONCLUSION
In the last few decades, China has established trade zones to achieve
certain economic and modernization objectives. Although other coun-
tries have also adopted trade zones, the zones have particular significance
for China because of its relatively young age and socialist character.
Noteworthy in China's trade zone pursuit is the ambiguity and vagueness
of the laws which China chose to implement the zone concept. This
harmful character indicates that those who pushed for the development
of the zones lacked the confidence in the concept to push for the needed
hard and fast rules. The ambiguous and vague laws thus provided nego-
tiating space.
While the SKIZ and other zones are causing an economic revolution
in China, they are also causing a "cultural revolution." This time, how-
ever, the "cultural revolution" is different from Mao's cultural revolu-
tion-it will not purge China of western concepts and institutions-
rather it will facilitate the assimilation into China of western concepts
and institutions.
500. Do Rosario, The Shenzhen SEZ: The Cleansing of a Cornerstone, FAR E. ECON.
REV., March 20, 1986, at 103.
501. Id. at 104.
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